Opinion
Docket No. 06110005
12-12-2022
The People of the State of New York v. Dalvin Beltran, Defendant.
For the People: John E. Bach, Esq., Town of Deerpark Special Prosecutor For the Defendant: Zev Goldstein, Esq., Law Offices of Zev Goldstein, PLLC
For the People: John E. Bach, Esq., Town of Deerpark Special Prosecutor
For the Defendant: Zev Goldstein, Esq., Law Offices of Zev Goldstein, PLLC
Hon. Michael J. Worden, Town Justice.
The following papers were read and considered by the Court in deciding this motion:
Papers Numbered
Notice of Motion 1
Affirmation in Support 2
Affidavit of Defendant in Support 3
Exhibits 4-5
Proposed Order 6
Affirmation in Opposition 7
Reply Affirmation in Support of Motion 8
Procedural History
Defendant filed a motion with this Court to vacate his 2006 guilty plea to a violation of §1180B of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York entered on November 27, 2006, in the Deerpark Town Court. Defendant asserts, inter alia, that his lifetime driving privileges in the State of New York are permanently revoked because he has accumulated more than twenty points within a twenty-five-year period, pursuant to a rule promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles in 2012. Defendant states that, had he known that such a plea would subject him to a lifetime revocation, he would not have pled guilty to the speeding violation. The People, by way of an Affirmation of Opposition, filed by John E. Bach, Jr., Esq., oppose the motion and request the relief sought by defendant be denied. Defendant filed a Reply Affirmation to the People's opposition.
Findings of Fact
Defendant was issued a Simplified Traffic Information on or about October 29, 2006, for speeding, 69 mph in a 55mph zone, in violation of §1180B of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the charge by mail and was fined $125.00 with a $55.00 surcharge. As a result of his guilty plea, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles assessed four (4) points on his driving license. The original ticket was later physically disposed of by the Town Clerk of the Town of Deerpark pursuant to the approval of the Office of Court Administration. An electronic record of the docket is maintained in this Court's management software.
On September 25, 2012, 15 NYCRR 136 was amended to impose a 25 year "look back" period which authorized the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles [herein after referred to as "the Commissioner"] to deny an application for relicensing under specific, enumerated circumstances. Relevant herein is supra 136.5(b)(2) which authorizes the Commissioner to deny relicensing if "the person has three of four alcohol or drug related driving convictions or incidents in any combination within the 25 year look back period and, in addition, has one or more serious driving offenses within the 25 year look back period" (supra at 136.5(b)(2)). A serious driving offense includes "20 or more points from any violations" (supra at 136.5 (a)(2)(iv)).
According to defendant's lifetime driving abstract, he has three (3) alcohol related convictions, to wit:
May 5, 2009, in Sullivan County, Town of Liberty
October 25, 2001, Orange County, U.S.M.A. West Point Court
September 5, 2001, Orange County, Village of Washingtonville
Additionally, defendant has accumulated a total of 35 points between May 21, 1997, and November 27, 2006. The lookback period, pursuant to the rules of the Commissioner, commences "25 years before the date of the revocable offense" (supra at 136.5 (a)(3)). Here, defendant's revocable offense was a conviction on May 5, 2009, for operating a motor vehicle with.08% or more alcohol in blood, making the lookback period commencing on May 5, 2009, and looking back 25 years to May 5, 1984. Accordingly, all of the defendant's 35 accumulated points fall within the 25 year look back period.
Under the Commissioner's rules as promulgated in 15 NYCRR at 136.5(b)(2), the combination of defendant's alcohol related convictions and accumulated points make him ineligible for relicensing in the State of New York.
Analysis
In the present matter before the Court, defendant seeks to vacate his guilty plea which resulted in a conviction entered on or about November 27, 2006. In the motion filed with this Court, defendant concedes to the facts of the case, and elaborates that "he understood that the ticket carried 4 points, and that his drivers' license would not be suspended until he reached 11 points." In support of the motion, defendant raises several issues in support of his motion to vacate the judgment:
1. Defendant "never dreamed that he could receive a lifetime drivers' license revocation predicated on this conviction." Defendant "did not understand that his plea of guilty would cause a lifetime revocation." Defendant pled guilty "to this speeding ticket without any notice of a potential lifetime driver's license revocation."
2. The defendant's accumulated points and combination of alcohol related convictions subject him to the "draconian lifetime consequence" of being ineligible for relicensing.
3. "To the extent that original records are no longer available, this prejudice should be charged to the State, not to the Defendant."
4. Defendant's loss of driving privileges "have critically hurt his ability to earn a livelihood."
Furthermore, defendant affirmed that he "would not have pled guilty if [he] would have known that [his] license would be revoked forever." Further, defendant affirmed that the loss of "driving privileges have critically hurt [his] ability to earn a livelihood." Defendant also asserts that he has "recovered from alcoholism."
Relevant Law
§ 510 of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law affords the Commissioner the discretion to reissue a license that has been revoked. 15 NYCRR 136.1(a) identifies the intent of the Commissioner's rules as, inter alia, "keeping with his responsibility to provide meaningful safeguards for the general public who are users of the highways" and to establish "criteria to identify problem drivers, the application of which shall result in a presumption, in certain cases, that the involved driver would present a potential danger to himself or other users of the highway if allowed to be licensed or relicensed."
The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department addressed the changes to 15 NYCRR 136 in Argudo v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 149 A.D.3d 830, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017). In Argudo, petitioner/plaintiff Hugo Argudo, had three alcohol related offenses, and had accumulated 27 points on his driving record during the lookback period. Argudo was denied relicensing under the 2012 amendments, and a DMV Appeals Board subsequently upheld the denial. Argudo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 149 A.D.3d 830, 831, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017).
Hugo Argudo sought relief, which was ultimately denied, via a hybrid Article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action in the Nassau County Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that in denying relicensing, the "Department of Motor Vehicles and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (DMV) acted unconstitutionally, arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his application" Argudo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, No. 14258/13, 2014 WL 4481486 (NY Sup. Ct. June 30, 2014).
On appeal, the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the Department of Motor Vehicles did not usurp the legislature's authority by enacting the emergency regulations; the Department of Motor Vehicles had the statutory authority to enact the emergency regulations; the denial of defendant's application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; and denial of defendant's application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Argudo v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 149 A.D.3d 830, 832, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589 (2017).
The New York State Court of Appeals settled challenges to 15 NYCRR 136 in Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017). In Acevedo, the Court of Appeals considered appeals by three Appellants with multiple convictions for an alcohol related driving offense, "the third for petitioners Kevin B. Acevedo and Caralyn A. Matsen, and the sixth for petitioner Michael W. Carney." Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017).
The Court of Appeals, in Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017) , held that the regulations were not inconsistent with a recidivist drunk driver's statutory rights regarding relicensing; the regulations did not contravene DMV Commissioner's statutory mandate to exercise discretion on a case by case basis; the regulations did not encroach on legislature's fundamental policy-making responsibility, in violation of constitutional separation of powers; the regulations were not irrational with respect to treatment of prior offenses; the definition of "alcohol- or drug-related driving conviction or incident" was not irrationally underinclusive; and the regulations were civil in nature and therefore were not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause Acevedo v. New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 77 N.E.3d 331 (2017).
Coram Nobis
The legislature has codified coram nobis relief in Article 440 of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law. CPL §440.10 subdivision one provides a mechanism for persons convicted of an offense to petition the trial court to exercise its inherent power to set aside the judgment of conviction on the basis of several enumerated circumstances (CPL § 410.10 (1) [a-k])). Some cases, however, may not fit within the enumerated circumstances of CPL § 410.10 (1) [a-k]. Under these circumstances, an application to set aside a judgment of conviction may be made by relying upon the common law writ of coram nobis People v. Bachert , 69 N.Y.2d 593 [1987], 516 N.Y.S.2d. 623 [1987].
The legislature did not eliminate the common law writ of coram nobis with the enactment of §440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law. "In its modern context a motion for a writ presupposes a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights not appearing on the record, no negligence which could be attributed to the defendant for failure to have brought the alleged error to the attention of the court at the time of the trial, and further, that the current proceeding is not a substitute for a new trial, appeal or other statutory remedy (Frank, Coram Nobis, para. 3.01, at 23; 18 Am Jur 2d, Coram Nobis, § 12, at 632) [internal quotations omitted] People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593, 598, 509 N.E.2d 318, 321, 516 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626, 1987 NY LEXIS 16371. The Court of Appeals has expanded coram nobis in scope when necessary to "afford a defendant a remedy when no other avenue of judicial relief appeared available" People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77, 1961 NY LEXIS 1135.
Case Law
In support of his motion, Defendant refers to the decisions of eight courts that have ruled on the impact of 15 NYCRR 136 to specific individuals with lifetime revocations:
People v. Sora, 2021 NY Misc. LEXIS 3857 . (Greene County Court as a lower appellate court for the Third Dept., 3rd J.D.). Reversed the denial of coram nobis application in the Catskill Town Justice Court and dismissed a 1989 conviction of VTL § 1110-a in the interests of justice.
People v. Velte, 61 Misc.3d 331, 332, 81 N.Y.S.3d 723, 724, 2018 NY Misc. LEXIS 3569, 2018 NY Slip Op 28258, 1 (Poughkeepsie City Court). Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty to speeding because he could not have been aware that his plea would result in the permanent revocation of his driver's license fourteen years later as a result of new DMV regulations imposed after the plea that would have a grave impact upon defendant's ability to maintain a living or earn wages for the remainder of his working years.
People v. Lynch, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 10270 (Patchogue Village Justice Court). Defendant's 1999 plea to VTL §1163-b vacated as it was not made with a full understanding of the consequences of his action.
People v. Daly, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 18164 (Clarkstown Town Justice Court). Vacated defendant's 1999 conviction of §1180(d) as the plea could not have been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into.
People v. Luther, 48 Misc.3d 699, 700, 12 N.Y.S.3d 491, 491, 2014 NY Misc. LEXIS 5923, 2014 NY Slip Op 24432 . (Monroe County Court as a lower appellate court for the Fourth Dept., 7th J.D.). East Rochester Town Justice Court properly granted defendant's motion to vacate his DWI conviction because he might not have pled guilty to that charge had he known that 15 NYCRR 136.5(b)(3) would be amended so as to render him ineligible to reapply for his driver's license for at least five years after expiration of the six-month revocation, and not allowing him to withdraw his plea under the circumstances would be an affront to the notion of due process.
People v. Olecski, 57 Misc.3d 698, 59 N.Y.S.3d 888, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 3254, 2017 NY Slip Op 27281 (New York City Criminal Court). Defendant, who pled guilty to operating a vehicle while ability impaired, was entitled to relief under CPL 440.10(1)(h) based on ineffective assistance of counsel because she received incorrect advice from counsel about the effect of a plea deal on her license and she demonstrated that she would not have pled guilty if not for the advice she received.
People v. Avital, 2019 64 Misc.3d 483 NYLJ LEXIS 2085 (East Fishkill Town Justice Court). Motion to vacate 2004 conviction of a speeding violation denied. Defendant's entire driving history that brought him within the purview of the new regulations. Thus, the court declined to intrude on the Commissioner's province by vacating guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily entered into.
People v. Gallagher, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 11298, 2020 NY Slip Op 51599(U), 7-8, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875, 2020 WL 8258741 (Rye City Court). Court denied defendant's motion to vacate 2001 speeding conviction, concluding, inter alia, it would be invalidating the regulations as applied to the Defendant.
This Court notes that the trial courts in both Avital and Gallagher, supra, denied the respective motions to vacate defendant's convictions. In Avital, defendant had "an extensive history of driving offenses, including alcohol-related convictions in 2007, 2008, and 2013, as well as more than 21 points from violations People v. Avital, 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2085. Similarly, in Gallagher, defendant had three (3) DWI convictions and 20 points from 5 convictions within the relevant look back period. People v. Gallagher, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 11298, 2020 NY Slip Op 51599(U), 3, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875, 2020 WL 8258741.
Other courts have refused to vacate judgements of convictions for various reasons. In People v. Boyles, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 576, the Town of Pleasant Valley Justice Court dismissed an application to vacate a 2003 conviction for driving while ability impaired. Defendant's coram nobis application claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing counsel did not advise him that a conviction would lead a lifetime bar to relicensing. Thus, the plea was not entered into knowingly or intelligently. The Court denied the relief, asserting that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim should have been raised in a CPL §440.10 motion, which was now time barred. Although not ruling on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court noted it would be "difficult to comprehend how counsel in 2003 could have advised the Defendant that his license could potentially be subject to a lifetime revocation under New York State Department of Motor Vehicles regulations that would be adopted nine years later." The Court also stated, "[g]ranting the Defendant's application to vacate this conviction, and in essence invalidating the regulation as applied to this Defendant, without the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles being given an opportunity to be heard, is not something this Court will entertain. Moreover, it appears Defendant's grievance is aimed more directly at the 2012 regulation than at the performance of his trial counsel in 2003" People v. Boyles, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 576.
In People v. Wheaton, 49 Misc.3d 378, 379, 17 N.Y.S.3d 586, 587 (NY Co. Ct. 2015), the trial court (Seneca County Court) denied defendant's motion to vacate a 2004 class E felony conviction of driving while intoxicated. In Wheaton, the Court rejected the finding by the Luther court, stating that to "hold that the failure to advise the defendant of a consequence then not in existence somehow renders the judgment of conviction to have been obtained in violation of due process or any other constitutional right defies both logic and common sense" People v. Wheaton, 49 Misc.3d 378, 379, 17 N.Y.S.3d 586, 587 (NY Co. Ct. 2015). Like Boyles, the Wheaton court also noted that the "defendant's grievance lies with the enactment and enforcement of the new regulation, not the manner of his conviction" supra at [NY Co. Ct. 2015]. The Court in Wheaton went on to hold:
In any event, "[t]he court has no obligation to explain to defendants who plead guilty the possibility that collateral consequences may attach to their criminal convictions" (People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081 [2005]; see generally People v. Jones, 118 A.D.3d 1360, 1361, 988 N.Y.S.2d 316 [2014]. The Court of Appeals has expressly stated that the loss of a driver's license' is a collateral consequence of a conviction (People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265 [1995], and we have accordingly held that a court's failure to disclose that consequence during the pleas colloquy does not warrant vacatur of the plea (People v. Gerald, 103 A.D.3d 1249, 1250, 959 N.Y.S.2d 362 [2013])." People v. Trathen, 121 A.D.3d 1594, 1595, 993 N.Y.S.2d 426 [4th Dept.2014]. People v. Wheaton, 49 Misc.3d 378, 379, 17 N.Y.S.3d 586, 587 (NY Co. Ct. 2015).
The Court in People v. Capraro, 2016 NY Misc. LEXIS 1451, 2016 NY Slip Op 50633(U), 2, 51 Misc.3d 1212(A), 36 N.Y.S.3d 408 denied a petition to vacate a 1992 plea of guilty to a speeding violation. Citing Wheaton, the Court held it "had no duty to inform the defendant that future DMV regulations could possibly impact his driving privileges." People v. Capraro, 2016 NY Misc. LEXIS 1451, 2016 NY Slip Op 50633(U), 2, 51 Misc.3d 1212(A), 36 N.Y.S.3d 408.
The Court in People v. Olecski, 57 Misc.3d 698, 59 N.Y.S.3d 888, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 3254, 2017 NY Slip Op 27281, cited by the defendant in support of his application, held that the Court was not required to inform defendant about the five-year revocation of her license prior to accepting the plea because it was a collateral consequence and not a direct consequence of her actions. People v. Olecski, 57 Misc.3d 698, 59 N.Y.S.3d 888, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 3254, 2017 NY Slip Op 27281.
Further, in People v. Newell, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 4708, 2022 NY Slip Op 22283, 2022 WL 4284590,, the Court rejected defendant's coram nobis request for relief to vacate 1992 convictions (by guilty pleas) to driving while ability impaired by alcohol and improper passing. The Court held, inter alia, that it was under no duty to inform the defendant of the collateral consequences to his guilty pleas. People v. Newell, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 4708, 2022 NY Slip Op 22283, 2022 WL 4284590.
Conclusions of Law
The fundamental question before this Court is did the defendant knowingly and intelligently enter into his 2006 guilty plea? Although not specifically presented as such in defendant's application, it is the core of defendant's motion (e.g. defendant "did not understand that his plea of guilty would cause a lifetime revocation.")
The Vehicle and Traffic Law mandates that before accepting a plea, a local criminal court must inform a defendant:
A plea of guilty to this charge is equivalent to a conviction after trial. If you are convicted, not only will you be liable to a penalty, but in addition your license to drive a motor vehicle or motor cycle, and your certificate of registration, if any, are subject to suspension and revocation as prescribed by law.
The giving of the foregoing instructions by means of a statement printed in a noticeably distinct manner and in bold type in a size equal to at least twelve point type, upon a summons or ticket issued to a person charged with any such offense shall constitute compliance with the requirements of this section. NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1807.
Prior to accepting a plea, the Court is only required to inform the defendant of the direct consequences of the plea and is not obligated to inform the defendant of the collateral consequences of the plea People v. Tinort, 5 Misc.3d 238, 239, 783 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268, 2004 NY Misc. LEXIS 1454; People v. Wheaton, 49 Misc.3d 378, 379, 17 N.Y.S.3d 586, 587 (NY Co. Ct. 2015).
Defendant mailed in his plea to the Court, and there is nothing on the record to suggest that the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued to the defendant failed to conform with the language specified in § 1807 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Court also finds that the plea was entered into both knowingly and intelligently in 2006. Defendant, through motion papers, acknowledges in the Affidavit of Facts in Support of Motion, that he understood "the ticket carried 4 points" and that his license to operate a motor vehicle would not be suspended "until he reached 11 points."
This Court disagrees with the conclusions reached in Lynch, Luther, Daly and Velte, and therefore holds that it was not required to inform the defendant of any and all possible collateral consequences of his guilty plea, let alone those collateral consequences imposed by a rule which was not enacted until six years after the plea was voluntarily entered into and accepted by this Court. In 2006, no one, including this Court, could have been aware of any rules to potentially or eventually be enacted in 2012. To hold this Court responsible for informing the defendant in 2006 of the collateral consequences of a rule adopted in 2012, as aptly stated in Wheaton, "defies both logic and common sense" People v. Wheaton, 49 Misc.3d 378, 379, 17 N.Y.S.3d 586, 587 (NY Co. Ct. 2015). See also People v. Olecski, 57 Misc.3d 698, 59 N.Y.S.3d 888, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 3254, 2017 NY Slip Op 27281. People v. Capraro, 2016 NY Misc. LEXIS 1451, 2016 NY Slip Op 50633(U), 2, 51 Misc.3d 1212(A), 36 N.Y.S.3d 408. People v. Boyles, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 576. People v. Newell, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 4708, 2022 NY Slip Op 22283, 2, 2022 WL 4284590.
Defendant was thus fully aware of the then current and potential consequences of a guilty plea to the offense of speeding at the time it was entered. The implementation of rules promulgated in 2012, does not retroactively invalidate defendant's plea entered into in 2006. Defendant's counsel, in his Reply Affirmation in Support of Motion, argue that the People, in their Affirmation in Opposition, failed to address that the defendant understood that the "points would fall off after 18 months." The Court has considered this aspect of the defendant's motion and concludes that, as the current ineligibility for relicensing is the aggregate number of points over a twenty-five-year period, combined with multiple convictions for an alcohol related driving offense, that it is not grounds to vacate the judgment in 2006.
Furthermore, this Court's conclusion is supported by two recent cases decided by the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department. In People v. DiTore, 209 A.D.3d 665, 667, 175 N.Y.S.3d 562, 564 (2022),, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a lower court (Supreme Court, Nassau County) ruling which granted defendant's motion to vacate a December 2010 plea of guilty to various offenses related to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The Appellate Division, Second Department held that the Commissioner's "regulations that led to the denial of the defendant's application to restore his driver license did not exist at the time he pleaded guilty, and the defendant failed to identify any conduct that occurred during the plea proceedings that constituted a violation of his due process rights" People v. DiTore, 209 A.D.3d 665, 667, 175 N.Y.S.3d 562, 564 (2022). DiTore also held that "the loss of a driver license is a collateral consequence of a plea of guilty and is not a consequence within the control of the court system (see People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 185, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617)" People v. DiTore, 209 A.D.3d 665, 667, 175 N.Y.S.3d 562, 564 (2022).
In People v. Maggio, No. 2021-03145, 2022 WL 16826890, at 2 (NY App. Div. Nov. 9, 2022), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a lower court ruling which granted a defense motion to vacate an April 2010 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, holding that the "Supreme Court (Suffolk County) erred in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that his plea of guilty was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The subject regulation that led to the denial of the defendant's application for relicensing did not exist at the time he entered his plea of guilty, and it would have been impossible for the court to inform the defendant of consequences flowing therefrom" People v. Maggio, No. 2021-03145, 2022 WL 16826890, at 2 (NY App. Div. Nov. 9, 2022).
Defendant also claims that the unavailability of original records is a prejudice that should be charged to the People. Said argument is without merit. In any respect, vacating a guilty plea 16 years after it had been entered, and restoring the case to the calendar, is patently a prejudice in favor of the defendant and adverse to the people's ability to re-prosecute this matter. This Court concurs with the reasoning in Gallagher, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875 (NY City Ct. 2020), and concludes that 16 years later, the issuing police officer may likely be retired, and no longer working or employed as a police officer. Even assuming that the officer was still employed and available to give testimony in 2022, the memory and recollection of a traffic offense observed in 2006 will certainly have faded. Thus, even if this Court were to vacate the guilty plea and restore the matter to the calendar, prosecution of the offense after more than a decade and a half would be difficult, if not impossible, and results in a clear prejudice which ultimately and completely benefits the defendant.
The Court next considers the defendant's claim that the loss of driving privileges "have critically hurt his ability to earn a livelihood." Financial hardship from the loss of a driver's license or operating privileges is not a "countervailing factor." People v. Capraro, 36 N.Y.S.3d 408, 51 Misc.3d 1212[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50633[U], 2016 WL 1590942 [Mt. Vernon City Court, 2016] (People v. Gallagher, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 11298, 2020 NY Slip Op 51599(U), 7, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875, 2020 WL 8258741. Further, financial hardship and burden is not limited to this defendant. Rather, it is likely a factor in similar cases of lifetime revocation. People v. Newell, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 4708, 2022 NY Slip Op 22283, 2, 2022 WL 4284590. While this Court is full cognizant of the limitations experienced by defendant due to the lack of a driver's license, it does not find financial hardship to be a compelling, overarching reason to vacate the 2006 plea and is unwilling to vacate the judgment of conviction based upon this claim.
The Court acknowledges defendant's assertion that he has "recovered from alcoholism." The struggle faced by the defendant with alcohol addiction and recovery is not lost on this Court. Defendant is to be commended for his efforts to maintain sobriety, but current sobriety does not warrant vacating the 2006 judgment.
This Court now addresses the defendant's claim that his combination of alcohol related convictions and accumulated points subject him to what he characterizes as a "draconian lifetime consequence." The characterization of the effect of 15 NYCRR 136 on defendant's inability to obtain relicensing as "draconian" is unpersuasive and trivializes the Commissioner's duty and responsibility to promulgate appropriate driving and licensing rules. In Acevedo, the Court of Appeals held:
But the ultimate aim of the Regulations-the legislative policy goal-is both well-established and widely shared: protecting the public from the dangers of recidivist drunk driving. The legislature, not DMV, made a value judgment between competing ends, concluding that public safety may outweigh the licensing interests of recidivist drunk driving offenders. The legislature has also expressed a clear intention to delegate broad authority to DMV to decide post-revocation relicensing applications, leaving all reissuance determinations subject to the "discretion of the commissioner" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][c]). Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 223, 77 N.E.3d 331, 344 (2017).
To be deemed "draconian," the rules promulgated by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles would need to be overly harsh and severe. The rules are neither and serve a public safety interest and only directly impact those dangerous driver's whom the Commissioner seeks to protect from the general driving public. Here, defendant has three alcohol related convictions and 35 accumulated lifetime points. Additionally, he has multiple non-point convictions, including three convictions of operating without a license, and three convictions of misdemeanor Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree. Defendant's 2006 conviction in this Court for speeding is not the cause of his lifetime ineligibility for relicensing. It is his cumulative history of convictions for alcohol related offenses, and moving violations with points assessed, that has led to his ineligibility under the rules promulgated by the Commissioner of the Motor Vehicles.
The suspension or revocation of one's driving privilege is a civil sanction (Brady v. Department of Motor Vehs., 278 A.D.2d 233 [2d Dept.2000], affirmed 98 N.Y.2d 625, [2002]) to both punish the errant motorist and to protect the public (Matter of Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74, 78 [1980] [citations and quotation marks omitted]). Once revoked, a driver's license may be restored only at the direction of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510[5]); See also, People v. Giacopelli, 171 Misc.2d 844 (JusCt Clarkstown, March 7, 1997).
In Gallagher, supra, the Court summarized case law pertaining to driving as a privilege. Driving is commonly held to be a privilege, not a right. People v. Burnet, 24 Misc.3d 292, 302, 882 N.Y.S.2d 835 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2009]. Since issuance of a driver's license is a privilege, granted by the State and not a right, the State can condition receipt of it, or absolutely revoke it. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Supreme Court Montgomery County 1955). Nevertheless, a license to operate an automobile is of tremendous value to the individual and may not be taken away except by due process. Hickey v Kelly, 9 A.D.2d 386, 389-90, 194 N.Y.S.2d 306 [4th Dept 1959], affd, 8 N.Y.2d 715, 167 N.E.2d 458, 200 N.Y.S.2d 821 [1960] People v. Gallagher, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 11298, 2020 NY Slip Op 51599(U), 6, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875, 2020 WL 8258741.
Further, Acevedo, supra, the Court of Appeals wrote:
In formulating the Regulations, DMV "deliberated extensively about how to restrict the driving privileges of persons who are eligible for relicensure but who might continue to present highway safety concerns" (NY Reg, Mar. 13, 2013 at 46). Among other things, DMV considered its own collection of empirical data, including statistics pertaining to drunk driving offenders and other high-risk relicensing applicants (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 216-a). The inclusion of the "serious driving offense" provision in the Regulations amounts to a line-drawing determination by the Commissioner regarding the degree of danger posed by various traffic offenses that do not involve drunk driving-a value judgment warranting substantial deference. We decline to disturb the Commissioner's informed and reasonable determination, made pursuant to an express delegation of authority and falling well within DMV's unique area of expertise (see Matter of Consolation Nursing Home, 85 N.Y.2d at 331). Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 2017 NY LEXIS 1299, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 227-228, 77 N.E.3d 331, 347-348, 2017 NY Slip Op 03690, 9, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 2017 WL 1839057. Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 223, 77 N.E.3d 331, 344 (2017).
In Gallagher, supra, the Court wrote the "defendant appears to be exactly the type of problem driver the Regulations were promulgated to address" and "the Court will not intrude upon the province of the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles by vacating guilty pleas. People v. Gallagher, 2020 NY Misc. LEXIS 11298, 2020 NY Slip Op 51599(U), 7-8, 70 Misc.3d 1210(A), 136 N.Y.S.3d 875, 2020 WL 8258741. Likewise, in Newell, supra, the court refused to "interfere with the prerogatives of the DMV by vacating guilty pleas that appear to have been knowingly and voluntarily entered." People v. Newell, 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 4708, 2022 NY Slip Op 22283, 2, 2022 WL 4284590. Similarly, the Court in Boyes, supra, concluded that vacating the defendant's plea would be "invalidating the regulation as applied to [the] Defendant without the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles being given an opportunity to be heard." People v. Boyles, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 576.
This Court concurs with the conclusions in Gallagher, Newell, and Boyles. Indeed, vacating guilty pleas, such as the one presently before the Court, which have been entered into knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the sole purpose of avoiding the collateral consequences of the Commissioner's regulations would act to invalidate the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner. It would create a proverbial loophole by which problem drivers - the exact type of drivers that the rules were implemented to address - could abate the Commissioner's rules by eliminating convictions to bring them under the requisite thresholds set forth in those rules. Consequently, it renders the Commissioner's rules and authority moot. This Court will not invalidate the Commissioner's authority and rules, nor render them moot.
Additionally, the authority to restore a driving license after revocation is a power under the exclusive control of the commissioner of motor vehicles (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510[5]); See also, People v. Giacopelli, 171 Misc.2d 844 (JusCt Clarkstown, March 7, 1997). In Maggio, the Appellate Division, Second Department reaffirmed this authority: "The Court of Appeals observed that the Vehicle and Traffic Law "contemplates that the Commissioner [of the DMV] will have exclusive authority over post-revocation relicensing, and that those relicensing determinations will be discretionary" (Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs ., 29 N.Y.3d 202, 220, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331)" People v. Maggio, No. 2021-03145, 2022 WL 16826890, at *2 (NY App. Div. Nov. 9, 2022). This Court will not usurp the legislatively granted power of the Commissioner.
Finally, the Court of Appeals in Acevedo declined "to disturb the Commissioner's informed and reasonable determination, made pursuant to an express delegation of authority and falling well within DMV's unique area of expertise. Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 2017 NY LEXIS 1299, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 227-228, 77 N.E.3d 331, 347-348, 2017 NY Slip Op 03690, 9, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 2017 WL 1839057. If this Court were to grant the relief presently sought it would do to the Commissioner's rules what the Court of Appeals has refused to do.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to vacate his 2006 conviction is DENIED in all respects.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.