From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Peden v. Peden

Superior Court of Connecticut
Mar 16, 2018
FSTCV176032579S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018)

Opinion

FSTCV176032579S

03-16-2018

Jay PEDEN v. Harry E. PEDEN, III et al.


UNPUBLISHED OPINION

GENUARIO, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendants have moved to dismiss this action claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim because the plaintiff does not have standing to assert a cause of action under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601 et seq. (FFHA), the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12100 et seq. (ADA), and the Connecticut Fair Housing Act, C.G.S. § 46a-64c (CFHA) all of which prohibit certain discriminatory practices. The defendants correctly assert that if the plaintiff does not have standing to assert his claims then the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. Manning v. Feltman, 149 Conn.App. 224, 232 (2014). Accordingly, it is fundamental to the defendants’ motion that the court analyze the specific claims that the plaintiff brings in his complaint. This is particularly important in the case at bar since the defendants characterize the plaintiff’s claims as allegations asserting violations of the three above-captioned statutory schemes. Notably, the first sentence of the plaintiff’s brief characterizes the case as a will construction case. The court’s first job is to analyze the complaint to determine what claims are being pled.

II. THE COMPLAINT

The complaint alleges the following pertinent facts. Harry E. Peden, Jr. (Harry, Jr.) died on July 20, 2006 having amassed considerable assets. His residence was inherited by his wife, Trinette C. Peden (Trinette) by virtue of the fact that Harry, Jr. and Trinette owned " the Residence" jointly with right of survivorship. Harry, Jr.’s son, Harry E. Peden, III (Harry, III) formed a limited liability company named TCP Realty, LLC (the LLC) and several of the properties previously owned by Harry, Jr., including the Residence were transferred to the LLC. Some of the membership units of the LLC were then transferred to a credit shelter trust. Over the next few years, on the advice of Harry, III, an attorney, Trinette gifted other membership units in the LLC to her four children. Harry, III prepared a will for Trinette which did not address where the plaintiff, one of the four children, would reside after Trinette’s death. The plaintiff is mentally but not intellectually handicapped. Trinette’s most recent will reflects Trinette’s recognition that the residence has been conveyed to the LLC and provided that some of the moneys held by her estate be used to acquire and transfer title to the Residence to a trust enabling the plaintiff to remain in the Residence for the rest of his life and thereafter the Residence would revert to the other three children. The complaint continues that Harry, III is seeking to gain control of the Residence and other properties owned by the LLC and to liquidate them, distributing the net proceeds to himself and his siblings. Harry, III, who is manager of the LLC and a temporary administrator of his mother’s estate is not willing to make an accommodation for his mentally handicapped brother and is on a course to evict him from the Residence knowing the consequences to his fragile brother. The complaint further alleges that the refusal of Harry, III and the LLC to make a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff violates the FFHA, the ADA and the CFHA which prohibit such discriminatory housing practices. According to the complaint Trinette’s will has not yet been admitted to the probate, but Harry, III has sought to have the Greenwich Probate Court determine ownership of the Residence. The complaint describes Trinette’s estate as substantial and alleges that therefore the transfer of the Residence to the trust consistent with the most recent will executed by Trinette would not place an undue hardship on the other Peden children. The plaintiff has named his two other siblings, Helen E. Wells and Jeffrey E. Peden as parties because they are beneficiaries and executors of Trinette’s estate, along with Harry, III and the plaintiff, and because they are members of the LLC. The plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeks inter alia construction of Trinette’s will in light of the Federal and Connecticut Fair Housing Acts and the Americans with Disabilities Act to enable [the plaintiff] to stay in [the Residence] and to a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Harry, III, individually, as temporary administrator of Trinette’s estate and as manager of the LLC from engaging in discriminatory housing practices prohibited by the cited statutory schemes.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

The substance of the defendants’ motion is based upon their claim that the plaintiff does not have standing to assert the rights that he claims have been violated pursuant to the three statutory schemes. " The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544 (2003) " the proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party’s standing is a motion to dismiss." D’Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615, footnote 6 (2005) (internal quotation mark omitted). " If a party is found to lack standing the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

" The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." Good Year v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). " In determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s claim in its objection that this is a will construction case a review of the complaint reveals the opposite. The pertinent allegations of the complaint alleged violations of three certain specific acts that prohibits discriminatory practices. Indeed, even to the extent the prayer for relief seeks construction of Trinette’s will it does so only in light of the three statutory acts. As of the date of the hearing there is no claim that the will has been admitted to probate and it appears that the parties disagree as to which will should be admitted to probate. The complaint does not allege facts that place before the court the issue of which will should be admitted to probate and that issue is still properly pending before the Greenwich Probate Court. This complaint alleges only violations of the three referenced statutory schemes. Accordingly, the decision on the motion to dismiss will rest upon the court’s determination as to whether or not the plaintiff has standing to claim that the defendants have violated the provision of the acts.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The American with Disabilities Act (ADA)

The ADA prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 12181(7)(A), the term " public accommodation" includes " an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging ..." " However the legislative history of the ADA clarifies that other place of lodging does not include residential facilities." Independent Housing Services of San Francisco v. Filmore Center Associates, 840 F.Supp. 1328, 1344. 14 (N.D.Cal. 1993). Because [the plaintiff] is alleging discrimination in connection with a place of residence, he fails to state a claim that is subject to the ADA under the public accommodation provision of that act.
Alston v. Jarrell, 2015 WL 418153 (D.Conn. January 30, 2015, Squatrito, J.) (some citations and quotations omitted). Nothing in the complaint would give rise to a claim that the Residence which the plaintiff seeks to be transferred to the trust for his life use is a place of public accommodation as contemplated in the ADA. The cases are clear that a single-family residence and transactions such as the one described in the complaint are not transactions that fall within purview of the act. Indeed, that plaintiff does not claim anywhere in the complaint that the family residence which he seeks to continue to occupancy is a public accommodation. The plaintiff simply has no claim under the ADA.

In Alston the court dismissed the complaint, but, of course under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion to dismiss is akin to Connecticut’s motion to strike and is an adjudication that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted as opposed to a determination that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.

B. The Federal Fair Housing Act

The plaintiff alleges that by refusing to transfer the property to the trust, Harry, III and the LLC have run afoul of the requirements of the FFHA which protects people with both physical and mental disabilities from discriminatory practices including the failure to make reasonable accommodations for those with such disabilities.

The defendants in their motion to dismiss argue that the FFHA prohibits discrimination " in the sale or rental" of a dwelling. It further defines " to rent" as " to lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the occupant." 42 U.S.C. Section 3602(e). The defendants argue that none of the allegations of the complaint characterize the plaintiff as a buyer or a renter. Rather, they argue that the allegations of the complaint assert a claim by the plaintiff of the right to remain as an occupant of the residence rent-free for the balance of his life without paying rent and without purchasing the premises. The defendants argue that in order to have standing under the FFHA, the plaintiff must be a buyer or a renter; since the plaintiff is neither, the plaintiff has no standing to assert violations of the FFHA.

The problem with the defendants’ motions is that the FFHA protects a broader class of people than simply buyers or renters. The FFHA, in section 42 U.S.C. Section 3604, states that " it shall be unlawful ... (f)(1) to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make available or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter. Thus the plaintiff does not have to be a buyer or renter in order to have standing to assert a claim under the FFHA. The plaintiff only need be, either a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available; or a person associated with that buyer or renter.

The complaint fairly alleges that Trinette contemplated a sale of the residence utilizing assets from her estate which would result in a transfer of the Residence to a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. As such the complaint as fairly read contemplates that the estate and/or trust be the buyer of the residence and the plaintiff would be a person associated with that buyer. Indeed 42 U.S.C. Section 3613 which authorizes a civil action to enforce rights under the FFHA expressly provides that the enforcement rights are not limited to buyers and renters but rather to " an aggrieved person" 42 U.S.C. Section 3613(a)(1)(A). Reading both the statute and the complaint in a fair manner, the plaintiff has alleged facts which would characterize him as a person associated with a buyer, or a person residing in or intending to reside in the Residence after it is sold, and therefore an aggrieved person entitled to take advantage of the act.

Of course in this procedural setting the court does not comment either one way or another on the merits of the claim or even whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The court only finds that it has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the plaintiff’s claim of violation of the FFHA, because the plaintiff has alleged facts which give rise to standing.

C. The Connecticut Fair Housing Act

Similarly the CFHA, C.G.S. Section 46a-64c(6)(A), states that it shall be a violation of this section

To discriminate in the sale or rental or to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a learning disability or physical or mental disability of: (i) such buyer or renter; (ii) a person residing or intending to reside in such dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available; or (iii) any person associated with such buyer or renter . (Emphasis added).

The CFHA tracks the language of the FFHA and our courts have held that it is to be interpreted in accordance with and in light of the provisions of the FFHA.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court must conclude that the plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims under the Federal Fair Housing Act and the Connecticut Fair Housing Act. While the plaintiff may not have standing to pursue his claim under the American with Disabilities Act, because the plaintiff has standing to pursue two of his claims, the motion to dismiss must be and is denied.


Summaries of

Peden v. Peden

Superior Court of Connecticut
Mar 16, 2018
FSTCV176032579S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018)
Case details for

Peden v. Peden

Case Details

Full title:Jay PEDEN v. Harry E. PEDEN, III et al.

Court:Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Mar 16, 2018

Citations

FSTCV176032579S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018)