Opinion
SC 166294 COA 366970
03-08-2024
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENJAMIN OTTO ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Genesee CC: 22-049373-FH
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
ORDER
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 30, 2023 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Zahra, J., (dissenting).
This Court intervenes in a trial court decision at a preliminary examination to bind over defendant on charges of criminal sexual conduct. The district court that oversaw the preliminary examination heard testimony from the alleged victim, to whom defendant was an authority figure and stepfather. The victim testified in detail, subject to extensive cross-examination, on the nature, pressure, and coercive atmosphere of the alleged abuse. The district court credited the victim's version of events as sufficient to establish probable cause, although the court indicated that defendant could reasonably dispute the victim's story before a trier of fact. In so doing, the court found there was probable cause to conclude that defendant used force and coercion to engage in sexual penetration of the victim under MCL 750.520d(1)(b). Defendant appealed the bindover decision to the circuit court, which provided detailed analysis in affirming the district court's decision. After the circuit court decision, defendant filed leave for an interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals unanimously denied leave for lack of merit. Now having received an adverse decision at three levels of judicial review, defendant asks this high court to intervene in his dispute at the very earliest stages of this prosecution. Because of the highly deferential, interlocutory, and case-specific nature of this appeal, leave should be denied without greater appellate inquiry. The case should continue in the ordinary course of proceedings. Therefore, I dissent for the following reasons.
Although defendant did not raise the issue before the district court, he argues on appeal that the facts as recounted by the victim are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause as to "[f]orce or coercion" under MCL 750.520d(1)(b). But probable cause is an immensely fact-intensive inquiry that is flexible and dependent on case-specific credibility determinations. Probable cause is a low bar and does not require anywhere near as much evidence as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for jury convictions.Further, as the court tasked with balancing competing factors and weighing the strength of evidence, appellate courts defer to decisions by a district court binding over a defendant on criminal charges. Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and probable-cause determinations at the bindover hearing are reviewed for abuse of discretion. All reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Compare People v Aldrich, 246 Mich.App. 101, 116 (2001) ("To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal.").
Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."); People v Yost, 468 Mich. 122, 126 (2003) (explaining that probable cause requires only "evidence from which at least an inference may be drawn establishing the elements of the crime charged").
People v Carter, 250 Mich.App. 510, 521 (2002) (stating that probable cause only requires a reasonable belief in the commission of criminal activity); United States v Moore, 999 F.3d 993, 996 (CA 6, 2021) (explaining that probable cause is a "low bar"); Dist of Columbia v Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) ("Probable cause 'is not a high bar.' ") (citation omitted); Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n 13 ("In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.").
People v Reese, 491 Mich. 127, 159 (2012) ("[T]he standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.") (emphasis omitted); People v Cress, 468 Mich. 678, 691 (2003) ("[G]reat deference must be accorded to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.").
People v Anderson, 501 Mich. 175, 181-182 (2018). See also People v Beilman, 512 Mich. 933, 952-956 & nn 39-47 (2023) (Zahra, J., dissenting) (collecting sources) (discussing in detail the strong deference provided to trial court determinations and the highly fact-intensive nature of Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiries, such as probable cause). This is in line with a developed body of law deferring to trial court decisions on the existence of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (describing, in the context of warrants and the good-faith exception, appellate courts' deference to lower courts' probable-cause decisions" 'in . . . doubtful or marginal case[s]' ") (citation omitted).
See, e.g., People v Fairey, 325 Mich.App. 645, 650 (2018).
The district court here heard detailed descriptions of sexual abuse in a context of authority, imposed pressure, and shock. Observing the alleged victim in person, the district court expressly found the credibility of the victim sufficient to establish probable cause and indicated that defendant's factual disputes were "for the jury" to decide. While the victim did not physically resist and allegedly submitted due to an imposing and coercive atmosphere, the requirement of "force or coercion" under Michigan statutes cannot be interpreted to require the victim to force the assailant into a physical confrontation. It is established law that "[a] victim need not resist" to prosecute an assailant for criminal sexual conduct.
MCL 750.520i. The existence of "force or coercion" under the statute is determined "in light of all the circumstances and includes, but is not limited to, acts of physical force or violence, threats of force, threats of retaliation, inappropriate medical treatment, or concealment or surprise to overcome the victim." People v Crippen, 242 Mich.App. 278, 282-283 (2000) (emphasis omitted). Yet no physical compulsion or physically forced sex has ever been mandated by the statute. In line with the plain meaning of the terms and a basic understanding of how sexual abuse occurs, Michigan courts have recognized force or coercion when the victim's "practical choice" has been overcome. People v Eisen, 296 Mich.App. 326, 334-335 (2012) (holding that the victim's fear of the defendant and her fear that he might commit the act whether she "wanted it or not" was sufficient to find coercion); People v Brown, 197 Mich.App. 448, 450 (1992) (concluding that a victim sitting in a room "alone, naked, and crying" and her statements that she did not wish to have sex were sufficient to find coercion); Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining "coercion" as "[c]ompulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force"); Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed), p 326 ("implied coercion" is equivalent to "undue influence," which is defined as "[t]he improper use of power or trust in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective; the exercise of enough control over another person that a questioned act by this person would not have otherwise been performed, the person's free agency having been overmastered."); The Compact Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed) (defining "coercion" as "[c]onstraint, restraint, compulsion; the application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent"); United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office on Women's Health, Sexual Coercion ("Sexual coercion is unwanted sexual activity that happens when you are pressured, tricked, threatened, or forced in a nonphysical way.") <https://www.womenshealth.gov/relationships-and-safety/other-types/sexual-coercion#:~:text=Sexual%20coercion%20is%20unwanted%20sexual,%2C%20landlord% 2C%20or%20a%20boss> (accessed January 30, 2024) [https://perma.cc/RNZ4-VGYH]. Without this realistic, fact-based approach, the requirement of force or coercion would be tied directly to physical violence and therefore, through basic implication and application, impose on victims an obligation of physical resistance. But such a requirement has been expressly disavowed in Michigan law. MCL 750.520i.
Finally, this is an interlocutory appeal at the very start of the case, when parties are only beginning to develop their theories of the case and the record is only beginning to be compiled and strengthened. This Court cannot intervene in every bindover decision simply because the cold appellate record arguably supports a different result. Interlocutory appeals are highly disruptive and disfavored on their own, not to mention appeals of fact-intensive decisions at a nascent stage of a prosecution, for which trial courts are entitled special deference. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that defendant's claim lacked sufficient merit to proceed on this very preliminary and interlocutory appeal, conforming with the conclusions of both the district court and the circuit court. This state's high court should not intervene on an interlocutory basis in a fact-intensive dispute where three levels of judicial review support the same, single conclusion of probable cause. Our role is not to nitpick debatable fact questions, but to focus on legal issues of statewide significance. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
June Med Servs LLC v Russo, 591 US__, __; 140 S.Ct. 2103, 2141 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Taglieri v Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 408 (CA 6, 2018) ("While we largely read briefs for a living, [trial courts] largely assess the credibility of parties and witnesses for a living.")), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Org, 597 U.S. __; 142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022); People v Hine, 467 Mich. 242, 250 (2002) ("An abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference of opinion."); Beilman, 512 Mich. at 952-956 (Zahra, J., dissenting) (discussing in detail the importance of trial court discretion, especially as to Fourth Amendment questions such as probable cause and reasonableness).
See McCarthy & Assoc, Inc v Washburn, 194 Mich.App. 676, 680 (1992) (reasoning that interlocutory decisions can risk "piecemeal appeals and an unnecessary waste of judicial resources"); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the [trial] judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system."); 4 Am Jur 2d, Appellate Review, § 81, pp 728-729 (stating that limitations on interlocutory orders "prevent fragmentary and premature appeals that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice and . . . ensure that the trial courts fully and finally dispose of the case before an appeal can be heard").
People v Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 27 (1992) ("This Court alone is the ultimate authority with regard to the meaning and application of Michigan law."); Grievance Administrator v Deutch, 455 Mich. 149, 157 n 5 (1997) (restating this Court's demanding responsibilities "to promulgate rules that establish, modify, and amend the legal practice and procedure in all Michigan courts, including the power to regulate and discipline members of the Michigan bar"); People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich.App. 450, 475 (2014) (comparing the role of the Court of Appeals, which is the state's "error-correcting court," with the actions of the Michigan Supreme Court); see also People v Mathey, __Mich __ (2024) (Docket No. 165977) (Zahra, J., dissenting) (discussing this Court's appellate intervention on a highly deferential evidentiary question as a pursuit in error correction).