Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nos. SA074214, BA369542.
BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.
Defendant Michael Paul Andrews appeals from a judgment entered after he was found in violation of probation in two consolidated cases. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On December 10, 2010, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record, and finding no arguable issues, we affirm the judgment.
On April 26, 2010, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BA369542, defendant was convicted of one count of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, and one count of violating Penal Code section 487, both felonies. Under a plea agreement, he was placed on three years’ formal probation.
On May 3, 2010, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. SA074214, defendant was convicted, also pursuant to a plea agreement, of one count of petty theft with priors, in violation of Penal Code section 666, as charged in a three-count felony complaint. Pursuant to the agreement, the trial court dismissed the remaining counts, and sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on formal probation for a period of three years, under specified conditions, including the condition that he obey all laws. On the same day, defendant was found in violation of probation in case No. BA369542. The trial court revoked defendant’s probation, and reinstated it on the same terms and conditions.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Less than one week later, defendant was arrested on suspicion of grand theft of an automobile. In lieu of a new criminal charge, a probation revocation hearing was scheduled for May 14, 2010. On that date, when defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s mental competence, the trial court adjourned the proceedings and referred defendant for a mental evaluation.
On June 14, 2010, the trial court found defendant competent within the meaning of section 1368, and scheduled a probation violation hearing. On the day scheduled, defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel, and the trial court held a Marsden hearing. Defendant was permitted to state the reasons for his dissatisfaction, which had to do with counsel’s prior representation, leading to his plea bargain. When the trial court denied the Marsden motion, defendant indicated to the court that he did not intend to cooperate with counsel, and asked to represent himself.
See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124 (Marsden).
The court warned defendant of the dangers of self-representation, as well as the consequences of a probation violation, questioned him regarding his education and literacy, and told defendant of his right to counsel, to subpoena witness, produce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, as well as his right against self-incrimination. Defendant read and signed a form waiving his right to counsel, and told the court that he understood the rights stated in the form and explained by the court. He expressly waived his right to counsel. The court found that defendant was able to represent himself, and granted him pro. per. status.
The two cases were consolidated for a probation violation hearing, which went forward on July 14, 2010. Walter Mancilla Veliz testified that while he and Carlos Escobar were working on the demolition of a house, he heard his truck’s distinctive noise. When he investigated, he saw someone driving away in the truck with something in its bed, later determined to be defendant’s bicycle and backpack. Veliz identified defendant in court as the thief, and confirmed that he had not given defendant permission to drive the truck.
Veliz and Escobar followed defendant in Escobar’s truck, managed to force him to stop, and confronted him. When Veliz and Escobar confronted defendant, defendant told them that “they” had told him to steal it, and were waiting for him. Defendant then hit Veliz twice with his closed fist, once in the face, and once in the chest. Veliz hit defendant back, and defendant ran away. The police arrived soon afterward, and arrested him. Defendant caused damage to Veliz’s truck estimated at $1800.
Los Angeles Police Officer Tomas Rodda testified that he went to the location of the theft in response to a call, obtained a description of the thief from Veliz, and went in search of him. He found defendant and detained him. Veliz was brought to defendant’s location by other officers, and Veliz identified defendant as the person who had driven his truck without permission.
Defendant testified in his defense that Veliz’s truck was stopped in the street with the keys inside and the doors open. Defendant claimed that he had just entered the truck out of curiosity, when a furious Veliz appeared and started hitting him. Defendant ran away, intending to ask neighbors for help. He denied having stolen the truck.
The trial court found that defendant drove Veliz’s car without permission, a violation of law, causing defendant to be in violation of probation in both cases. As to case No. SA074214, the trial court terminated probation, and imposed the three-year prison sentence, with 158 days of custody credit, including 79 actual days in custody and 79 good time/work time credits. In addition to the fines and assessments required by law, the court ordered defendant to provide DNA samples and thumb and palm impressions.
In case No. BA369542, the trial court terminated probation and selected count 1, a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, as the principal term. The court imposed the high term of three years in prison, explaining that it did so based upon the aggravating factor that defendant had three felony cases brought against him in a six-week period. The court ran the three years concurrently with the term imposed in case No. SA074214. Because count 1, unlawfully driving a vehicle, and count 2, grand theft, involved the same vehicle, the court stayed count 2 pursuant to section 654. Defendant was awarded 136 days of custody credit, which included 68 actual days in custody and 68 good time/work time credits. The court ordered identical fines and fees as in case No. SA074214, and ordered defendant to provide DNA samples and thumb and palm impressions.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment entered in both cases on July 14, 2010. The trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.
We conclude that defendant has, by virtue of counsel’s compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)
The judgment is affirmed.