Opinion
No. 1-15-2179
08-29-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRYSTAL ALMARAZ, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
No. 14 CR 7010
Honorable Evelyn B. Clay, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Hyman and Mason concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Evidence sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery on accountability basis. Claim that the trial court made a trial finding against the manifest weight of the evidence is not cognizable separately from defendant's insufficiency claim.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial, Crystal Almaraz, the defendant, was convicted of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seven years. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict her beyond a
reasonable doubt. She also contends that the trial court's finding that the photographs of the victim's injuries proved defendant's knowledge of abuse ignored expert testimony and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
¶ 3 Defendant and codefendant Julio Galvez were charged with aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery for causing great bodily harm and permanent disfigurement to A.G. by striking her about the body, and burning her about the body, on or about September 14 through October 14, 2013. The aggravated battery counts alleged that defendants did so when they were at least 18 years old and A.G. was under 13 years old. The aggravated domestic battery counts alleged that A.G. is defendants' child. Defendant was tried separately from codefendant.
¶ 4 At the February 2015 trial, defendant's mother Sylvia Almaraz testified that defendant was born in 1989 and has four children including A.G., who was less than four years old as of trial. Sylvia visited defendant's home on October 14, 2013, when defendants and the children were there. She noticed that A.G. sat motionless and had a bruise-like mark on her cheek. Crystal and Julio left, leaving the children in Sylvia's care. Sylvia changed A.G.'s diaper and noticed multiple small "marks" on her buttocks. Upon removing A.G.'s clothing, Sylvia noticed scratches and marks, including a mark "like a burn," on her back and legs. She also noticed blood in A.G.'s ear, a scratch on her forehead previously covered by her hair, and a mark on her elbow. Sylvia immediately phoned Crystal; she answered the phone, but Julio answered Sylvia's question about what happened to A.G. and stated "that he was the one." Sylvia then phoned the police to report A.G.'s injuries, and A.G. was taken to a hospital. Sylvia was at A.G.'s hospital examination, and at trial identified various photographs as accurately depicting her injuries.
¶ 5 Crystal and Julio saw Sylvia on October 14 after their telephone confrontation. At that time, A.G. had no visible injuries but was crying, and Sylvia did not speak with either defendant.
Crystal told Sylvia on a later date that Julio had prevented her from phoning the police to report A.G.'s injuries. Sylvia was interviewed by Detective Anthony Lopez a few days after the incident, but denied telling him that she spoke with defendant on the telephone when she called upon discovering A.G.'s injuries. In a November interview, Sylvia told police that Crystal had told her that A.G. had fallen at a baby-sitter's home.
¶ 6 On cross-examination, Sylvia described her relationship with defendant as "bad" because she disapproved of Crystal's relationship with Julio and believed that he beat her. She had seen K.G., one of A.G.'s brothers, frequently "scuffling" with her, including pushing her to the ground. Sylvia did not notice any injuries on K.G. Sylvia denied that defendant had coached her on her testimony and maintained that they had "hardly" discussed the events of October 14. Crystal did not actually tell Sylvia that A.G. fell at a baby-sitter's home, but Sylvia told the police so in November because she was "very confused." To the best of Sylvia's knowledge, Crystal never struck any of her children.
¶ 7 On redirect examination, Sylvia testified that she did not see K.G. strike A.G. on the back, legs, stomach, or buttocks on October 14. She agreed with the characterization that "today, you want your daughter, the defendant, to get [K.G.] and [A.G.] back."
¶ 8 Dr. Yelena Dukarevich testified to being the physician who examined A.G. in the hospital on October 14, 2013. A.G. was "very anxious, guarded, afraid of strangers, really just terrified of everything." She had bruises on her forehead, both sides of her face, upper arms, abdomen, thighs, and knee. She had extensive linear bruising on her back and buttocks. She had a linear abrasion to her forehead, abrasions on her right cheek, a linear abrasion on her left cheek, more abrasions on her abdomen, and scratches to her feet. Dr. Dukarevich explained that linear abrasions are "typically a sign of nonaccidental trauma, specifically a patient potentially being
struck or hit with something." A.G. had a mark on her buttocks that was either a burn or "the mark of some kind of very specific object." Dr. Dukarevich described a mark on A.G.'s forehead as possibly "an old bruise," noted a "fading bruise" on her right cheek near another bruise, and explained that one of her back bruises was greenish because it "is more likely to be a little bit older." At trial, Dr. Dukarevich identified photographs of these various injuries.
¶ 9 Dr. Dukarevich diagnosed the injuries as consistent with child abuse. She explained that when toddlers fall, they usually fall forward, which is inconsistent with bruising to the cheeks, upper arms, back, buttocks, and thighs. She also considered it "very atypical, if not impossible" for linear and square bruises to the back and buttocks to occur accidentally. Rather than a fall, Dr. Dukarevich attributed A.G.'s observed injuries to being struck by a linear object. As A.G.'s injuries were immediately visible upon disrobing, Dr. Dukarevich opined that it would not be possible to bathe A.G. and not notice her injuries.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Dr. Dukarevich testified that A.G. appeared well-fed and well-groomed. She could not "tell with certainty when a bruise actually occurred" but "bruises do fade over time. A barely visible, greener, bruise is likely but not a hundred percent indicative of an older bruise. A bruise that's blue or red or swollen is a younger bruise. That being said, I can't give you an exact date or time." Dr. Dukarevich disagreed when asked "you could not tell how [the injuries] actually happened," admitting that "I could not tell exactly what caused the trauma to" A.G. but explaining that physicians "learn about how toddlers fall. And I have to say that neither myself nor any of my colleagues have ever seen accidental trauma similar in any way, shape, or form to what we saw on A.G." While some of the injuries could have been attributed to accident if they were not accompanied by the other injuries, collectively - and particularly the linear bruises on the back and buttocks - they could not. She was not certain whether the mark
on A.G.'s buttocks was a burn or "an imprint of a solid object" but was certain that it was one or the other, and "it could have [happened] hours to days" earlier.
¶ 11 Detective Anthony Lopez testified that he interviewed Crystal in November 2013 regarding A.G.'s injuries. When asked what she knew about the injuries, Crystal answered that she was aware only of codefendant spanking A.G. on October 14, first in her presence and then in the washroom behind a closed door. When asked why the injuries were so numerous "and maybe a week old," she did not answer. Defendant attributed a bruise on A.G.'s face to running, slipping on water, and falling on her face. She bathed A.G. on October 13 and saw no other injuries then. On cross-examination, Detective Lopez testified that defendant described codefendant as her live-in boyfriend and father of A.G. and K.G. She also told him that codefendant had since moved out and she had no further contact with him. She had not seen A.G. slip and fall but was told so by codefendant. She denied ever striking A.G., and she denied being afraid of codefendant.
¶ 12 Detective Lopez spoke with Sylvia in October 2013. Sylvia said that she spoke with Crystal on October 14, at which time defendant had attributed A.G.'s injuries to "falling onto a cooler" and Sylvia had replied that such injuries were not caused by falling on a cooler.
¶ 13 The court denied a directed finding motion. Crystal elected not to testify. Following closing arguments, the court found Crystal guilty. The court found her "claimed ignorance of the physical condition of her child" incredible "given the photos showing obviously to anyone, even persons who do not have a medical degree [that] they are a number of old injuries and very new injuries from red *** to greenish all over this child's body. There is no mother with any concern whatsoever would notice that and not take the child in to be examined." The court expressly found great bodily harm but not permanent disability.
¶ 14 Crystal filed a posttrial motion alleging in detail that the evidence was insufficient to convict her. Following arguments, the court denied the motion. The court found that A.G.'s "marks on her body, head to toe," constituted great bodily harm to a three-year-old. The court found that defendant was aware of codefendant's spanking of A.G. and accepted his account that she slipped and fell. By "her failure to act and protect that child, she did nothing, she aided and abetted [codefendant] in the battery of this child." The court then sentenced defendant to seven years' imprisonment, and this appeal followed.
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict her beyond a reasonable doubt, and in particular that the evidence was insufficient that defendant had knowledge of A.G.'s injuries and that those injuries constituted great bodily harm.
¶ 16 On a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to weigh, resolve conflicts in, and draw reasonable inferences from the testimony and other evidence, and it is better equipped than this court to do so as it heard the evidence. Id.; In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 59. We do not retry the defendant; that is, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Bradford, ¶ 12. The trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances; instead, it is sufficient if all the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Jonathon C.B., ¶ 60. The trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence, nor to seek all possible explanations consistent with innocence and elevate them to reasonable doubt, nor to find a witness was not credible merely
because the defendant says so. Id. A conviction will be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt remains. Bradford, ¶ 12.
¶ 17 A person commits aggravated battery if she is at least 18 years old when she "knowingly, and without legal justification by any means *** causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to any child under the age of 13 years." 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2014). A person commits aggravated domestic battery when she "knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement" as she "knowingly without legal justification by any means [c]auses bodily harm to any family or household member." 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), 12-3.3(a) (West 2014). What constitutes "great bodily harm" for purposes of aggravating a battery is a question of fact to be determined by the finder of fact, because it does not lend itself to a precise legal definition but does require proof of an injury more serious than a simple battery. People v. Mandarino, 2013 IL App (1st) 111772, ¶ 63.
¶ 18 A person is criminally accountable for the acts of another when "either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILCS 5/5-2(a) (West 2014). An express agreement is not necessary to establish a common purpose to commit a crime, therefore, accountability may be established by a defendant's knowledge of and participation in the criminal scheme even without evidence of her direct participation in the criminal act itself. People v. Hernandez, 2017 IL App (2d) 150731, ¶ 22. Evidence that a defendant maintained a close affiliation with her companions after the crime, or failed to report the crime, may be considered in determining her accountability. Id., ¶ 23.
¶ 19 A defendant's intent or knowledge are rarely susceptible of direct proof and may be established by circumstantial evidence; that is, an inference may be drawn from the defendant's acts and the circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct to establish defendant had the requisite intent or knowledge. Id., ¶ 22; People v. White, 2016 IL App (2d) 140479, ¶ 37; People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (3d) 121016, ¶ 28.
¶ 20 Here, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State as we must, we find the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated battery of a child and aggravated domestic battery. The testimony of Dr. Dukarevich and Sylvia, and the photographs they authenticated, firmly established the extent of A.G.'s injuries on October 14. Dr. Dukarevich explained why she ruled out accidental causes, such as a fall, for such injuries. As to defendant's knowledge of A.G.'s injuries, Dr. Dukarevich and Sylvia established that A.G.'s injuries were readily visible upon disrobing her for bathing or changing, and Crystal admitted to Detective Lopez that she bathed A.G. on October 13. Defendant argues that Dr. Dukarevich could not be certain when A.G.'s injuries occurred, in support of the defense theory that A.G. was injured in a single recent incident that defendant would not have detected before Dr. Dukarevich and Sylvia saw the injuries. However, Dr. Dukarevich also testified that A.G. had fading and greenish bruises, and explained that red, greenish bruises indicate the relative age of the bruises. Moreover, the court could view the photographs of the injuries for itself in light of Dr. Dukarevich's testimony. It was not unreasonable for the trier of fact to infer from such evidence that A.G.'s injuries were not all of the same age and thus reject the defendant's theory of a single recent incident. Lastly, given the extent of A.G.'s injuries, we do not consider the court's finding of great bodily harm unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory.
¶ 21 Defendant also contends that one of the trial court's bench-trial findings - photographs of A.G.'s injuries proved defendant's knowledge of A.G.'s abuse - ignored expert testimony and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. The standard of review in a criminal case after a verdict of guilty where the defendant questions the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the essential elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. The case defendant cites is a case that uses a manifest-weight of the evidence standard to review a trial court's findings after a hearing on a motion to suppress. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011). We find that the defendant has confused the standard of review to be used when this court reviews a trial court's findings after a hearing on a motion to suppress, with the standard of review to be used in criminal cases where we review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. We find defendant's argument has no merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 22 Affirmed.