Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCD188372 Frederick Maguire, Judge.
McCONNELL, P. J.
Aaron D. Bonin was found guilty by a jury of battery committed by gassing on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243.9, subd. (a)), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery on a peace officer with injury (§ 243, subd. (c)(1). He admitted he had a prior conviction that qualified as a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). He was sentenced to a total term of seven years.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Bonin contends the waiver of his right to counsel was inadequate because the court failed to review with him the maximum possible sentence or the nature of the charges. He also contends the court should have denied his motion for self-representation. We find no error.
The Sixth Amendment gives an accused the right of self-representation. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 833-834 (Faretta); People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 369.) A trial court must grant a request for self-representation if the defendant makes a timely request, is mentally competent, and his request is knowingly and intelligently made after having been appraised of the dangers of self-representation. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 931-932.) "No particular form of words . . . is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. ' "The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case." ' " (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140.) The record as a whole includes any written forms advising the defendant about self-representation. (People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 719.)
Bonin was present at his preliminary hearing where testimony was given showing the factual basis of the charges and where the nature and factual basis of the charged counts was discussed by the attorneys and the court. In prior mental competency proceedings, it was determined that Bonin understood the nature of the charges, including their factual basis.
At the outset of the self-representation hearing, Bonin went over a written form containing advisements about the right to self-representation with the assistance of his counsel. Bonin initialed and signed the written form including statements of the charges — "PC 243.9(a), PC 245(a)(1), [and] PC 243(c)(1)" — and of the maximum punishment that could be imposed — 12 years 4 months.
At the hearing, Bonin acknowledged he had initialed the items on the form. When the court asked if Bonin had any questions, Bonin only asked if there was "some kind of booklet" that would tell him how to prepare for trial. The court responded to this question and advised Bonin of the dangers of self-representation.
The record as a whole shows Bonin was informed of the maximum possible sentence, informed of the factual basis of the charges, understood the nature of the proceedings and was thoroughly advised of the dangers of self-representation. Under these circumstances, we conclude his waiver of his right to counsel was adequate.
Bonin also contends Faretta was wrongly decided and that a court should not be precluded from denying a motion for self-representation even when there is a valid waiver of the right to counsel. However, as Bonin acknowledges, we are bound by the Faretta decision. He raises the issue only to preserve his right to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court that would seek to overturn Faretta.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, J., IRION, J.