Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County Super. Ct. No. TA089064-01 of Los Angeles Arthur M. Lew, Judge
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Lamont Ramon Alexander appeals an order of probation granted after he pleaded nolo contendere to possession of cocaine base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.) We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Around 9:15 p.m. on a February evening, Los Angeles Police Officer Reyes and Hernandez were patrolling near West Colden Avenue in Los Angeles, an area of narcotics trafficking and criminal street gang activity. A criminal street gang murder occurred at the intersection of West Colden and Broadway Avenues the prior week.
The police officers saw four men standing behind a parked automobile at 313 West Colden Avenue. Hernandez recognized one of the men, Felton Patterson, as a "Hoover Crips" criminal street gang member who was on parole following imprisonment for a firearm possession conviction. Officer Hernandez had arrested Patterson regarding the prior criminal offense. The officers decided to stop and were joined by additional police officers.
Officer Reyes testified that the four men standing behind the parked automobile "attract[ed]" his attention because "[i]t's a high narcotics gang area [and] a week prior . . . there was a homicide right at the corner of Broadway and Colden." He stated that he decided to stop because Officer Hernandez advised him that Patterson was a gang member and a parolee with a conviction for possession of a firearm.
Officer Reyes ordered the men to place their hands upon their heads to ensure the safety of the police officers, Alexander faced away from the officers and reached for his pants pocket. Reyes repeated the command, but Alexander continued to ignore it. Reyes then handcuffed and searched Alexander because he believed that he was reaching for a weapon or discarding contraband. His patdown search revealed cash and 27 wrapped packages of rock cocaine.
Alexander filed a motion to suppress evidence of the cash and rock cocaine, contending that he was illegally detained and searched. The trial court denied the motion, and stated that police officers "have every right to protect themselves" and that Alexander's refusal to place his hands upon his head and his persistence in reaching into his pocket was "suspicious activity."
Alexander then waived his constitutional rights and pleaded nolo contendere to possession of cocaine base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Alexander three years' probation, with terms and conditions including payment of a $200 restitution fine and a $200 suspended probation revocation restitution fine. (Pen. Code, §§ 1202.4, 1202.44.)
Alexander appeals and contends that he was illegally detained and searched.
DISCUSSION
Alexander argues that the police officers had no reason to believe that he was involved in or planning criminal activity or that he was a parolee subject to search. He asserts that police officers may not detain and search him merely because he was associating with a parolee in a public place.
In a proceeding to suppress evidence, the trial court determines the credibility of witnesses, resolves conflicts in the evidence, weighs the evidence, and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom in deciding whether a search is reasonable. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) Upon review, we defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings that are supported by sufficient evidence. (Ibid.) We exercise our independent judgment, however, to determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable. (Id., at pp. 673-674; People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837, 846.)
A detention and subsequent search for concealed weapons are constitutionally reasonable if the police officer describes specific and articulable facts that warrant the intrusion. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.) "[T]he temporary detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than an arrest, be based on 'some objective manifestation' that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 230.) An area's reputation for criminal activity and the time of night are proper considerations in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Id., at pp. 240-241.) We consider the totality of the circumstances, not isolated factors, in determining whether a detention is reasonable. (People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233.)
Here the detention and patdown search were reasonable within the Fourth Amendment. Defendant stood with a parolee and criminal street gang member and two other men behind a parked automobile at night. The neighborhood was known for narcotics activity and street gang crimes. A criminal street gang murder had occurred the prior week at the nearby intersection. The parolee had been convicted of illegal possession of a firearm. The police officers acted reasonably in asking defendant to place his hands upon his head to ensure their safety while they investigated the parolee's presence and purpose in the area.
People v. Matelski, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 837, is persuasive. There police officers detained persons leaving the residence of a probationer to determine their identities and purposes. Matelski concluded that the brief detention was a minimal intrusion upon defendants' privacy justified by the government interests in conducting a probation search. (Id., at p. 852.)
Having lawfully detained Alexander, the patdown search for concealed weapons was reasonable. (People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.) Police officers may conduct a limited warrantless search for weapons in order to protect themselves and others nearby if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person searched is armed and dangerous. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30; People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Here, despite repeated commands, Alexander refused to place his hands upon his head. Instead, he turned away from the officers and reached inside his pants pocket. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the police officers to assume that Alexander may have been armed and reaching for a weapon.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J., PERREN, J.