Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR125247
Swager, Judge.
After denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, he was convicted following a jury trial of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The trial court found that defendant suffered a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)), and served six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of nine years. In this appeal he renews his challenge to his detention and the warrantless search and seizure of evidence. We conclude that detention and search of defendant and his vehicle were lawful, and affirm the judgment.
Our recitation of the facts is limited to the evidence pertinent to the detention and search, and is taken from the hearing on the motion to suppress.
Officer Christopher Pacheco of the St. Helena Police Department was on patrol in a marked police unit on the night of October 18, 2005, when he observed defendant’s vehicle proceeding directly in front of him northbound on Main Street. The officer noticed that the car had October 2005 registration tags. After he verified that the vehicle registration had expired two days before, officer Pacheco initiated a traffic stop.
Defendant promptly pulled his vehicle to the curb, but appeared to be “agitated” and frustrated “after being pulled over.” He “threw his hands up” in frustration. He also attempted to “get out of the car immediately,” so the officer asked him to “stay in the car.” Defendant then sat in the driver’s seat, but continued to keep his feet outside the vehicle. The officer asked defendant repeatedly to “place his feet back in the vehicle,” and he finally did so.
Once defendant was seated and the car door was closed, officer Pacheco asked him for a driver’s license. Defendant stated that he “did not have a driver’s license and knew he should not be driving a motor vehicle.” He produced “the only ID he had,” a California Department of Corrections card, although he was aware he shouldn’t “have that card as well.” Defendant also shared with the officer that “he had just gotten out of prison four months ago and had been incarcerated for possession of approximately quarter pound of marijuana.”
As he looked inside the vehicle, officer Pacheco noticed it “was very cluttered” with a “lot of tools and stereo equipment.” Defendant stated that he “recently purchased the car in Richmond approximately four days ago,” and claimed the items inside were “all his.” Officer Pacheco testified that defendant “appeared very nervous, his hands were shaking,” and he was “fidgeting.” He repeatedly asked the officer “to just be cut a break.”
Officer Pacheco checked with dispatch on the status of defendant’s license and registration. He also contacted a cover officer. Dispatch confirmed the defendant was “unlicensed” and the car registration had expired. Officer Pacheco decided to tow the car and conduct an inventory search. For “safety reasons,” he decided to place defendant in the patrol car. Although defendant was informed that he was not under arrest, he became “very agitated and very reluctant to sit in the patrol car.” His pupils “appeared to be restricted;” he continued to exhibit “extreme shakes in his hands.” Officer Pacheco suspected that defendant “was under the influence of controlled substance based on the dilation of his pupils and demeanor.”
Outside the patrol vehicle, officer Pacheco asked defendant to remove his hands from his sweatshirt pockets. When he did so, the officer observed “a hypodermic syringe within his pocket.” Inside the syringe was clear liquid, which the officer believed from his training and experience “to be methamphetamine.” Defendant was immediately placed under arrest. In response to the officer’s question, defendant stated “that he had over a hundred syringes in the vehicle and that they were for a friend of his that [sic] was diabetic.” A search of the car ensued, which resulted in seizure of syringes, methamphetamine powder in baggies, and drug paraphernalia. Approximately 18 minutes passed from the moment the officer first observed defendant’s vehicle until the arrest occurred.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that his detention was “impermissibly extended” while the officer conducted an investigation. He claims that the initial reason for the detention – that is, the expiration of the vehicle registration, and the discovery of the lack of a “valid driver’s license” – did not justify the continued, “additional investigation” by the officer. His position is that the “unduly prolonged” investigation transformed the valid traffic stop into an unlawful detention.
“ ‘In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In evaluating whether the fruits of a search or seizure should have been suppressed, we consider only the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.” (People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, 1113–1114, fn. omitted; see also People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279; People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496.)
I. The Initial Detention .
Defendant does not dispute that the initial detention was lawful. “[W]hen there is articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, the vehicle may be stopped and the driver detained in order to check his or her driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1135.)
II. The Duration and Scope of the Detention .
We turn to an examination of the duration and scope of the detention. The judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a detention, “ ‘is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1341; see also People v. Brown, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496.) An investigative detention must only last for a period of time that is necessary to accomplish its purpose and must be conducted in the least intrusive manner required to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions. (People v. Gorrostieta (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 71, 82.) Our Supreme Court had held that “ ‘[an] officer may temporarily detain [an] offender at the scene for the period of time necessary to discharge the duties that he incurs by virtue of the . . . stop.’ ” (People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 765, quoting People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584.) “ ‘ “[T]he stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.’ ” Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 675; see also United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682; People v. Brown, supra, at p. 499.)
“An investigatory stop exceeds constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible. [Citation.] Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. [Citation.] There is no set time limit for a permissible investigative stop; the question is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101–102.) “ ‘The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” [Citations.] In making our determination, we examine “the totality of the circumstances” in each case.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463; see also People v. Thurman (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 824.)
Defendant has no grounds to complain of the officer’s investigation of the status of his vehicle registration or driver’s license. Following the lawful vehicle detention, the officer was entitled to demand production of defendant’s driver’s license and registration, to remove defendant from the car and to expand the scope of the detention when defendant failed to produce the required documents. (People v. Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.)
A further detention would have been unwarranted had defendant produced a valid registration and driver’s license, but he did not. (Cf. People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577, 581; Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 353; United States v. McSwain (10th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 558, 561.) The discovery that defendant, the sole occupant of the car, had neither a current registration nor a valid driver’s license, furnished grounds for an expanded detention and intrusion. Officer Pacheco testified that in accordance with “standard practice” he decided to undertake an inventory search of the car at the detention scene before it was towed. Under the circumstances, the officer reasonably exercised his discretion to impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search to secure the car and its contents. (See Veh. Code, § 22651, subd. (p); Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371; People v. Saunders, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1135–1136; People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372–375; People v. Trejo (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 460, 462-463; People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 327–328; U.S. v. Wanless (9th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2d 1459, 1463.)
Additional suspicious circumstances also warranted further investigation. An officer may continue to detain a person as part of an investigatory stop when the officer’s suspicions are heightened by facts uncovered during the investigation. (People v. Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101–105.) Here, the officer learned within a few minutes after the detention that defendant had very recently “gotten out of prison,” and observed that the interior of the car cluttered with “tools and stereo equipment.” Defendant was also visibly shaking, fidgeting, quite agitated, and somewhat reluctant to cooperate with the officer. The time taken to run a warrant and probation check on defendant – not more than five or ten minutes, according to officer Pacheco – and to determine whether the vehicle or any of its contents were stolen – another “several minutes” – was entirely justified by the facts presented to the officer. (People v. Valencia, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918-919.)
The officer also acted reasonably in first asking defendant to sit in the police vehicle while an inventory search was conducted, then directing defendant to remove his hands from his sweatshirt pockets. Given defendant’s overtly suspicious behavior and the observation by the officer of objective symptoms that he “was under the influence of controlled substance,” those minimally intrusive measures were warranted by considerations of officer safety. (Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117-118; People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375; People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 484; People v. Wilborn (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 339, 348.) The detention was not illegally prolonged. (People v. Wilborn, supra, at p. 348.) The observation of a syringe in defendant’s pocket then furnished cause for an arrest and search. (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 375; People v. Wilborn, supra, at p. 348; People v. Calvert (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1829.) The trial court therefore did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Stein, J.