Opinion
November 3, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Finnegan, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the four sentences imposed for the offenses of which the defendant was not convicted; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the hearing court properly determined that he lacked standing to contest the legality of the search of the vehicle which he was operating immediately before his arrest. The defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, which was owned by and had been stolen from another individual (see, People v. Strunkey, 202 A.D.2d 610; People v. Cherena, 177 A.D.2d 638; People v. Gittens, 110 A.D.2d 908). Furthermore, the defendant concedes that the police possessed probable cause to place him under arrest.
The defendant's challenge to the adequacy of the factual basis for his Alford plea ( see, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25) is unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Mackey, 77 N.Y.2d 846; People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662; People v. Pellegrino, 60 N.Y.2d 636). In any event, the contention is without merit, since the record demonstrates that his plea of guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree was knowing and voluntary and was neither improvident nor baseless ( see, People v. Doceti, 175 A.D.2d 256; People v Bruno, 74 A.D.2d 577).
We discern no error in the court's imposition of an enhanced sentence upon the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree based on the defendant's failure to appear on the scheduled sentencing date ( see, People v. Koslow, 160 A.D.2d 954; People v. Gamble, 111 A.D.2d 869). Moreover, the sentence is not unduly harsh or excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
However, the four additional terms imposed by the sentencing court for criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (two counts), unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree must be vacated, since the defendant never pleaded guilty to those offenses.
Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Luciano, JJ., concur.