From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Batres

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Sep 22, 2008
No. B199173 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROLANDO BATRES, Defendant and Appellant. B199173 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Seventh Division September 22, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA035540, Hayden Zacky, Judge

Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmond G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Haman aka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Shawn McGahey Webb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WOODS, J.

Appellant Rolando Batres challenges his multiple convictions and sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a minor, sexual penetration by a foreign object, lewd acts, oral copulation and forcible rape convictions. He argues that the court erred in admitting evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 that he had committed an uncharged rape in Mexico and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. He further contends the trial court improperly imposed a three-strike sentence on the basis of a prior New York conviction, which the prosecutor did not demonstrate qualified as a strike under California law. Finally, he claims his 417 year sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. As we shall explain, appellant waived any claims with respect to the uncharged rape and the prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object in the trial court. Notwithstanding the foregoing, appellant’s sentence under the Three Strikes law must be vacated and remanded because the record fails to disclose that his prior conviction in New York qualified as a “strike” under California law.

All statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of the crimes described below are based on the evidence presented at trial and are described only to the extent relevant to the issues on appeal.

The victim in this case is the appellant’s daughter. Beginning when the victim was four years old, the appellant began touching her inappropriately on her chest and vaginal area. Appellant warned the victim that if she reported the touching to anyone, he would hurt her mother or grandparents. Appellant’s wife (the victim’s mother) left the appellant several times during their marriage taking the victim and her siblings to get away from appellant. Appellant was physically violent and verbally abusive to the victim’s mother and the child and he frequently abused alcohol. On a number of occasions, appellant also threatened to kidnap the children and take them to El Salvador. The victim, her mother and siblings moved back and forth from Arizona several times; they also lived in a number of locations including, Buena Park, Norwalk, Lancaster and Lake L.A. The appellant would always find them and eventually when things calmed down his wife would allow him to move back in with the family. Appellant was also in and out of jail during this time period. This pattern of appellant living with the family and then the victim’s mother and family moving away from him repeated over the years.

When the victim was eight years old appellant resumed touching her, including coming into her room at night and forcing his fingers inside her vagina. According to the victim this occurred about once a week. She did not tell anyone because she was afraid of her father. His sexual conduct escalated to a point where he lay on top of her and slightly penetrated her vagina with his penis, but he did not ejaculate. When the victim was about 10 or 11 years old, he began kissing her breasts, and forcing her to hold his penis in her hand.

In the late 1990s appellant was arrested and deported to El Salvador. He did not see the family for awhile but kept in contact with them. In 2000, appellant re-entered the United States and moved back in with the family. Back in the home, he resumed abusing the then 13-year-old victim several times a month in her bedroom. By this time he was forcing her to orally copulate him. Appellant continued to threaten the victim.

Appellant was arrested again for making terrorist threats and again he was deported to El Salvador. Appellant was deported a total of four times. In 2004 he made his way to Tijuana, where he stayed for a time. During the summer of 2004, the victim and her family traveled to Mexico to see appellant and perform missionary work for their church. The family stayed with the pastor and so for a while when they were in Mexico, appellant did not touch the victim. But during the last week of the trip, the victim’s mother and her siblings returned to the United States and appellant and the victim stayed in a rented room.

On one of the evenings at the rented room, appellant encouraged the victim, who was then 15 years old, to consume alcohol. That evening after he had given the victim four or more beers, appellant raped the victim a number of times, telling her she was old enough and could handle it. He also told her that it was better to have sex with him because he would take care of her and not get her pregnant, though he did not use a condom. The next day appellant warned the victim that if she told anyone about what had happened no one would believe her and that he would tell people that she had wanted to try it. Consequently, the victim did not tell anyone about being raped in Mexico by appellant.

When the victim returned to Los Angeles with her mother, appellant joined them shortly thereafter. The victim tried to avoid her father, but he would tell her that she belonged to him, that he loved her and that they should run away together. Appellant had resumed raping the victim. She had missed several menstrual cycles before she figured out that she was pregnant. Although when she told appellant about being pregnant he had initially agreed to take her to get an abortion, he offered excuses and delayed it, until by December 2005 she was too far along to have an abortion. Appellant continued raping her until she was three months pregnant. Appellant told the victim’s mother that the victim had become pregnant after having been raped in Mexico by a taxi driver.

The victim gave birth to baby in April 2005. Appellant did not bother the victim for awhile. After the baby was about three months old, appellant would visit the bedroom the victim shared with the baby and would rape her about three times a week. He would also force her to orally copulate him. Appellant continued to threaten the victim about not reporting his abuse; he told her he would take the baby away from her.

After one violent family confrontation, appellant began threatening to kill everyone in the family; and broke furniture. Thereafter in March 2006, after appellant fought with the victim’s mother concerning the baby, appellant made a comment about being the baby’s father. When the victim’s mother questioned the victim, she told her mother what had happened. The victim, her mother, her siblings and baby moved out, obtained a restraining order against appellant, and the victim reported appellant’s crimes to the police.

Appellant was charged with multiple counts stemming from his years of sexual abuse against his daughter: three counts of aggravated sexual assault (Penal Code section 269) upon a child under fourteen years of age and more than ten years his junior (Counts 1, 5 & 14); three counts of a lewd and lascivious act (Penal Code section 288) upon a child under the age of fourteen (Counts 2, 3, & 4); one count of sexual penetration by foreign object (Penal Code section 289) upon a child under the age of eighteen (Count 6); five counts of forcible rape (Penal Code section 261) (Counts 7-11); and one count of oral copulation upon a child and one count of forcible oral copulation (Penal Code section 288a) (Counts 12 & 13). The information further alleged that appellant had one serious felony conviction and two prior strike convictions and had served three prior prison terms.

Appellant pled not guilty. Shortly before trial appellant submitted a request to proceed in pro per status during the trial. The court granted his request, and ordered his former counsel to serve as stand-by counsel during the trial.

Thereafter the trial commenced. After the opening statement, the court conducted a section 402 proceeding during which the prosecutor sought permission to introduce evidence pursuant to section 1108 that appellant had raped the victim in Mexico during the summer of 2004. Appellant did not object to the admission of the evidence and the court granted the request.

The jury convicted the appellant on all counts. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior allegations. The court found the priors and strike allegations to be true, and imposed various fines and restitution orders and sentenced appellant on the convictions counts under the Three Strikes Law to state prison for a total of 417 years to life.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts the trial court committed a number of errors. First he claims the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to present evidence pursuant to section 1108 of the uncharged rape of the victim that occurred in Mexico. He also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument when she referred to appellant as a “monster” and when she made comments which referred to punishing appellant and other passionate appeals to the jury. Finally, he assails his sentence, claiming that the court erred in using a prior New York arson conviction as a strike when it did not qualify as a strike under California law and that his 417-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and usual punishment. We examine his contentions in turn.

I. Admission of the Mexico Rape Under Section 1108.

In the trial court during a section 402 proceeding, the prosecutor informed the court that she intended to introduce evidence of an uncharged sexual offense under section 1108. Specifically, this referred to evidence that during the summer of 2004 while the victim and her family visited Mexico, appellant raped her. The prosecutor argued that although the rape occurred outside the jurisdiction it was nonetheless relevant and admissible under section 1108 because it showed the victim’s state of mind and explained her subsequent behavior, including the conception of the child. The court indicated that it was not aware of any case law that would preclude admission of the evidence simply because it happened in a foreign jurisdiction, and asked the appellant to present case law if he had any to support the exclusion on that basis. The court further indicated that the evidence was relevant to the issues of motive, intent, modus operandi, common scheme or plan and lack of mistake. The court nonetheless indicated that it would research the issue. Appellant remained silent during this exchange.

When the proceedings resumed a few days later, appellant requested a continuance and moved to dismiss the proceedings arguing that he had not had adequate time to prepare his defense. The court denied the request, reminding the appellant that he had been advised of the perils of self-representation and that his stand-by counsel had already announced that he was ready to proceed with the trial. The court then revisited the issue of the admissibility of the uncharged Mexico rape. The court asked appellant whether he had anything to present or argue, and appellant indicated that he had nothing and that he was not ready to respond to anything. The court granted the request and allowed the prosecutor to present the evidence.

At the end of the trial the court instructed the jury concerning the uncharged Mexico rape pursuant to CALCRIM 1191, as follows: “The People presented evidence that the defendant committed other sex crimes in Mexico and elsewhere that were not charged in this case. Those crimes are defined for you elsewhere in these instructions. [¶] If you decide the defendant committed the [uncharged] offenses, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit as charged here.”

Before this court appellant asserts that the court erred in admitting the evidence of the rape that occurred in Mexico because: (1) it does not qualify as a “sexual offense” under section 1108; and (2) the evidence was overly inflammatory, confusing, cumulative of other evidence and lacked probative value because it was too dissimilar to the conduct at issue. He further argues that admission of this evidence violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. As the Attorney General correctly points out, however, appellant forfeited his claims, including his claim of federal constitutional error, by failing to object in the trial court. (People v. Pierce (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 898 [defendant failed to preserve claims under section 1108 by not raising them in the trial court]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424 [federal constitutional claims waived where defendant did not assert those specific grounds in the trial court]; People v. Vichory (2000) 76 Cal.App.4th 92, 97 [rejecting the appellant’s challenge to the court’s admission of evidence under section 1108, the court observed: “[w]e reject his constitutional argument because no objection on that ground was raised below. ‘It is “the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal’’”], superseded by statute on other grounds.) We also note forfeiture applies with equal force to those defendants who choose to represent themselves at trial. (See People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 618.) Consequently, having failed to assert his claims of error in the trial court, we decline to address them on appeal.

We note that the argument that section 1108 violated federal constitutional due process rights has been considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911-925.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Before this court appellant complains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during her closing argument. Specifically he complains that the prosecutor referred to him as a “monster” and called his conduct as “monstrous.” In addition he argues that the prosecutor made other comments during her argument which were intended to elicit the passions and prejudices of the jury against him and to encourage them to consider his punishment. As we shall explain, appellant waived any objections concerning this conduct, but even if he had preserved them, we would conclude that he has not demonstrated that they amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

Below when appellant was cross-examining his daughter the victim, he specifically asked her two times whether she considered him to be a “monster” because of his conduct. Thereafter, during closing argument the prosecutor showed the jury a picture of the victim and her child asserting that they both looked like babies. Then the prosecutor stated: “[Appellant] asked her if she thought he was a monster. She said in the nicest way he is a ‘monster.’” Appellant did not object to this reference or ask for a curative instruction.

At the conclusion of her summation the prosecutor asked the jury to find the appellant guilty arguing: “It’s time that [the victim] had justice. It’s time that it stopped. It’s time that he pays for what he did. When you find him guilty, he’s guilty as charged. Thank you.” Appellant did not object to this request.

Thereafter, in appellant’s closing argument, he asked the jury to put aside emotion and use common sense in deciding his case. He told the jury that having sex with your drunk teenage daughter is not illegal in Mexico. He further cast blame on the victim for failing to notify the authorities of his molestation at any point between 1992 and 2006, arguing that she “had more than ample time and opportunities to report” him and that, but for her failure to do so, the charged offenses “would have never occurred.”

The prosecutor responded on rebuttal:

Some nerve. Talk about a victim being violated again here in court. That’s what you witnessed; that’s what we all witnessed. It’s her fault because at age four she failed to report. Had she reported at age 4, she wouldn't have been raped and molested for the rest of her life for 14 years. [¶] Oh, gee. That darn four year old. She could have prevented all these crimes to her if only she’d reported it because never mind that the father, their abuser, is beating up everyone, beating up the house and threatening. Never mind that. [¶] . . . . He says rape is not illegal in Mexico. [¶] Gee, to those of us, anyone with heritage from Mexico, boy, are we offended. Somehow you can rape your daughter in Mexico and that would be lawful. No. That's not the issue here. That’s just the kind of person that you have talking to you. [¶] Of course it’s illegal. It’s illegal here and hopefully everywhere else in the world. But any civilized nation would say no, you don't get to have sex with your daughter, and you don’t get to say you know what, she was almost 16, and it was mutual interest. She decided to stay with me, and we drank. You don’t get to say that. That’s disgusting. [¶] This whole thing happened. What this man did is truly monstrous. He needs to be responsible for what he did. It’s in your hands at this point.”

Appellant objected to the “monstrous” reference at that point, and the court responded that the prosecutor was just reiterating the testimony. Appellant argued that the prosecutor’s comment appealed to the jury’s emotions. The court reminded the jury that this was closing argument, during which the attorneys were allowed to argue the case, but that it was up to the jury to determine the facts.

Finally, at the very end of her rebuttal the prosecutor asked the jury to “[b]ring justice here and make this man suffer the time that he is supposed to serve by finding him guilty.”

The attorney general asserts appellant waived his claim of prosecutorial misconduct because he failed to object to the monster comments and other references to bringing appellant to justice, holding him responsible, and because appellant failed to request a curative instruction. We agree. “To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a criminal defendant must make a timely objection, make known the basis of his objection, and ask the trial court to admonish the jury.” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.) However, “the failure to request that the jury be admonished does not forfeit the issue for appeal if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1201.) Defendant’s conclusory assertion that any objection and request for admonition would not have cured the prosecutor’s rhetoric is insufficient to avoid waiver. To the contrary, we conclude any alleged harm arising out of the prosecutor’s remarks would have been readily curable by an appropriate and timely admonition. Accordingly, because defendant did not timely object to any of the comments (except for the last “monster” reference during rebuttal) and request a curative admonition and does not show either of those actions would have been futile or would not have cured any prejudice, we conclude he has waived any contention on appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing argument. (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1201-1202, [defendant forfeited any claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments where he failed to object to comments about the Spanish Inquisition and the persecution of early Christians].)

In any event, appellant’s claims of misconduct lack merit. “A prosecutor's misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor’s misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202.) Whether the prosecutor acted in good faith is not the issue. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 661.) We review the prosecutor’s remarks to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied them. (Id. at p. 663.) Also, we do not view the prosecutor's remarks in isolation but rather “in the context of the argument as a whole.” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)

Specifically, regarding the prosecutor’s “monster” references, we agree with the trial court that these were a direct reference to a characterization that appellant interjected into the trial. A prosecutor may make comments that would otherwise be improper if they are fairly responsive to argument of defense counsel and based on the record. (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952-953; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 199-200 [characterization of the defendant as a “monster” constituted fair comment on the evidence presented]; People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal.3d 156, 177.)

Likewise, in our view, the other comments which appellant claims are objectionable on appeal, namely those that urged the jury to return a guilty verdict, to bring appellant to justice and “make this man suffer the time that he is supposed to serve” do not cross the line into the realm of misconduct. They amount to nothing more than an appeal to the jury to return a guilty verdict. Clearly the jury knows that a guilty verdict would result in some punishment for appellant and the prosecutor’s non-specific reference to the appellant serving time does little more than point out the obvious result of a guilty verdict. “The prosecution may properly urge his points vigorously as long as he does not act unfairly.” (People v. Escarcega (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 853, 862-863.) None of these comments indicate unfair efforts to incite the jury against the appellant. The essence of this argument was that the evidence supported the charges and the prosecutor wanted the jury to convict appellant of each charge. This is precisely what prosecutors argue in every case. Thus, they were not misconduct. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 261-262 [no misconduct where prosecutor urged “jury ‘to make a statement,’ to do ‘the right thing,’ and to restore ‘confidence’ in the criminal justice system by returning a verdict of death”]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1041-1042, [prosecutor's remarks that “if you want to have a voice in your community and an effect upon the law in the community, this is your opportunity” not improper because “[n]o reasonable juror would have construed the remarks as urging the jurors to follow community sentiment rather than their own judgment”].)

Accordingly, we conclude that notwithstanding the fact that he waived this claim, no such prosecutorial misconduct appears on this record.

III. Use of a New York Arson Conviction as a Strike

Appellant attacks his sentence on appeal arguing that the trial court erred in finding his prior conviction in New York does qualify as a strike under California law. As the attorney general properly concedes, based on the record, appellant is correct.

Under California’s Three Strikes Law, the sentence upon conviction of a current offense is enhanced for persons who have been previously convicted of a strike -- a violent felony, as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c), or a serious felony, as defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c). (§§ 667, subd. (f)(1), 1170.12, subd. (d)(1).) In California, arson is a serious felony, and therefore qualifies as a strike. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19), 667, subd. (a)(1), (4).) Appellant’s New York conviction was for third degree arson.

“‘In order for a prior conviction from another jurisdiction to qualify as a strike under the Three Strikes law, it must involve the same conduct as would qualify as a strike in California.’” (People v. Wood ell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 453 (Wood ell).) A conviction in another jurisdiction will qualify as a strike if the statutory elements of the foreign crime include all of the elements of the predicate California felony. (People v. Warner (2006) 39 Cal.4th 548, 552-553; People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 348 (Guerrero).) “There is . . . no guarantee the statutory definition of the crime in the other jurisdiction will contain all the necessary elements to qualify as a predicate felony in California.” (Wood ell, supra, at p. 453.) Thus, “‘in determining the truth of a prior-conviction allegation, the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction.’” (Id. at p. 452, quoting Guerrero, at p. 355 .) “To allow the trier to look to the record of the conviction -- but no further -- . . . effectively bars the prosecution from re litigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of [a] speedy trial.” (Id. at p. 453, quoting Guerrero, at p. 355.) The power of the trier of fact to consider the evidence within the record of the foreign conviction extends only to such evidence as is not precluded by the rules of evidence or other statutory limitation. (People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1201.)

If the foreign law can be violated in more than one way and the record does not disclose any of the facts of the offense actually committed, the court will presume that the prior conviction was for the least offense punishable under the foreign law. (Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.)

Here the prosecutor’s proof of appellant’s prior New York arson conviction consisted of a “Sentence and Commitment” (i.e., the New York abstract of judgment) and an “Inmate Information – Location/status/legal Dates/etc.” These documents established that in 1986 appellant had been convicted of third degree arson and served a number of years in state prison. The prosecutor also presented testimony from the detective in this case indicating that she had received these documents from local authorities in New York. Based on this evidence the court in this matter found the New York prior conviction true and also found that it qualified as a strike under California law. None of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to prove this strike disclosed the underlying facts of the third degree arson conviction.

Thus, based on this record, the least adjudicated elements test must be applied to determine whether third degree arson in New York qualifies as a “serious” or “violent” felony under California law.

Under California the crime of arson occurs when a person “willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property.” (Penal Code, § 451.) Arson qualifies as “violent” if it causes great bodily injury or involves an inhabited structure or property. (Penal Code, § 667, subd, (c)(10).) Under New York law a person is guilty of arson in the third degree if he or she intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion. (N.Y. Penal Law, § 150.10.) On its face, the New York statute does not constitute a “violent” felony under California law because it does not require proof of great bodily injury or the burning of an inhabited structure or property.

Likewise the crime of third degree arson does not necessarily qualify as a “serious” felony under the Three Strikes Law. California law and New York arson laws have divergent elements. Specifically, case law interpreting California arson law, Penal Code section 451 has long required proof of damage by evidence of “burning.” (See People v. Lee (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176-1178.) In contrast, the New York arson statute does not require that the damage be caused by “burning.” (People v. McDonald (1986) 68 N.Y.2d 1, 14.) The California and New York laws also appear to differ on the proof of “ignition” element. Under New York law the required element of “ignition” can be shown by sources, such as an explosion, which would not satisfy the ignition element under California law, which requires ignition result only from burning or setting a fire.

In view of the differences between these elements of California and New York law, conduct which satisfies the least adjudicated elements of third degree arson do not necessarily constitute arson under California law, and thus does not qualify as a “serious” felony under the California Three Strikes law.

Thus, we conclude that the prosecution did not meet its burden to establish that appellant’s third degree arson conviction under New York law qualifies as a serious or violent felony in California. Accordingly, we remand for retrial to allow the prosecutor to present evidence on the issue of whether the conduct underlying appellant’s New York arson convictions qualifies as a “strike” under California law. (See People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, aff’d sub nom., Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721; People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 635.)

Because appellant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded, appellant’s other challenge, namely, that his 417-year sentence amounted to cruel and/or unusual punishment is moot.

DISPOSITION

The appellant’s sentence is vacated and the true finding as to the strike allegation is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for retrial of this issue in a manner consistent with this opinion. In the event the prior serious felony allegation is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant shall be re sentenced.

In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

We concur: PERLUSS, P.J. ZELON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Batres

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Sep 22, 2008
No. B199173 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Batres

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROLANDO BATRES, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

Date published: Sep 22, 2008

Citations

No. B199173 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 22, 2008)