Opinion
No. 337948
04-12-2018
UNPUBLISHED Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 14-000858-FC Before: SAWYER, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and MURRAY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was originally sentenced, as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 40 to 60 years for armed robbery, 20 to 40 years for first-degree home invasion, and 57 to 120 months for felon-in-possession, and to a consecutive two-year term for felony-firearm. Defendant appealed, and this Court affirmed his convictions, but remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), and to correct an error in the scoring of offense variable (OV) 8. On remand, the trial court corrected the errors and resentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 427 to 720 months for armed robbery, 20 to 40 years for first-degree home invasion, and 75 to 120 months for felon-in-possession, and to a consecutive two-year term for felony-firearm. He now appeals as of right. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his felon-in-possession sentence amounts to an unreasonable and disproportionate upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range. Due to the current advisory nature of the guidelines, a sentencing court may "depart from that guidelines range without articulating substantial or compelling reasons for doing so." Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. "A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness." Id. "[T]he standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness on appeal is abuse of discretion." People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017).
The trial court's minimum sentence of 75 months for defendant's felon-in-possession conviction exceeded the applicable guidelines range by 18 months. Thus, we must review the sentence for reasonableness. A departing sentence is reasonable if it satisfies the "principle of proportionality" as set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 471-472. The principle of proportionality " 'helps to fulfill the overall legislative scheme of criminal punishment by taking care to assure that the sentences imposed across the discretionary range are proportionate to the seriousness of the matters that come before the court for sentencing.' " Id. at 472, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 651.
When departing from the guidelines, then, a sentencing court must " 'justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,' " Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 470, quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, by explaining why "a departure sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range," People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; ___ NW2d ___ (2017). In so doing, it must consider the sentencing guidelines, Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474-475, as well as "the nature of the offense and the background of the offender, Id. at 472 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Other factors that may also be considered include: " '(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant's misconduct while in custody, the defendant's expressions of remorse, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation.' " People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 352-353; 901 NW2d 142 (2017), quoting People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 46; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), rev'd in part on other grounds by Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453 (2017). Further, a sentencing court must provide adequate reasons for the extent of its departure. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476.
Beyond stating generally that defendants are responsible for the actions of their codefendants and that the trial in this case was "pretty horrible," the trial court provided no explanation for its felon-in-possession departure sentence. Instead, it simply inquired as to whether the sentence violated the two-thirds rule. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the principle of proportionality to defendant's sentence for felon-in-possession, as it failed to justify the sentence imposed or provide adequate reasons for the extent of its departure. See Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476.
Nevertheless, we need not remand for resentencing. As defendant's felon-in-possession sentence runs concurrent to his armed robbery and first-degree home invasion sentences, the court's error will have no effect on his prison time and is, therefore, harmless. See People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 690-692; 854 NW2d 205 (2014) (holding that guidelines ranges need not be calculated for lower-crime-class offenses when those sentences will be served concurrently with sentences for higher-class offenses).
Defendant also argues that the trial court did not properly take into consideration the federal reasonableness factors set forth in People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), rev'd in part by Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453 (2017), when it determined his remaining sentences. However, the Steanhouse Court rejected this reasoning from Masroor, and "decline[d] to import the approach to reasonableness review used by the federal courts[.]" Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 460, 473-474.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
People v Bridgeman, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 26, 2016 (Docket No. 327102).