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People v. Benson

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District.
Nov 20, 2003
No. H025538 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)

Opinion

H025538.

11-20-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEBRA LYNN BENSON, Defendant and Appellant.


After her suppression motion was denied, defendant Debra Benson agreed to plead guilty to possessing methamphetamine, a controlled substance, for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) A second charge of possessing a pipe for smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) was dismissed. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. Among the probation conditions were that she serve six months in the county jail and submit to chemical testing by her probation officer and search by any peace officer.

On appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence against her. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5. subd. (m).) For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment.

THE SUPPRESSION HEARING

The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing.

On January 24, 2002, Santa Clara Police Officer Bob Henderson learned that defendant was staying in a Santa Clara motel room with a man and a child and that there was a warrant for defendants arrest for driving without a license. The following day at 9:42 p.m. Officer Henderson went to the room with Officers Meechum and Layton to execute the warrant. Meechum knocked on the door. Defendants 12-year-old daughter opened the door. Meechum and Henderson stepped inside the room. Meechum announced that they were there to serve the warrant.

Defendant points out that the trial judge once misstated the daughters age.

Defendant was lying on the furthest of the two beds in the motel room. She approached the door at Meechums request. Henderson handcuffed defendant at the door while Meechum looked inside the motel room. Defendant was nervous and fidgety. Her eyes reacted slowly. She appeared to be under the influence of a stimulant.

Hendersons testimony was equivocal about whether defendant was handcuffed just inside the motel room door or outside the door. His usual practice is to have the person step outside. At first he recalled doing so in this case. After reviewing his report he recalled that he must have stepped just inside. Defendant acknowledges that this conflict is not material to the issues on appeal.

Meechum called Hendersons attention to a cut straw on the bed that defendant had occupied. On the floor in front of the bed was a burned marijuana cigarette. When Henderson entered the room he saw a black purse at the foot of the bed that defendant had occupied. Inside the purse he found a glass pipe of the type commonly used to smoke contraband and a plastic baggie containing what appeared to be methamphetamine. Next to the purse was a q-tip container. Inside that clear container were two baggies containing what appeared to be methamphetamine. On the dresser was another burned marijuana cigarette. On top of the nightstand was a digital scale. In the nightstand between the two beds were a red pouch containing plastic baggies and a small scale like those used to weigh narcotics.

At defendants request the police called a relative who came to take care of defendants daughter.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion, stating: "My view of this it is probably a search incident to a valid arrest[.] Even if not, officers clearly have an obligation to respond to the welfare of a minor child. I dont see any sort of pretext of using an arrest to search. If they had not basically taken action to secure and make sure the welfare of the minor child is protected they would have suffered the consequences for not doing that, so I think logic and common sense shows [sic] that their conduct and actions in this case did not violate any Fourth Amendment right of the defendant."

THE MERITS OF THE SUPPRESSION MOTION

On appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion.

"In reviewing the trial courts denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial courts ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We independently review the trial courts application of the law to the facts." (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969.) "In conducting our independent review, we are concerned with the correctness of the ruling, not the trial courts reasoning." (People v. Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 951 (Zichwic.)

Since the officers had an arrest warrant for defendant, when they saw defendant in a motel room, they were justified in entering the room to execute the warrant. An arrest warrant authorizes a police officer to enter a residence when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is on the premises. (Pen. Code, § 844; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 632-633; People v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 164 (LeBlanc), and cases there cited [entry into motel room].) An arrest warrant does not justify an officers brushing past the suspect in order to search for contraband. (United States v. Albrektsen (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 951, 954.) Contrary to defendants argument, the record in this case does not indicate that the officers used the arrest warrant as a pretext to search the premises. They did not brush past defendant to search the motel room.

Since the officers were lawfully in the motel room, it did not amount to a search for them to see in plain view the cut straw and burned marijuana cigarette. (Zichwic, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) Having seen contraband in plain view, they were entitled to seize it. (LeBlanc, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165-166.) The plain view of the cigarette led Officer Henderson to the foot of the bed, where he also saw the purse and a q-tip container in which two baggies of methamphetamine were visible. However, the observation of contraband without more did not justify the officers in searching the premises for more contraband without obtaining a warrant. (LeBlanc, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 167.) In other words, the plain view did not allow Officer Henderson to search defendants purse and find a narcotics pipe and another baggie of methamphetamine.

The trial court concluded that the search was justified as an incident to defendants arrest. People v. Ingham (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 326 (Ingham) set forth the applicable law at pages 330-331. " `It is settled Fourth Amendment doctrine that a police officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestees person and of the area into which the arrestee might reach to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence. (United States v. Burnette (9th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 1038, 1049.) Such searches may be made whether or not there is probable cause to believe the arrestee may have a weapon or is about to destroy evidence. (United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 14.) `The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the "immediate control" area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved. [Citations.] However, warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the "search is remote in time or place from the arrest," [citation], or no exigency exists. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) Once law enforcement officers have reduced personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. (Id. at p. 15.)

"Here, the property at issue is defendants purse. The ` "search incident to arrest" rule has been interpreted to include a womans purse as a normal extension of the person subject to search as an item "customarily carried by an arrested person . . . [and] within the area of her immediate control." (People v. Flores (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 221, 230.) Further, so long as the purse is in use by the arrestee at the time of her arrest, it does not need to be on her person at that moment to be subject to search. (People v. Belvin (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 955, 958.)"

A search must be truly incident to the arrest to be justified by the arrest. In Ingham, the police went to the defendants house to execute an arrest warrant for her. After the police told the defendant she was under arrest, they allowed her to retrieve a small wallet from inside a large wallet that was inside her purse. (Ingham, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329-330.) At this point, according to the appellate court, the police could have searched her purse incident to her arrest. "The purse was in use by defendant and was located on the floor of the room where the arrest took place, i.e. within the area of her immediate control." (Id. at p. 331.) However, the police did not search her purse at the time. The officer handcuffed the defendant and took her and her purse into the patrol car. The officer did not search the defendants purse until they arrived at the police station. (Id. at p. 330.) By this time, since the purse and the defendant were within the officers exclusive control, the search no longer qualified as incident to her arrest. (Id. at pp. 332-333.)

Defendant argues that the search of her purse could not be justified as incident to her arrest when she was already "handcuffed and in custody at the doorway." She relies on People v. Mendoza (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1127. In that case the police arrested three men in the bathroom of a house on suspicion of possessing cocaine. (Id. at p. 1129.) The police then brought one of the men, the defendant, into the presence of a shoulder bag that he had carried into the house and searched the bag. (Id. at p. 1132.) The appellate court concluded: "Returning to the original rationale of Chimel [v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752], we cannot condone the search of the bag under its holding. The arrestees could not have obtained a weapon or destroyed contraband in the shoulder bag from the place they were brought under police control, the bathroom." (Id. at p. 1132.)

In this case, unlike the facts in Mendoza, we believe that defendants purse remained in her immediate control though she walked several steps away from it at Officer Meechums request. As stated in People v. Belvin, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 955: "We conclude that defendants purse, apparently in use by her at the time of her arrest, legally amounted to an extension of her person and could be searched on her arrest. Whether the search of the purse took place before or after defendants physical removal to another room we consider wholly fortuitous." (Id. at p. 959.) We conclude that, to the extent there was a search of defendants motel room and not merely observation of contraband in plain view, the search was justified as incident to defendants arrest.

In light of this conclusion we need not reach the alternate ground relied on by the trial court, namely, that the search was justified in order to render aid to defendants minor daughter as one of the " `community caretaking functions " of the police. (See People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 467 [plurality].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: WUNDERLICH, J., MIHARA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Benson

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District.
Nov 20, 2003
No. H025538 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Benson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEBRA LYNN BENSON, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District.

Date published: Nov 20, 2003

Citations

No. H025538 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)