Opinion
4:21-cv-09489-KAW
12-17-2021
MICHAEL PECTOL, Plaintiff, v. BRENT PECTOL, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION; ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO A DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 2
KANDIS A WESTMORE United States Magistrate Judge
On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff Michael Pectol filed this civil action and application to proceed in forma pauperis. Having considered the application, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis.
The Court now screens Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and, for the reasons set forth below, concludes that the district court is divested of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and REASSIGNS the case to a district judge with the RECOMMENDATION that it be dismissed with prejudice, and that all pending motions be denied as moot.
Plaintiff has filed several motions, including a motion for summary judgment, even though summons has not been issued. (See Dkt. Nos. 7, 10-14.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The in forma pauperis statute provides that the Court shall dismiss the case if at any time the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A complaint is frivolous under Section 1915 where there is no subject matter jurisdiction. See Castillo v. Marshall, 207 F.3d 15, 15 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 19987) (recognizing the general proposition that a complaint should be dismissed as frivolous on Section 1915 review where subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).
II. DISCUSSION
As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts are “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [they] have subject matter jurisdiction”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that his minor children require a new “custodial agent” and complains that he and his family were displaced by the defendants, who “utilized tactical co[r]ruption and misrepresentations to violate and corrupt Superior Court of California processes and jurisprudence….” (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to relitigate family law matters decided by the state court, which implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear direct appeals from the judgments of state courts. Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). The purpose of the doctrine is to “protect state judgments from collateral federal attack.” Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). It applies not only to final state court orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state court as well. Id.; Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). The doctrine “bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, ” but also “the de facto equivalent of such an appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal court plaintiff.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An action functions as a forbidden de facto appeal when the plaintiff is: “[1] asserting] as his injury legal errors by the state court and [2] see[king] as his remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). Here, Plaintiff is seeking to change the child custody arrangement entered in state court, which constitutes a de facto appeal. (See Compl. at 2.)
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two United States Supreme Court cases: District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, and the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice because it is frivolous under Section 1915.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED.
Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth above, the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, thereby depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and rendering the complaint frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Therefore, the undersigned REASSIGNS this case to a district judge with the RECOMMENDATION that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and that all other pending motions be denied as moot.
Any party may file objections to these recommendations within 14 days of being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Civil L.R. 72-3 (N.D. Cal.). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. IBEW Local 595 Trust Funds v. ACS Controls Corp., No. C-10-5568, 2011 WL 1496056, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.