Opinion
B230748
01-25-2012
In re ANGEL G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGEL G., Defendant and Appellant.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Douglas L. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NJ25201)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Wayne C. Denton, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Douglas L. Wilson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Angel G. was declared a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice after the court sustained a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging he had committed attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. On appeal Angel contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court's attempted murder finding because the corpus delicti of the crime could not be established without his extrajudicial statements. In addition, he contends his statements to law enforcement officers should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602 Petition
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed on March 30, 2010 alleging Angel, then 14 years old, had committed attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (Pen. §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)). The petition also alleged the offenses were committed to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)); a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); and a principal personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1)). Angel denied the allegations.
Statutory references are to the Penal code unless otherwise indicated.
The People initially challenged Angel's fitness to be dealt with under the juvenile court law (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (c) [minor is presumed to be unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law if he or she was 14 years of age or older at the time the charged offense was committed and the offense is among those listed in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b), which includes attempted murder]). That challenge was withdrawn, and Angel was declared fit to be adjudicated in juvenile court.
2. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
According to the evidence presented at the jurisdiction hearing, on March 26, 2010 Elida Juarez heard three gunshots and saw three young Hispanic men running out of a driveway near 14903 Chadron Avenue in Gardena. Two of the young men, including Angel, were holding guns. Juarez called the police, who recovered one unexpended 380 caliber bullet and a bullet fragment from the location. Los Angeles County sheriff's deputies who responded to the scene also noticed the window of a nearby red Honda Civic had been shattered.
Soon after receiving Juarez's call and description of the gunmen, sheriff's deputies detained Angel and two of his companions a few blocks from where Juarez had heard the gunshots. One of the men had gunshot residue on his hands. No gunshot residue was found on Angel's hands. Juarez identified Angel as one of the gunmen. After being advised on the scene of his right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda)), Angel told sheriff's deputies he did not want to make any statements.
At the sheriff's station six hours later, two detectives readvised Angel of his Miranda rights and asked whether he wished to talk to them. Angel said he did and signed an admonition and waiver of his Miranda rights. He told detectives he and his friend Chucky were walking near Chadron Avenue in Gardena on their way back from a liquor store at approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 26, 2010. "Li'l Mobster" gang members sitting in a black truck displayed gang signs, asked Chucky and Angel where they were from and said "Fuck Sureno 13." When Chucky and Angel identified their gang affiliation as Sureno 13, the passengers in the truck's back seat pulled out guns. Angel and Chucky ran to a nearby house to escape being shot. At the house Chucky made a telephone call requesting a gun. Two individuals named Moreno and Alonso arrived with a handgun within an hour. Angel and two companions, including a person known as "Listo," returned to the location where they had encountered the black truck "to fight" the Li'l Mobster gang members. When they arrived, a white van carrying Li'l Mobster gang members drove up. Listo fired two shots from his handgun at the van and attempted unsuccessfully to dislodge a third bullet from the gun's chamber. Listo and Angel then fled.
The People also presented evidence Antonio Herrera, a member of the Mobsters criminal street gang, had been shot once in the lower left side of his back on the afternoon of March 26, 2010. Herrera testified he was shot near the intersection of 135th street and Yukon, several blocks away from the location Juarez had heard gunshots. Herrera, a reluctant witness for the prosecution, did not see who shot him and did not know who would want to hurt him. He testified a passerby in a blue van picked him up and drove him to his sister's house. From there, he was taken by ambulance to the hospital. The People's theory at trial was that Angel and his confederates had shot Herrera.
Herrera testified Li'l Mobsters was a younger part of the Mobsters criminal street gang.
Theodor Baljet, a Los Angeles County sheriff's deputy and gang investigator, testified as an expert on criminal street gangs. Among other things, Baljet explained one of the primary activities of criminal street gangs is to defend their turf against rival gangs, actions often culminating in deadly violence. Baljet also testified the Mobsters and Sureno 13 were rival gangs.
The juvenile court sustained the petition, including the special criminal street gang and firearm use allegations. Following a disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Angel a ward of the court and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice.
The court explained it initially had some concern whether the shooting was an attempted murder or assault with a firearm, but ultimately was persuaded it was the former: "[I]t makes sense to me firing a couple of shots and then the gun jamming. That indicates to me that if the gun did not jam, he would have shot more times and possibly a death would have resulted. . . . I'm satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. So the petition is sustained."
DISCUSSION
1. There Was Prima Facie Evidence of the Corpus Delicti Independent of Angel's Extrajudicial Statements
"In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California, it has traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant." (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 (Alvarez); accord, People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1127; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 (Jennings).) The rule "is intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened." (Alvarez, at p. 1169; accord, Jennings, at p. 368; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 405.)
The corpus delicti rule applies to juveniles charged in delinquency proceedings. (See In re J.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 914, 916; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 39; In re Charles G. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 62, 65.)
The level of proof required to establish the corpus delicti is "'quite modest.'" (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1128; Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 368.) "The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt[.] [I]t is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible. [Citations.] There is no requirement of independent evidence 'of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,' so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171; Jennings, at p. 368 ["[w]e reemphasize that the quantum of evidence the People must produce in order to satisfy the corpus delicti rule is quite modest; case law describes it as a 'slight or prima facie' showing"].) "[O]nce the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant's extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues." (Alvarez, at p. 1171.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of the attempted murder of Herrera independent of Angel's extrajudicial statements. (See Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 364 [when the sufficiency of evidence necessary to establish the corpus delicti is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there was sufficient independent evidence, apart from the defendant's extrajudicial statements, to establish a prima facie showing of the elements of the corpus delicti].) The People presented evidence gunshots were fired at 14903 Chadron Avenue. Three young men, including Angel, were seen running from the scene. Angel and another of the young men were seen carrying guns. Angel's confederate tested positive for gunshot residue. At about the same time Herrera, a rival gang member, was shot. This is sufficient to meet the relatively modest burden of establishing the corpus delicti, that is, both the harm and the criminal agency to accomplish it. Although Angel emphasizes Herrera's testimony he was shot at a different location, a few blocks away from where Juarez saw Angel and his confederates running with guns, his testimony on this point could reasonably be deemed suspect by any trier of fact. The juvenile court found he was a reluctant and hostile witness; and it was clear he did not want to be viewed as a "snitch" for cooperating with police, even in connection with the prosecution of a rival gang member.
Contrary to Angel's contention, independent evidence of his mental state—intent to kill—was not necessary to prove the corpus delicti in this attempted murder case. While a defendant's mental state has been held, in a narrow category of cases, to be a part of the corpus delicti (see, e.g. People v. Lopez (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 185, 190 [corpus delicti of selling narcotics included knowledge that substance sold was narcotic]; People v. Hawkins (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 681 [corpus delicti of opening or maintaining a place for purpose of unlawfully selling narcotics included perpetrator's purpose]), intent to kill is not an element of the corpus delicti for attempted murder. (See People v. Daly (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 59 [corpus delicti of attempted murder consists of fact of injury and existence of criminal agency as its cause; the defendant's "state of mind" is not an element of corpus delicti]; People v. McGlothen (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014.)
Once the corpus delicti was established, of course, the court was free to consider Angel's extrajudicial statements for their full weight. Angel does not contend the evidence, including his extrajudicial statements, is insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings.
2. Angel's Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated
a. There was no Miranda violation
"As a prophylactic safeguard to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, required law enforcement agencies to advise a suspect, before any custodial law enforcement questioning, that 'he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.'" (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 947 (Martinez), quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 479.) Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, law enforcement must "'scrupulously honor[]'" the invocation and cease questioning him or her. (Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 103 [96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313] (Mosley); accord, Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) ___ U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098] (Berghuis).) These constitutional protections apply to minors. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 45 [87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527]; People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1167.)
Angel contends his pretrial statements to police violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 346 and should have been suppressed. He acknowledges he was advised of his rights by Detectives Kenneth Brown and Sonny Saavedra at 12:30 a.m. on March 27, 2010 and expressly waived those rights, both orally and in writing. However, because he had told Juan Meza, the deputy sheriff who had given him Miranda warnings at the scene six hours earlier, he "did not want to give any statements," Detectives Brown and Saavedra were obligated to honor that request unless or until Angel initiated further questioning. Their failure to do so, Angel argues, violated his constitutional rights.
Significantly, Angel did not seek to suppress his statements in the juvenile court. Typically, the failure to assert a Miranda violation in a criminal trial results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal. (See People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 116 [forfeiture doctrine applies to objections based on Miranda violations], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22); People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666-667 [Miranda-based claim forfeited for failing to object at trial]; People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.) The forfeiture doctrine applies in juvenile cases. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [juvenile delinquency]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [juvenile dependency].)
One of the basic justifications for the forfeiture doctrine—to provide the court with the opportunity to make findings based on a fully developed factual record (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754)—and the difficulty in reviewing such issues for the first time on appeal, are highlighted here. To determine the merits of Angel's claim, we must consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, his initial invocation of his right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at pp. 102-103.) We review the trial court's legal conclusions in this regard independently but "'evaluate the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements and waivers and "'accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.'"'" (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 751.) Because Angel did not raise the issue in the juvenile court, there is little factual record from which to make this determination.
Even if we were to review Angel's claim on the merits, however, based on the limited and undisputed factual record before us, it necessarily fails. Angel argues the fact the second interrogation related to the same offense, while not necessarily dispositive in an analysis of the totality of the circumstances (Mosely, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 106; People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 987 [fact that subsequent interrogation involved same crime is but "one factor" to consider under totality of the circumstances]), weighs heavily in favor of finding a Miranda violation. A similar contention was made in People v. Warner (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1125. There, the defendant invoked his right to remain silent following his arrest and a proper Miranda advisement. The investigating officer immediately ceased questioning. The next morning a different detective, unaware of the defendant's earlier invocation of his right to remain silent, gave new Miranda warnings. This time the defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the detective. The Court of Appeal held the second interrogation did not violate Miranda. Citing Mosley, the court explained the first invocation had been "scrupulously honored" when the first detective ceased questioning. The overnight interval was a sufficient period between questioning; and, absent evidence of collusion, coercion or other police misconduct to wear down the defendant or dissuade him from exercising his right to remain silent, the second interrogation, conducted after a fresh set of Miranda warnings, was proper. (Warner, at p. 1131.)
Here, as Angel acknowledges, Detective Meza scrupulously honored his invocation of his right to remain silent and immediately ceased questioning him. Six hours later—a significant period of time—two different detectives gave Angel a new set of Miranda warnings (see, e.g., Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 107 [describing two hours as a significant period of time between interrogations].) At that point Angel expressly waived his rights and agreed to give a statement. There was no evidence the detectives had colluded or endeavored in some fashion to compel Angel to make a statement or otherwise dissuade him from exercising his right to remain silent. On the record before us, the interrogation by Detectives Brown and Saavedra did not violate Miranda.
b. Angel's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary
A waiver of a person's Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 751 ["'a suspect [may] not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel'"]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992.) In the case of a juvenile, the determination whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary requires "special caution." (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 45; see Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 586, 599 [courts must use "special care in scrutinizing the record" to determine whether a minor's custodial confession is voluntary].) Because children "'generally are less mature and responsible than adults'" and often "'lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them'" (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) ___ U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310]), courts look to the totality of the circumstances, which includes an evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence, to determine whether he or she "has the capacity to understand the warnings given him [or her], the nature of his [or her] Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725; People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1167.)
This claim, too, is forfeited for failing to raise it in the juvenile court. It is also without merit. Although Angel was 14 years old, he had been arrested before for battery and disturbing the peace and was apparently familiar with Miranda warnings, expressly exercising his right to remain silent at the scene before changing his mind a significant time later and making a statement. He was in the ninth grade and receiving passing grades in his subject. There was no evidence of significant mental deficits, nor was there evidence he did not understand the warnings. To the contrary, after being readvised of his Miranda warnings at the Sheriff's station, Angel replied, "Yes. Yes. I understand. And yes, I want to talk about it." Angel's statements to police were recorded, and there was no evidence of coercion. Considering the totality of circumstances based on the limited and undisputed factual record before us, Angel's waiver more than satisfied federal constitutional standards.
Angel has alternatively argued his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to move to suppress his extrajudicial statements at the jurisdiction hearing. In light of our holding the statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda, we need not consider this claim.
--------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
PERLUSS, P. J. We concur:
ZELON, J.
JACKSON, J.