Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. VA095148, Margaret Miller Bernal, Judge.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
Following a trial at which he represented himself, a jury convicted Israel Alexander Williamson II of assault with intent to commit a felony (count 2; Pen. Code, §§ 220, 264.1, 288, 289), sexual battery by restraint (count 3; Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)), and false imprisonment by violence (count 4; Pen. Code, § 236). The trial court sentenced Williamson to four years in state prison for the assault conviction and concurrent sentences of three years for the sexual battery conviction and two years for the false imprisonment conviction. Williamson, now represented on appeal by counsel, seeks reversal of his conviction on the ground the trial court erred in finding him mentally competent to waive his right to assistance of counsel. We modify the judgment to stay execution of his conviction for sexual battery and false imprisonment under section 654 and affirm the judgment as modified.
All section references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
A. Commitment Crime
At 6:30 in the morning on May 2, 2006, Williamson followed Rosemary C. to her apartment building from the bus station and assaulted her. He lifted her skirt and touched her vagina underneath her underwear as she unlocked the door to her apartment building. He tried to cover her mouth, but she struggled with him and screamed for help. Rosemary turned and saw that his pants were undone and he had an erect penis. He said, “Bitch, I just want to fuck you.” Williamson ran off when Rosemary’s 15-year-old daughter, M.C., came out of the building in response to her cries for help. The police found Williamson at a nearby bus stop and brought Rosemary there to identify him. Rosemary and M.C. also identified him out of a photographic lineup. Williamson confessed to the assault during an interview with the Norwalk police that day. He was charged as described above and taken into custody. Williamson was referred to department 95 for an evaluation of his mental competency on July 13, 2006 and October 31, 2006. He was found competent to stand trial in both instances.
Due to the nature of the offense, the last name of the sexual assault victim is omitted.
Count 1 for kidnapping to commit rape was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
B. Competency Hearing
On March 13, 2007, Williamson demanded another lawyer on the ground it was against his “religious background” to be represented by a Hispanic lawyer since he had “never been to a church with anyone of that race.” According to Williamson, “I don’t politic with any Spanish. I don’t mean to be a racist, but I don’t mingle, talk to, communicate with Spanish at all.” The court denied his motion. On March 20, 2007, Williamson rejected the prosecution’s offer of a sentence of four years eight months. Williamson then demanded to represent himself. The trial court declared a doubt as to Williamson’s mental competence pursuant to section 1368 and appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate him and address the issue of his ability to understand the implications of his demand.
Dr. Kaushal Sharma was unable to examine Williamson because he refused to meet with him. Dr. Sanjay M. Sahgal interviewed Williamson and determined he did not suffer from any mental illness. He observed:
“The defendant’s thought processes were linear and coherent. There was no clinical evidence of delusional thinking. The defendant denied experiencing hallucinations and he did not appear to be responding to internal stimuli. [¶] The defendant’s cognitive examination was intact based upon screening questions for memory, language, concentration, and attention. [¶] . . . [¶] The defendant meets the first criterion for mental competency. He was able to state the charges against him. . . . He was able to understand the roles of the judge, jury, public defender, and prosecutor in a typical jury trial. It should be noted that he did not answer specific questions about these issues but his cognitive performance during the interview suggested that he had this capability. The same is likely true for the concept of plea bargaining and the meanings of the various pleas in our legal system. I believe that the defendant demonstrated adequate cognition during the interview such that he likely understands the nature and purpose of the legal proceedings against him or would be able to do so if these things wer[e] explained to him. [¶] The defendant also meets the second criterion for mental competency. When he wanted to, the defendant participated in the interview in a meaningful and engaging manner. He did not demonstrate any substantial cognitive deficits or delusional thoughts. I believe that the defendant is capable of cooperating in a rational manner if he chooses to do so. [¶] Because the defendant meets both criteria for mental competency, it is my opinion that he is currently competent to stand trial.”
Dr. Sahgal concluded, “it appeared that the defendant was being unreasonable and perhaps unwise in his reluctance to work with his attorney and in his insistence on representing himself. Being unreasonable or unwise does not suggest that an individual is incompetent to stand trial. For the defendant to be incompetent to stand trial, there would have to be an authentic mental disorder that impairs his ability to cooperate in a rational manner. At this time, I believe that he is simply choosing not to cooperate based upon his personality, stubbornness, and personal viewpoint. Therefore, I believe he is competent to stand trial given the presumption of competency in our legal system.”
The trial court found Williamson competent and able to proceed as his own counsel. Following an extended colloquy, the trial court found Williamson “made an unequivocal voluntary, knowingly, intelligent waiver of his right to be represented by an attorney with full understanding of that right.”
C. Trial
In a two-day jury trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Rosemary and her daughter that supported the facts recited above. The prosecution also presented testimony from the detective who interviewed Williamson and the officer who prepared the photographic lineup. A transcript of Williamson’s interview was introduced into evidence. In his opening statement, Williamson told the jury:
“I just lost a parent probably like three weeks or a month before. Less than three weeks. Two weeks probably. And I was on my way to Disneyland and I saw someone that I thought I knew. And I used to always joke around with her in high school. So I approached her with a gag and when the person turned around, it wasn’t them so I immediately turned around and tried to get away from her. She exploded. I tried to apologize. She wouldn’t listen. I tried to help her gather her things and explain where I knew her from, but she just—we didn’t even speak the same language, as a matter of fact. [¶] So the woman went inside. I tried to just say something to her but things didn’t work out, so I turned round and I went down to the park. And she started sending her daughter at me, so I got kind of embarrassed and I tried to tell [her] daughter sorry, but she swung so I left it alone, and ended up leaving where I was at. I’m trying to aim for school again and things didn’t work out. And recently I got called by the police. [¶] I just – I aim to . . . be a student again one day real soon, to be a student athlete again real soon. I’d like to apologize for my actions and hopefully maybe mend the scar that I left. . . . I don’t want to be in jail until I’m 26 not getting the education that I’m on course to get . . . I apologize. I was actually sober, so that’s why I know it really makes it worse. Well, I might have drank at 10:00 . . . that night. I just wanted to say I’m sorry. And I have little people at home, not children of my own, but other relatives I have to help out with bills, and I just made a very dumb mistake, and I don’t want to put the burden on one—what do you call it? Mature figure when they haven’t proven all the way that things can get taken care of. Besides that and myself, I’m so sorry for doing what I did and I just don’t want to be stuck here.”
On cross-examination, Williamson apologized to Rosemary and asked if there was anything he could do to make it up to her. He also asked, “Did she enjoy it, me putting my hands on her?” He asked M.C., “Are you okay from encountering me? Is everything okay? Is everything cool with you now? Is everything cool and going smoothly without me intervening[?] Williamson presented no other defense, failed to cross-examine the other witnesses, and declined to take the stand when asked by the court.
The jury found Williamson guilty on all counts and he was sentenced as previously detailed. Williamson requested and was appointed an attorney to represent him on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Williamson contends his convictions must be reversed for the trial court’s erroneous finding of competency. We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Williamson was competent to waive his right to assistance of counsel. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140.) We also find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a second competency hearing after trial began.
I. Waiver of the Right to Counsel
A defendant may waive the right to assistance of counsel if: (1) he is competent to waive the right, and (2) the waiver is knowing and voluntary. (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401 & fn. 12; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835-836 (Faretta); People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 140.)
A. Competence to Waive the Right
The standard for competency to waive the right to assistance of counsel has been equated with that for competency to stand trial: the defendant must have a “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,’ ” and must have “ ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 396, 397-402; see also People v. Nauton (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 976, 979.)
Dr. Sahgal found, “[Williamson] was able to state the charges against him. . . . He was able to understand the roles of the judge, jury, public defender, and prosecutor in a typical jury trial.” Indeed, Williamson understood enough about the proceedings against him to attempt to explain his actions to the jury—that he thought Rosemary was someone he knew from high school and the “gag” he wanted to play on her simply went horribly awry. He also attempted to elicit sympathy from the jury by telling them he had recently lost a parent and he wanted to go back to school. Dr. Sahgal further concluded Williamson was able to cooperate with his lawyer, if he chose to do so. That he simply chose not to cooperate “based upon his personality, stubbornness, and personal viewpoint” is not sufficient to show he was unable to do so.
Nevertheless, Williamson argues there was insufficient evidence he “had the constitutionally required ‘rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ [citation] or, as the trial court required, that appellant understood the ramifications of proceeding without an attorney—which requires in turn a predicate understanding of the basic function and purpose of a jury trial. . . . [¶] Nowhere on the record is there any indication that appellant was ever cognizant of, or made cognizant of, what a jury trial meant, what a defense attorney does, what the prosecutor’s role would be, what, in short, was the real-world point of the proceeding, and what part he was to play in it, if he chose to act as his own counsel.”
By comparison, Williamson cites to various cases in which the defendant waived the right to counsel and demonstrated considerable legal knowledge in providing his own defense. (See People v. Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 711; People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 142.) None of these cases, however, stand for the proposition that a defendant must be a legal expert to affect a valid waiver of his right to assistance of counsel. “[C]ompetence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” (Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 399.) In Faretta, the Court held that a defendant who chooses self-representation must do so “competently and intelligently,” but made it clear that the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” is “not relevant” to the determination of whether he is competent to waive the right to counsel, and that, although the defendant “may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.” (Faretta, supra, 422U.S. at p. 834.) Thus, “a criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation.” (Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 400, fn. & italics omitted.)
Under this standard, Williamson’s lack of legal expertise to put on an effective defense is not sufficient basis to deny his right to self-representation. Indeed, he “has the right to present no defense and to take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty. [Citations.]” (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617, fn. omitted; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364-1365.) We find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Williamson was competent to waive his right to counsel. (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 131.)
B. Voluntary Waiver
“ ‘ “The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 140.) Williamson focuses on Dr. Sahgal’s report which stated that he either understood or had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him “if these things were explained to him.” Williamson contends he did not affect a voluntary waiver of his right to an attorney because the court failed to explain the proceedings against him.
Our review of the record reveals an extended colloquy in which the trial court advised Williamson of the charges against him and the potential consequences if he were convicted. He was advised a lawyer would investigate his case, file pretrial motions, and advise him, but that he would have to prepare his own defense, including doing his own research and conducting his own investigation, if he represented himself. He was also told he would get no special treatment, that the prosecutor was experienced and prepared, and would not give him any consideration just because he was representing himself. As required under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pages 835-836, Williamson indicated he was willing to give up these rights.
Despite the extensive Faretta waivers, Williamson contends he lacked a real understanding of what he was giving up. In particular, Williamson complains the trial court did not adequately explain what a “defense” was. According to Williamson, “[i]f appellant did not understand the concept of ‘defenses’ or a ‘defense,’ appellant lacked not just a core legal concept, but the essential comprehension of what a criminal trial is for.” Williamson overstates his mental incapacity. He understood enough of the proceedings against him to try to explain his actions to the jury in his opening statement. This was a defense, albeit an ineffective one. There is no indication Williamson did not understand the proceedings against him or that he was waiving certain rights, advised by the court, by choosing to represent himself.
II. Further Competency Hearing
Williamson further contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court did not, on its own initiative, make a renewed inquiry into his mental competency during the trial when it became obvious that Williamson had no factual or rational understanding of the proceedings against him. Specifically, Williamson points to his opening statement, his unusual statements to Rosemary and her daughter during cross-examination, his statements at sentencing that he would be released, and his wish to have a retrial with former counsel. Williamson also focuses on the trial court’s statement that he be referred to psychiatric care once incarcerated.
Where, as here, the defendant was found to be competent at three pretrial competency hearings, a trial court is not required to conduct a further competency hearing unless it is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence that raises a serious doubt about the validity of the competency finding. (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153.) More is required than just the defendant’s bizarre statements or actions. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33 [no substantial change of circumstances to warrant a second competency hearing despite unusual statements by defendant about his having large amounts of money, that he was a god, that the President and Governor were conspiring against him, and that the conspirators would be beheaded]; People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 727.) We generally give great deference to a trial court’s decision whether to hold a competency hearing. (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 33.) We cannot say as a matter of law that the statements in question were a “substantial change of circumstances” requiring the trial court to hold a second competency hearing. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a second competency hearing. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 543.)
III. Revocation
We are also not persuaded that the trial court erred by failing to revoke his in pro. per. status. Trial courts may revoke in pro. per. status for misconduct that seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial. (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 7-8.) Williamson claims the integrity of the trial was compromised when he proved unable to effectively represent himself. An ineffective defense or no defense is not a basis to revoke a defendant’s choice to represent himself. (See People v. Parento (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1378 [no error for court not to appoint counsel after in pro. per. defendant refused to participate and was absent from trial].)
We further decline to flout long-standing precedent that holds the standard to evaluate whether a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial is the same as the one to determine whether a defendant is competent to represent himself. (Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12.) Williamson urges us to impose a higher standard on a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court most recently addressed this issue in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) __ U.S. __ [128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d. 345]. There, the court held “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (Id. at p. 2388.) In reaching this conclusion, the court differentiated the mental capacity necessary to stand trial and the capacity necessary to represent oneself. However, Indiana v. Edwards only deals with whether a court may deny a “gray-area” defendant his right to self-representation, not whether it must do so. The facts in this case are more analogous to those in Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at pages 400-401, which “involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godinez’s constitutional holding is that a State may do so.” (Indiana v. Edwards, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2385].) Accordingly, we continue to be bound by the standard enunciated in Godinez.
IV. Sentencing Issues
Finally, Williamson contends the sentences on his conviction for sexual battery by restraint (count 3) and false imprisonment by violence (count 4) should be stayed under section 654, which prohibits multiple punishment for a single act. Where a course of criminal conduct is found to be divisible into separate acts, however, each act may result in a separate punishment. (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 637.) Whether a course of conduct is divisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. Where all the offenses were incident to one objective, these acts are indivisible, and the defendant may only be punished for any one of the offenses. (Ibid.)
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.”
The prosecution concedes the sentence should be stayed as to the false imprisonment conviction, but argues the sentence imposed for the sexual battery conviction should not be stayed. (§ 654; People v. Han (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 797, 809; People v. Martinez (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 851, 858.) According to the prosecution, Williamson’s objective in “reach[ing] under the victim’s skirt and touch[ing] her vagina before he threw her to the ground” was sexual arousal while his objective in “[throwing] the victim to the ground while expressing an intent to ‘fuck’ her” was to facilitate a rape. We disagree. We find the acts leading to the conviction in count 3 for sexual battery holds the same criminal objective as those acts leading to the conviction in count 2 for assault with intent to commit rape. (See People v. Bradley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1158.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay execution of the sentences imposed for the sexual battery by restraint conviction (count 3) and for the false imprisonment by violence conviction (count 4). The superior court is directed to modify the abstract of judgment accordingly and forward it to the Department of Corrections. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.