Opinion
No. 5:18-CV-284-D
07-11-2019
ROYCELIA LEILAN PENDER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Roycelia Leilan Pender ("Plaintiff") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the denial of her applications for disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). The time for filing responsive briefs has expired, and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the parties' filings, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #15] be granted, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #17] be denied, and the case be remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on April 1, 2010, which was denied on August 22, 2013. (R. 62-84.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a new application for a period of disability and DIB on August 29, 2013, with an alleged onset date of August 30, 2012. (R. 96-98.) The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for hearing was filed. (R. 96-112, 113, 139-40.) A hearing was held on June 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Joseph L. Brinkley, who issued an unfavorable ruling on October 5, 2017. (R. 13-27, 35-61.) On April 13, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. 1-5.) At that time, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner. See20 C.F.R. § 404.981. On June 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action, seeking judicial review of the final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On this date, Plaintiff also filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), which was denied on September 24, 2013, based on income ineligibility. (R. 114-19.) The decision denying Plaintiff's SSI application is not part of this appeal. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pldgs. [DE #16] at 1 n.1.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision denying disability benefits is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; [i]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), and Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 589) (first and second alterations in original). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court determines whether the Commissioner has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained the weight accorded to the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
II. Disability Determination
In making a disability determination, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step evaluation process. The Commissioner asks, sequentially, whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1; (4) can perform the requirements of past work; and, if not, (5) based on the claimant's age, work experience, and residual functional capacity can adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Albright v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th. Cir. 1995). At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id. "The Commissioner typically offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert responding to a hypothetical that incorporates the claimant's limitations. If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015).
III. ALJ's Findings
As a preliminary matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the requirements for insured status under the Social Security Act ("the Act") on December 31, 2015. (R. 16.) Therefore, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's application as to the period from August 30, 2012, to the date last insured on December 31, 2015. (Id.)
Applying the five-step, sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff "not disabled" as defined in the Act. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since August 30, 2012, the alleged onset date, through the date last insured of December 31, 2015 (R. 16.) Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "degenerative disc disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, headaches, and obesity." (Id.) The ALJ found Plaintiff's thyroid cancer non-severe where the "medical and other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work." (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. (R. 16.) The ALJ analyzed Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine). (Id.) Although there are no specific listings for hypertension, diabetes mellitus, headaches, or obesity, the ALJ evaluated these impairments under listings for other body systems and found that the requirements were not met. (R. 16-17.)
Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found that Plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). She can lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk for a combined six hours in an eight-hour workday with interruptions and regularly scheduled breaks; sit six hours in an eight-hour workday with interruptions and regularly scheduled breaks; frequently as opposed to constantly use the upper extremities to reach in all directions, handle, finger, feel, and grasp bilaterally; occasionally climb stair and ramps, kneel, and crouch; occasionally use the lower extremities to operate foot and leg controls bilaterally; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or crawl. She can have occasional exposure to temperature extremes, vibrations, and wetness. She cannot work around dangerous moving mechanical parts and unprotected heights. She cannot perform job tasks requiring her to stand and/or walk on uneven terrains. She may require the use of an assistive device for standing and/or walking for more than 45-minute intervals. She needs the option of alternating between sitting, standing, and walking every one hour. She would not need to leave the workstation when not on regularly scheduled breaks.(R. 17.) In making this assessment, the ALJ found Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms "not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record." (R. 19.) At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a pharmaceutical operator. (R. 25.) Next, the ALJ determined that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed, such as office helper, photocopy machine operator, and cashier. (R. 25-26.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from August 30, 2012, to December 31, 2015, the last date insured. (R. 26-27.)
The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff's work as a pharmaceutical operator, found in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 559.382-042, is medium, skilled work at Specific Vocational Preparation level (SVP) 5. (R. 56.) --------
IV. Plaintiff's Arguments
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by (1) failing to consider the findings contained in the prior decision in determining the RFC, and (2) failing to explain how the evidence supports the RFC. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pldgs. [DE #16] at 12-18.) The Commissioner contends the ALJ correctly evaluated the prior unfavorable decision and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC assessment. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pldgs. [DE #18] at 5-17.)
A. Prior Decision
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider a prior ALJ decision, which found Plaintiff capable of performing a limited range of sedentary work. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly stated that the prior decision found her RFC to be at the light work level when the prior decision stated she had the RFC to perform sedentary work. (R.68.) The Commissioner asserts the "ALJ specifically noted that in a prior ALJ decision issued on August 29, 2012, Plaintiff was determined to be capable of sedentary exertional activity with additional environmental limitations." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. J. Pldgs. at 7.) However, the record reflects that the ALJ mischaracterized the prior decision as finding Plaintiff capable of light work when, in fact, the prior decision assigned sedentary work. Because the ALJ failed to reconcile this ambiguity, the court is unable to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
"Remand may be appropriate where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636). "An ALJ has a duty to explain the administrative decision so as to enable meaningful judicial review." Parker v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-38-FL, 2014 WL 2604282, at *3 (E.D.N.C. June 11, 2014). Where courts are "left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on [Plaintiff's] ability to perform relevant functions and indeed, remain uncertain as to what the ALJ intended, remand is necessary." Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637. In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court may not "reweigh [the] evidence, make credibility determinations, or supplant the ALJ's judgment with our own." Sharp v. Colvin, 660 F. App'x 251, 259 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005)).
Here, there are inadequacies in the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's RFC was at the light exertional level. The prior decision—dated August 29, 2012—found Plaintiff to have the RFC to perform sedentary work with the ability to "sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour day, stand and walk for up to 2 hours in an 8-hour day, lift 10 pounds occasionally, and frequently lift and carry articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools." (R. 68.) However, the ALJ found through the date last insured of December 31, 2015, that Plaintiff had the RFC to "perform less than the full range of light work" with the ability to "lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk for a combined six hours in an eight-hour workday with interruptions and regularly scheduled breaks; sit six hours in an eight-hour workday with interruptions and regularly scheduled breaks." (R. 17.)
The court cannot conduct meaningful review of this increase to Plaintiff's RFC in light of the ambiguity created by the ALJ's statement that "[i]n a prior administrative law judge decision issued on August 29, 2012, [Plaintiff] was determined to be capable of light exertional activity with additional environmental limitations." (Id.) The ALJ continues:
Since the date of this [prior] decision, [Plaintiff] has been treated conservatively. She has had physical therapy for her musculoskeletal complaints but declined epidural steroid injections. Her diabetes
mellitus is uncontrolled, but she does not take her medication properly. Her hypertension is somewhat controlled, and her headaches responded to medication. I find [Plaintiff] is capable of a reduced range of light work with more specific manipulative, postural, and environmental restrictions, use of a cane, and a sit/stand option.(R. 17-18 (citations omitted).) It may well be that the ALJ found Plaintiff's RFC had improved since the prior decision, but there is also evidence that would support a contrary finding. Thus, the court is left to guess what the ALJ intended—whether he meant to state that Plaintiff's RFC in the prior decision was at the sedentary or light exertional level—and what the evidentiary basis was for his RFC assessment. Because the court is prohibited from supplanting the ALJ's judgment with its own, the case should be remanded.
B. RFC Analysis
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because it is not supported by any medical opinion. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. J. Pldgs. at 15-18.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered the record evidence and concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with enumerated limitations. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. J. Pldgs. at 9-17.) As set forth above, the basis for the ALJ's RFC determination is unclear. Accordingly, the case should be remanded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #15] be GRANTED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #17] be DENIED, and the case be REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until July 25, 2019, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
A party that does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, a party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
This 11th day of July 2019.
/s/_________
KIMBERLY A. SWANK
United States Magistrate Judge