Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA082113
THE COURT:Jay Curtis Brooks appeals from the judgment entered following his guilty plea to robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, count 1), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a), count 2) and misdemeanor possession of an opium pipe (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a), count 3). His request for a certificate of probable cause was denied. Appellant admitted seven prior felony convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), two prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) and a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). After denying appellant’s Romero motion, the trial court sentenced him to a term of 25-years-to-life on count 1 and a concurrent 25-years-to-life term on count 2. It dismissed count 3 in furtherance of justice under section 1385 and struck the two 5-year priors under section 667, subdivision (a). Appellant’s convictions were based upon the following facts:
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
On November 18, 2005, at approximately 8:00 a.m., appellant entered the Jack in the Box on San Pedro Street, in Los Angeles. When the person at the counter, Lourdes Ortiz, asked for his order, he pointed a toy gun at her and demanded the money in the cash register. Ortiz opened the register and appellant reached over, took the money and left. A customer, Jose Canales, who was in his car at the drive-through window at the time of the robbery, followed appellant, who left in a red Corvette, and went to a local motel. Canales and Ortiz each independently identified appellant in a photographic six pack. He was also identified by them in a live lineup.
When appellant was arrested later that day, a glass cylinder pipe and a substance subsequently determined to be rock cocaine were found.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On October 1, 2007, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider.
On October 31, 2007, appellant filed a letter brief raising contentions, which we interpret to include claims that (1) his preplea requests for self-representation and his Marsden motion were improperly denied, thereby depriving him of his right to counsel, (2) his plea bargain was the result of duress because he was forced to accept the agreement or proceed to trial without an adequate opportunity to prepare and present a defense, and because he was required to admit prior convictions as part of an open plea, (3) he was denied an investigator and hence the right to counsel, (4) he was denied facilities and resources necessary to prepare a defense, (5) he was invidiously discriminated against by government, and (6) the trial court improperly denied his motion to vacate his plea agreement which he alleged was entered under duress.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
Generally, no appeal may be taken from a judgment of conviction on a plea of guilty or no contest. (People v. Hunter (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 37, 41.) Section 1237.5 establishes an exception to this general rule, providing that an appeal may be taken in such circumstances if a defendant “has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, [and] [t]he trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” (§ 1237.5, subds. (a) & (b); People v. Hunter, supra, at p.41; People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 955.)
Defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. Hence, he cannot raise any claim going to the validity of his guilty pleas, including claim No. 2 above, that his plea bargain was the result of duress, and claim No. 6, relating to the denial of his motion to vacate his plea. While the motion to vacate is a post-plea question, it is based upon the validity of the plea and is therefore not cognizable on appeal without a certificate of probable cause having been obtained. (See People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 62-63.)
The only issues which may be raised on appeal from a conviction based on a guilty plea without obtaining a certificate of probable cause are claims relating to the validity of a search or seizure and issues relating to the court’s post-plea determination of degree of crime and punishment to be imposed. (People v. Hoffard (1995)10 Cal.4th1170, 1178, fn. 6.) A post-plea question not challenging the validity of a guilty plea is an issue that may be raised on appeal after a guilty plea without a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1100.) But issues going to guilt or innocence are not cognizable on appeal without satisfying section 1237.5. (People v. Hoffard, supra, at p. 1178.)
None of appellant’s contentions are within the narrow category of claims that may be raised on appeal from a guilty plea without a certificate of probable cause. With regard to claim No. 1, respecting the denial of appellant’s Marsden motion, the claim was waived when appellant entered his pleas. (People v. Lovings (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1310-1311 [claim of improper denial of Marsden motion waived by guilty plea where no claim plea was unintelligent or involuntary].) Moreover, his request to represent himself was granted shortly after it was denied. Appellant has not clearly indicated the basis for his claim of governmental invidious discrimination. Claim Nos. 3 and 4 were waived as they challenge appellant’s guilt.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The order under review is affirmed.