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People v. Bell

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Mar 7, 2008
No. B197834 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAMON LORENZO BELL, Defendant and Appellant. B197834 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Fourth Division March 7, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. KA076538 of Los Angeles County, George Genesta, Judge.

John Doyle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WILLHITE, J.

Damon Lorenzo Bell appeals from the judgment entered following his guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, count 1 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), possession of an opium pipe or device, a misdemeanor, count 2 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) and his admission that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a) – (d) and 667, subds. (b) – (i)) and a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to prison for four years, consisting of the middle term of two years in count 1, doubled by reason of the Three Strikes law, plus a concurrent term of six months in county jail for count 2. The one-year enhancement for his prior prison term was stayed. He obtained a certificate of probable cause and contends he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure. He also requests that this court review the sealed proceedings and documents the trial court reviewed pursuant to his Pitchess motion. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the judgment.

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The evidence at the suppression hearing established that on September 26, 2006, Pomona Police Officers Steve Congalton and Mark Medellin were conducting an investigation in the parking lot of the Lemon Tree Motel in Pomona when appellant and his brother, Shon Bell, approached. When the brothers were approximately 10 feet from the officers, Officer Congalton asked appellant how he was doing and whether he or his brother was on parole or probation. The men continued to approach and Officer Congalton called them over. Officer Congalton asked appellant if he had anything illegal and appellant said he did not. Within seconds, Officer Congalton asked if he could search appellant. Appellant did not verbally respond to the question but walked toward the deputy, put his hands up and “took a position to where [the officer] could do so.” Appellant put his hands behind his head “as if he knew the routine,” and at that point Officer Congalton could see an exposed meth pipe in appellant’s pocket. When appellant turned around, Officer Congalton initiated a search of appellant’s outer clothing for weapons. After the search, appellant sat down and Officer Medellin noticed a bulge in appellant’s sock. Inside the sock, Officer Medellin found a small portion of marijuana and some methamphetamine packaged in clear plastic.

In denying the suppression motion, the court stated it had confidence in Officer Congalton’s testimony with reference to the sequence of events. The court concluded it had been a consensual stop and a consensual search.

DISCUSSION

I

“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion, we uphold any factual finding, express or implied, that is supported by substantial evidence, but we independently assess, as a matter of law, whether the challenged search or seizure conforms to constitutional standards of reasonableness. [Citation.]” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327.)

“‘“For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically three different categories or levels of police ‘contacts’ or ‘interactions’ with individuals, ranging from the least to the most intrusive. First, there are . . . ‘consensual encounters’ . . ., which are those police-individual interactions which result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever—i.e., no ‘seizure,’ however minimal--and which may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any ‘objective justification.’ . . . Second, there are what are commonly termed ‘detentions,’ seizures of an individual which are strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which may be undertaken by the police ‘if there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ . . . Third, and finally, there are those seizures of an individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention, seizures which include formal arrests and restraints on an individual’s liberty which are comparable to an arrest, and which are constitutionally permissible only if the police have probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 327-328.)

“‘[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. [Citations.] Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. [Citation.] The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. [Citations.]’” (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 328.) Approaching a person and asking for permission to search him does not transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a detention. People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 57, fn. 3.) Substantial evidence supports the finding that the encounter and search were consensual. Officer Congalton greeted appellant, asked him to approach and asked permission to conduct a patdown search. Appellant indicated his consent to a search by raising his hands and coming closer to the officer allowing him to search. The challenged encounter and search conformed to constitutional standards of reasonableness. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 327.)

II

Prior to trial, appellant brought a Pitchess motion, requesting records relating to accusations and/or evidence that Officers Congalton and Medellin engaged in acts of misconduct, defined as acts of bias, dishonesty, coercive conduct or acts constituting a violation of the statutory or constitutional rights of others. Appellant asserted that on the date of his arrest, Officer Congalton ordered him from the sidewalk into a parking lot, detaining him without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Appellant asserted he was searched without his permission and that he was never asked to give permission. He admitted he had a glass marijuana pipe on his person but denied it was sticking out of his pocket. He also denied he had methamphetamine on his person.

The trial court granted the Pitchess motion, stating it would examine complaints against Officers Congalton and Medellin regarding fabrication of evidence, false testimony or perjury, false police reports and false arrests. At appellant’s request, this court has reviewed the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing and find the trial court properly concluded there were no relevant, discoverable matters. (See Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232.)

This is so, notwithstanding appellant’s claim the trial court should have turned over complaints and reports of illegal search and seizure, dishonesty, racial prejudice, and acts of moral turpitude.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., MANELLA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Bell

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division
Mar 7, 2008
No. B197834 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Bell

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAMON LORENZO BELL, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division

Date published: Mar 7, 2008

Citations

No. B197834 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2008)