Opinion
Docket No. 46789.
Decided August 27, 1980.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Don W. Atkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Gerald S. Surowiec, for defendant on appeal.
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant also appeals his guilty-plea conviction of habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085.
Initially, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress evidence of his prior convictions. The court heard arguments on the motion and recognized its discretion on the record. People v Roberson, 90 Mich. App. 196; 282 N.W.2d 280 (1979). We find that the court did not err in holding that the evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes, based upon the factors enunciated in People v Crawford, 83 Mich. App. 35; 268 N.W.2d 275 (1978), and MRE 609.
Defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the armed robbery and felony-firearm convictions is also without merit. The eyewitness testimony of the victim, coupled with the recovered stolen check made payable to the defendant, would enable a finder of fact to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich. 354; 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979).
Finally, defendant alleges that the habitual offender conviction must be reversed as being obtained contrary to People v Fountain, 407 Mich. 96; 282 N.W.2d 168 (1979). In view of the fact that defendant was sentenced to a lesser prison term as a result of the alleged error, we find no possible prejudice.
Affirmed.
E.A. QUINNELL, J., concurred.
I concur with the majority opinion but believe that the admissibility of prior convictions issue merits further comment.
The trial judge correctly noted his discretion on the record. People v Cherry, 393 Mich. 261; 224 N.W.2d 286 (1974). He did not, however, note his consideration of the Crawford (People v Crawford, 83 Mich. App. 35; 268 N.W.2d 275) factors in this matter, specifically, that defendant's convictions relate to credibility, that the probative value of admission outweighs any prejudicial effect and that there are no alternative, less burdensome means of impeaching the defendant while protecting his right to choose whether or not to testify. The trial court must note all three factors on the record in future cases. MRE 609, People v Joyner, 93 Mich. App. 554; 287 N.W.2d 286 (1979).