Opinion
E068408
08-01-2018
In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric A. Swenson, Jennifer B. Truong, and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600256) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Dismissed. Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric A. Swenson, Jennifer B. Truong, and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On April 26, 2017, pursuant to the People's motion, the juvenile court withdrew the Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 notice of hearing filed on April 25, 2017, against defendant and appellant, A.C. (Minor), born in April 2000. The juvenile court found probable cause existed "for detention of the [M]inor commencing April 24, 2017." On appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court erred in finding probable cause existed for the detention of Minor. We dismiss the appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 2015, the People filed a first amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging Minor had committed two counts of felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (counts 1 & 4; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and two counts of misdemeanor petty theft (counts 2 & 3; Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)). At the hearing on March 13, 2015, the People moved to reduce the counts 1 and 4 allegations to misdemeanors pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b); the court granted the motion. Minor admitted the allegations in counts 1 and 4. The court dismissed the counts 2 and 3 allegations on the People's motion. On March 26, 2015, the court declared Minor a ward of the court, granted her probation, but continued her placement in juvenile hall while awaiting placement in a suitable foster care facility as determined by probation.
The court took a bare stipulation there was a factual basis to the admission. "If the trial court inquires of defense counsel regarding the factual basis, it should request that defense counsel stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or written plea agreement." (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 444.)
Minor was apparently placed in such a facility at some point thereafter, but left it without permission on May 11, 2015. On May 12, 2015, the People filed a section 602, subdivision (a) petition alleging Minor had violated a term of her probation by leaving her placement facility without authorization. On May 18, 2015, Minor admitted the violation of probation. The court continued Minor as a ward of the court on probation in placement.
The court again took a bare stipulation there was a factual basis for the admission.
The court issued an arrest warrant on August 19, 2015, after Minor again left her placement without permission. On the same day, the People filed a juvenile petition alleging Minor had violated her probation by leaving her placement without authorization. Minor was arrested on or about September 15, 2015, in Las Vegas, for giving false information to a police officer; Minor admitted the allegation. The probation officer later noted Minor had been accepted in a placement in Iowa and would tentatively be placed there on December 23, 2015. Minor was apparently placed in Iowa on January 12, 2016. However, on March 14, 2016, the probation officer recommended Minor be removed from her out-of-state placement and be returned to her parents due to continued medical problems. On March 25, 2016, the court placed Minor with her parents.
There is nothing in the record which expressly reflects the court actually took an admission or found true the allegation Minor violated a term of her probation by leaving her placement without authorization. However, we infer the court rendered such a finding on the violation due to its subsequent placement of Minor in a more restrictive environment. --------
On May 5, 2016, probation filed a section 777 notice of hearing requesting removal of Minor from the physical custody of her parents. Minor left home without permission on May 4, 2016. Minor was picked up on an arrest warrant on May 12, 2016. At the hearing on May 17, 2016, the court found: "A prima facie showing has been made that the minor comes within . . . Section 602 or 777." The court found by clear and convincing evidence that continuance in her parents' custody would be contrary to Minor's welfare. The court vested temporary placement and care of Minor with the probation officer pending disposition or further order of the court. The court noted that "[p]robable cause did exist for the detention of the minor commencing May 16th, 2016." The court set the contested jurisdictional hearing on the section 777 notice.
On June 7, 2016, the People agreed to withdraw the section 777 notice and file a section 778 change of circumstances with the understanding Minor would admit the change of circumstances. On June 22, 2016, probation filed the section 778 change of circumstances alleging the previous disposition had not been effective in rehabilitating Minor and that it was no longer in Minor's best interest to remain in her parents' custody. On the same day, Minor submitted on the allegations, the court found a change of circumstances, and the court ordered Minor detained until she could be placed in a suitable placement facility.
On December 6, 2016, in a six-month review memorandum, probation recommended Minor remain a ward of the court, but be returned to the physical custody of her parents. On December 14, 2016, the court released Minor to her parents.
On January 24, 2017, probation filed another section 777 notice of hearing and requested issuance of an arrest warrant after Minor left home without permission on January 20, 2016. The court issued the arrest warrant. The Los Angeles Police Department detained Minor on the arrest warrant on January 30, 2017.
At the detention hearing on February 1, 2017, the court noted: "I'm going to make detention findings without any prejudice to either party, just for funding purposes and technical purposes." The court found prima facie evidence Minor came within section 602 or 777. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that a return of Minor to her parents' custody was contrary to her welfare. The court found grounds for detention existed because Minor was likely to violate court orders and flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court.
On February 3, 2017, Minor admitted the allegation she ran away. On February 9, 2017, the court ordered Minor to cooperate with a Wraparound program and ordered Minor released to her parents once Wraparound services were in place and ready to commence. On February 28, 2017, the juvenile court released Minor in hopes that the safety plan from Wraparound would be completed soon, Minor would be accepted into it, and Minor would participate in the program as ordered.
On April 25, 2017, probation filed another section 777 notice of hearing noting Minor had been taken into custody on April 24, 2017. Minor tested positive for opiates on March 28, 2017. At the hearing on April 26, 2017, defense counsel noted: "I believe that the [section] 777 [notice] is going to be dismissed. [Minor] takes Tylenol with codeine, and the tests that probation did are not fine enough to be able to distinguish between Tylenol with codeine and some other type of drug."
The People moved to withdraw the section 777 notice. The court ordered the section 777 notice withdrawn. The court found that a prima facie case for detention of Minor had been made: "Grounds for detention existed for the necessity for the protection of the minor. But the Court will state that, on the record, that there appears to be a miscalculation by probation without appropriate follow-up based upon her medications." The court found that "[p]robable cause did exist for detention of the minor commencing April 24, 2017." The court ordered Minor released.
Defense counsel objected: "For the record, we are objecting to any detention findings because as far as we're concerned, this was an illegal detention." The court responded: "That's noted for the record. Again, the Court stated it's for funding purposes only to make sure proper funding is established." Defense counsel requested the appointment of a civil attorney "to look at any civil remedies related to this case." The court responded defense counsel could file a motion with respect to that issue and the court would then consider the matter.
II. DISCUSSION
Minor contends the juvenile court erred in determining there was probable cause for the detention of Minor because insufficient evidence supported the detention and it "is not constitutionally permissible for a juvenile court to order the parents of a minor child to pay the costs of maintaining the minor in a detention facility where the minor was placed in such facility pursuant to a petition for wardship which was subsequently dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence." The People respond that Minor's positive test for a controlled substance supported the court's finding and that Minor's claims regarding her parents' liability are moot because the court did not order them to pay any costs.
We ordered supplemental briefing to address three issues: (1) whether there was an appealable order from which Minor could appeal where the section 777 notice was withdrawn; (2) whether, assuming an appealable order exists, Minor has standing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the imposition of costs upon her parents; and (3) whether, assuming the order is appealable and Minor has standing, the issue is ripe since the court did not find Minor's parents liable for any costs associated with her detention. We hold there is simply no appealable order and dismiss the appeal.
"A judgment in a proceeding under Section 601 or 602 may be appealed from, by the minor, in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from, by the minor, as from an order after judgment." (§ 800, subd. (a).) "An appeal may be taken by the people from any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) An order made after judgment entered pursuant to Section 777 or 785." (§ 800, subd. (b)(2).)
"[W]henever a minor is taken into custody by a peace officer or probation officer . . . the minor shall be released within 48 hours after having been taken into custody . . . unless within that period of time a petition to declare the minor a ward has been filed pursuant to this chapter . . . ." (§ 631.) The purpose of the statute to compel a hearing within 48 hours of the taking of a minor into custody is to compel a hearing as soon as possible. (In re Larry W. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 290, 293.) A detention hearing is a hearing at which a judge of the juvenile court shall "determine whether the minor shall be further detained." (§ 632, subd. (a).) "There is no provision for an appeal from an order of detention. [Citations.]" (In re Macidon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 600, 607.) An appeal from a juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders challenging predetention removal and detention orders is moot where those orders are superseded by the dispositional orders. (See In re Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1089.)
Here, the juvenile court did not even enter a detention order, which itself would not have even been appealable. Rather, the court's order appears to be directed at probation's "pre-detention" of Minor or its taking of Minor into custody based on the allegations contained in the section 777 notice of hearing. A detention order is an order which determines whether a minor shall be further detained. (§ 632, subd. (a).) The court did not render an order regarding whether Minor should be further detained. This is because, prior to the court's ability to even consider the matter, the People moved to withdraw the section 777 notice of hearing which the court granted. Thus, there was no "detention" order to be appealed, let alone a dispositional order which would have been required for an appeal to be taken from which Minor could address any detention order.
The claims on appeal appear to derive from a confusion and conflation of the different meanings of the word "detention." One type of detention "has been said to occur 'if the suspect is not free to leave at will—if he is kept in the officer's presence by physical restraint, threat of force, or assertion of authority.' [Citation.]" (Evans v. City of Bakersfield (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321, 330.) Another type of detention is more accurately described as an arrest which includes "'taking a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized by law.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) The third is the result of a juvenile court's order that a minor should be further detained. (§ 632.) Here, although Minor was subject to the former two types of detentions, she was never subject to the third. Moreover, the court never entered a dispositional order which would have permitted the issue of the propriety of a detention order to be raised on appeal, if one had been entered.
Minor's chief complaint, or perhaps more accurately her parents' complaint, is that her parents may become liable for the costs of her incarceration. However, the court made no such order. The court noted: "[I]t's for funding purposes only to make sure proper funding is established." There is simply no indication that the "funding purposes" to which the court referred were any order or potential order for Minor's parents to pay the costs of Minor's detention. Indeed, the court issued similar findings previously, without objection, on May 17, 2016, and on February 1, 2017. During the latter hearing, the court issued the finding "without any prejudice to either party." This would suggest not only that the court was not ordering Minor's parents to pay the costs of Minor's detention, but that it had no intention of doing so in the future. Moreover, we note that the juvenile court previously found Minor's parents did not have the ability to reimburse the county for attorney's fees, despite the fact that her parents jointly made over $100,000 a year. Under these circumstances, not only is it clear the court was not ordering parents to pay the costs of Minor's detention, but it appears the court had no intention of ever doing so.
As the People note in their supplemental brief, the court in In re D.B. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 252 recently rejected a minor's challenge to a juvenile court's dispositional order after the probation officer recommended the court order reimbursement of certain county costs which the juvenile court specifically left out of its order. (Id. at p. 256.) The court first noted that "the juvenile court made no binding ruling regarding his parents' reimbursement obligations." (Id. at p. 258.) Thus, "[a]ny claim that the juvenile court erred in ordering Minor's parents to reimburse the county's legal costs . . . was premature and we reject it, because no final order for payment has yet been entered." (Id. at p. 260, fn. omitted.)
Here, similarly, the court made no binding ruling regarding Minor's parents' reimbursement obligations. Moreover, the juvenile court's finding that probable cause supported Minor's detention was not made as part of a section 632 detention order, let alone a dispositional order. Thus, the issue is not ripe for appeal. We leave for another day, should that day ever come, the issue of whether an order of the juvenile court requiring Minor's parents to reimburse the county for the costs of Minor's detention would be enforceable. (In re D.B., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 265; see In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021 [juvenile court order making the minor's mother jointly and severally liable for victim restitution was an appealable order].)
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J. We concur: SLOUGH
J. FIELDS
J.