Opinion
No. 50 C.D. 2012
05-15-2013
Caine Pelzer, Appellant v. Property Officer Pry C01, Property Officer Jenkins C01, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 Security Officer, John Doe 4 Security Sgt.
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Caine Pelzer appeals, pro se, from the July 7, 2011 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County (trial court) that sua sponte dismissed with prejudice Pelzer's: (1) Writ of Seizure (Writ); (2) Action in Replevin (Action); and (3) Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) (Application), pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1), on the basis that Pelzer did not set forth a cause of action, thereby making the matter frivolous. On appeal, Pelzer argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the Writ and Action because he has demonstrated a right to possession of certain property under Pennsylvania law and, therefore, has asserted a colorable cause of action for an action in replevin. Moreover, Pelzer asserts the trial court should have permitted him to proceed IFP because he has established his indigence. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court's Order and remand for further proceedings.
Rule 240(j)(1) permits a trial court, prior to ruling on an IFP request, to dismiss an action where the trial court is satisfied that the action is frivolous. Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). Rule 240(j) recently has been subdivided to include special provisions for suits that are instituted via a writ of summons and directs the trial court not to act on the IFP petition until a complaint is filed, which must occur within ninety days of filing the IFP petition. Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j)(2).
On or about July 5, 2011, Pelzer filed the Writ, Action and Application with the trial court. These documents named John Doe 1, John Doe 2, Property Officer Pry CO1, Property Officer Jenkins CO1, John Doe 3 Security Officer, and John Doe 4 Security Sgt. (collectively, Defendants), all of whom are employed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) - Houtzdale, as defendants in their individual and official capacities. In the Action, Pelzer avers the following facts.
10. Plaintiff, Caine Pelzer had his property packed by SCI-Somerset on November 14, 2010 to be transferred to SCI-Houtzdale which property consisted of (9) [b]oxes of property. Each box specifically had an individual inventory sheet documenting what was stored in each box, each inventory sheet was signed by [Pelzer] and (2) corrections officers at SCI-Somerset documenting its contents and the facts of it being in working/operable condition before being shipped to SCI-Houtzdale.
11. [Officers] Pry and Jenkins received [Pelzer's] property from the security department at SCI-Houtzdale on November 25, 2010, which consisted of 4 [b]oxes of property, (specifically) one (1) footlocker and three (3) brown boxes of [Pelzer's] property (one damaged television which seems like the bottom was hammered out) and (8) eight inventory slips [were] missing.
12. [Officers] Pry and Jenkins inventoried [Pelzer's] 4 boxes of property on November 25, 2010 and documented 1 damaged
television and 1 inventory slip was present which did not record all of [Pelzer's] property. This was conducted in the restricted housing unit [(RHU)].(Action ¶¶ 10-17.) Based on these allegations, Pelzer asserts that Defendants' actions have deprived him of the due process of law guaranteed by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Specifically, Pelzer stated:
13. On November 25th, 2010, [Pelzer] filed grievance #345383 documenting [Pelzer's] lost lawsuits and caseload to case #12727-2009 [L]uzerne Courthouse and Superior Court #1385 MDA 2010. As well as (nine) law books documented as 1) The Prisoners Guerilla Handbook, @ $49.95[;] #2) The Ceiling of America @ $22.95[;] #3) Represent Yourself In Court And Win @ $39.99[;] #4) The Criminal Law Handbook @ $39.99[;] #5) Lucifer - Ancient Law @ $20.00[;] #6) Justice Denied @ $19.00[;] #7) The Movement (Value Unknown); #8) Pa. Rules of Court - State (Price Unknown at this filing)[; and] #9) The Citebook @ $49.95.
14. On November 25, 2010, [Officers] [P]ry and [J]enkins confiscated [Pelzer's] property and took it somewhere off the housing unit (allegedly to security) and wrote a misconduct on [Pelzer] because he refused to throw away any property due to the fact 5 boxes were missing.
15. On [D]ecember 9, 2010, John [D]oe 1, 2, 3 and 4 performed another inventory on [Pelzer's] property with the same 4 boxes as the November 25, 2010 inventory. No previous inventory slips were found, but this time [Pelzer] was told to take (2) boxes of property in his (RHU) cell and that (2) boxes would be stored in property rooms located in the [RHU].
16. After it was discovered the other property would not be located, grievance no. 346908 was filed and a [t]elevision of lesser value was placed somewhere in [Pelzer's] storage area. All law books and legal documents listed herein have been kept from [Pelzer] as well as all inventory sheets documenting said lost property.
17. Defendants involved acknowledged the fact that [Pelzer] was received at SCI-Houtzdale with 9 boxes of property but has failed to protect [Pelzer's] property knowing the record is clear showing such deprivation of property without due process of law.
This claim is for negligence of the state committed by its employees ([D]efendants, C/O 1 Pry, C/O 1 Jenkins, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 and John Doe 4 at SCI-Houtzdale for the loss and destruction of [Pelzer's] property while acting within the scope of his/her duties on November 25, 2010[,] or any date prior to [Pelzer's] initial inventory done at SCI-Houtzdale where the destruction and loss of [his] property occurred.(Action ¶ 19.) Pelzer averred that the location of his missing property is unknown. (Action ¶ 21.) The Action sets the value of the damaged television at $245, of some of his missing books at $241.83, and states that the value of the missing books of "unknown" value would have to be determined by his family, who had purchased the books, and the value of the missing lawsuits and case load would have to be determined by the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. (Action ¶ 20.) The Writ identified the property listed in paragraph 13 of the Action and requested that the Clearfield County Sheriff seize the listed property. (Writ.) Finally, in the Application, Pelzer avers, inter alia, that he is unable to pay the fees and costs of prosecuting this action, he is unable to obtain funds from others to pay for the litigation, and he has no job or other assets to assist in funding his litigation. (Application.)
The trial court issued its Order on July 7, 2011, pursuant to Rule 240(j), dismissing the matter with prejudice based on the trial court's conclusion that the litigation was frivolous because Pelzer did not set forth a cause of action. Pelzer now appeals to this Court.
Our review of a trial court order dismissing an action pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j) is limited to determining whether an appellant's constitutional rights have been violated and "whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law." McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 798 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). An abuse of discretion occurs where, "in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will." Appeal of Lynch Community Homes, Inc., 522 A.2d 716, 719 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
On appeal, Pelzer argues that he has asserted a colorable claim for an action in replevin because he had property rights associated with the five missing boxes and the damaged television, of which Defendants negligently deprived him without the minimum level of procedural safeguards available under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. According to Pelzer, his Action included, inter alia, the value of the property to be returned and his asserted right to continued possession of the taken property and, therefore, he should be permitted to proceed in this litigation.
Pelzer also complains that the lack of an opinion from the trial court prevented him from knowing why his litigation was dismissed. (Pelzer's Br. at 6.) We agree that the lack of explanation regarding the trial court's grounds for its sua sponte determination that Pelzer failed to set forth a cause of action and dismissal of this matter does create a challenge to understand the specific reason the Action was dismissed.
Defendants present numerous arguments in support of the trial court's dismissal of Pelzer's litigation as frivolous pursuant to Rule 240(j). Initially, the Defendants assert that the claims against John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 Security Officer and John Doe 4 Security Sgt. (John Doe Defendants) as unknown individuals are inherently frivolous under Pennsylvania's fact-pleading requirements. Next, Defendants argue that Pelzer's due process and negligence claims are frivolous because Pelzer fails to establish a property interest to which process is due where the Department of Corrections (Department) has authority to limit the amount of property an inmate may possess. Defendants further assert that Pelzer fails to plead the necessary elements of negligence. Finally, Defendants contend that they were acting within the scope of their official duties and, therefore, protected by sovereign immunity.
We first address Defendants' assertion that the Action against the John Doe Defendants is inherently frivolous because Pelzer's "failure to establish the identity of the alleged wrongdoers" prevents the Action from satisfying Pennsylvania's fact-pleading requirements. (Defendants' Br. at 10.) Defendants do not cite any support for this argument other than general case law on fact-pleading. See Feigly v. Department of Corrections, 872 A.2d 189, 196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (stating that "[a] pleading must be sufficiently specific to enable a responding party to prepare a defense" and "specific averments, rather than mere notice pleading are required"); Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1171 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (requiring plaintiffs to "allege facts that, if proved, will support an inference of the combination and its intent"). While we acknowledge the argument that Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state, the use of "John Doe" where the identity of a particular defendant is unknown is a well-established practice. Indeed, this practice is engaged in by both civil plaintiffs and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in criminal matters. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 607 Pa. 99, 4 A.3d 156 (2012) (naming four John Doe defendants); Commonwealth v. Laventure, 586 Pa. 348, 894 A.2d 109 (2006) (discussing the use of "John Doe" criminal complaints and warrants); Delaware County v. Mellon Financial Corp., 914 A.2d 469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (naming 300 John Doe defendants); City of Philadelphia v. John Doe, 405 A.2d 1317 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). Moreover, Pelzer included each John Doe's position with SCI-Houtzdale, along with the dates relevant to his lawsuit, which narrows the list of potential defendants in his Action. Pelzer knew whom he wanted to include as Defendants, but he did not know these individual officers by their proper names. Thus, we decline to conclude that Pelzer's Action is frivolous on this basis.
The Department, which is representing the Defendants, also asserts that, pursuant to the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, Act of October 14, 1980, P.L. 950, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 732-101 - 732-506, it is precluded from appearing on behalf of "unnamed/unidentified alleged employees." (Defendants' Br. at 10 n.1.) Having reviewed the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, Section 8525 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8525 (relating to legal assistance for Commonwealth employees whose actions are alleged to have given rise to a claim against the Commonwealth), and the regulations at 4 Pa. Code §§ 39.1 - 39.8 (relating to the defense of suits against Commonwealth employees), cited in support of the Department's position, we do not agree with the Department's broad assertion. Moreover, as noted above, Pelzer included identifying information for these John Doe Defendants that would render it possible for the Department to identify which of its employees worked in these positions during the relevant time period.
We now consider whether Pelzer established a colorable claim for replevin based on Defendants' negligence or, as Defendants contend, he failed to establish a property interest protected by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and/or a negligence claim. Specifically, Defendants assert that because the Department can reasonably limit the property an inmate may possess and direct the disposition of excess property, Pelzer has no property interest in his personal property upon which a due process claim could be sustained. See DC-ADM 815, Section 3(B)(9) (stating that "[a]n inmate may not exceed the property limits established by the Department"); Small v. Horn, 554 Pa. 600, 614, 722 A.2d 664, 671 (1998) (providing that reasonable regulations limiting the "quantity and type of property that inmates may possess do not violate due process" if the regulations are based on legitimate penological interests). Defendants further argue that Pelzer's Action does not sufficiently allege a negligence claim because he did not allege that: (1) Defendants had a legal duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct; (2) Defendants failed to conform to that standard; and (3) Defendants were causally connected to the resulting injury.
DC-ADM 815 may be found on the Department's website at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/916572/815_personal_property__state_issued_items__and_commissary_-_outside_purchases_pdf
"Replevin is a possessory action in which the issues are plaintiff's title and right of possession. The primary relief sought is the return of the property itself, the damages being merely incidental." Valley Gypsum Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 581 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). "In order to maintain replevin, the plaintiff must have a general or special property right in the thing taken or detained." International Electronics Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Products Company, Inc., 370 Pa. 213, 217, 88 A.2d 40, 42 (1952). A trial court may order reimbursement in replevin matters. See, e.g., Associates Commercial Corp. v. L & C Bus Lines, Inc., 458 A.2d 610, 611 (Pa. Super. 1983) (noting that if the plaintiff has a right to continued possession of chattels and the plaintiff's interest is greater than the value of the chattels, the trial court can properly calculate reimbursement). Pursuant to Rule 1073.1(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.C.P. No. 1073.1(a), a complaint for an action in replevin must include the following: "(1) a description of the property to be replevied, (2) its value, (3) its location if known, and (4) the material facts upon which plaintiff's claim is based." Id.
In his allegations, Pelzer describes the property to be replevied, the value of most of the property (where known), how the value of the other property could be determined, that he does not know the property's location, and the material facts upon which his claim is based, which are that Defendants, while acting in their official duties, negligently lost or destroyed that property during Pelzer's transfer and subsequent confinement at SCI-Houtzdale. (Action ¶¶ 10-21.) Such allegations appear, on their face, to satisfy the requirements set forth in Rule 1073.1(a). However, the plaintiff in a replevin action "must have a general or special property right in the thing taken or detained." International Electronics Co., 370 Pa. at 217, 88 A.2d at 42.
Although Defendants' assertion that the Department may regulate an inmate's possession of property is accurate, it does not follow that such restrictions completely negate the property interest an inmate may have or assert in the inmate's personal property. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Small, noted that "where a prisoner's property is sent to an address of his choice, no deprivation of property has taken place because, although the prisoner no longer has possession of the property, he still retains control over it." Small, 554 Pa. at 614, 722 A.2d at 671. Thus, in Small, our Supreme Court recognized that inmates have at least a limited property interest, protected by due process, in their personal property. Id. Moreover, in Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), this Court held that an inmate can file a negligence claim against Department employees for the negligent damage to or loss of an inmate's personal property that was placed in the employees' care, custody, and control and that those employees were not entitled to sovereign immunity. Therefore, Defendants' broad assertion that Pelzer can have no protected property interest in his missing boxes and damaged television is not grounds for affirming the trial court's Order.
Defendants further argue that, because they were acting in the scope of their official duties, they are entitled to sovereign immunity under Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522 (setting forth the exceptions to sovereign immunity for damages from negligent acts that would have been recoverable under common law or statute creating a cause of action that would otherwise be available had the injury not been caused by a person who can assert sovereign immunity). However, this Court has held that, where an inmate sets forth a claim for damage to the inmate's personal property that is in the care, custody, or control of prison employees, those employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 8522(b)(3) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(3) (relating to the care, custody, and control of personal property). Williams, 917 A.2d at 918. Here, Pelzer's Action is based on his claim that while his boxes of personal property and television were in Defendants' possession, Defendants negligently caused the loss or destruction of that property. (Action ¶ 19.) Pursuant to Williams, Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity for such claims. --------
We now review Pelzer's Action and consider whether he has stated a claim for negligence. To state a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant had "a legal duty or obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct"; (2) the defendant failed "to conform to that standard"; (3) there is "a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and resulting injury"; and (4) the plaintiff suffered "actual damage or loss." Williams v. Syed, 782 A.2d 1090, 1093-94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
Defendants assert that Pelzer has failed to state a claim for negligence and, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the Action as frivolous under Rule 240(j). An action is frivolous "if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action." McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). In his Action Pelzer describes the Defendants' duties in their roles as property officers or security officers, which include transporting, receiving, inventorying, and searching inmate property at SCI-Houtzdale. (Action ¶¶ 2-7, 11-12, 14-15.) It is reasonable to infer that Defendants are to perform these duties in a non-negligent manner. Pelzer alleges that Defendants negligently performed their work duties, thereby causing the loss or destruction of his property. (Action ¶ 19.) We are satisfied that Pelzer's allegations have sufficiently set forth the necessary elements for a negligence claim to survive dismissal for frivolousness. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Pelzer's Action as frivolous under Rule 240(j) for failing to state a claim.
Pelzer also asserts that the trial court should have granted him IFP status because he cannot afford the filing fees and costs associated with prosecuting his litigation. Having dismissed the matter for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court did not address Pelzer's Application. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Pelzer's Action pursuant to Rule 240(j), we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings, including for the trial court to consider Pelzer's Application.
Accordingly, the trial court's order is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, May 15, 2013, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County in the above-captioned matter is hereby VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge