Opinion
44269 Record No. 801541.
January 22, 1982
Present: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Compton, Thompson, and Stephenson, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice.
No preliminary hearing before a Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court under [Code Sec. 16.1-241(I)] is required when an adult accused of offenses committed against a juvenile is directly indicted by a Grand Jury.
Criminal Procedure — Statutory Construction — Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts, Jurisdiction [Code Sec. 16.1-241(I)] — Preliminary Hearing Before Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Not Required When Accused is Directly Indicted by Grand Jury Without Having Been Previously Arrested or Charged.
A prisoner serving sentences imposed for rape, sodomy and abduction of a female under sixteen years of age for purposes of prostitution, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground he was denied a preliminary hearing in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court under Code Sec. 16.1-241(I), being instead directly indicted by a Grand Jury. His argument is based principally upon the construction of Code Sec. 16.1-241(I) in Jones v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 666, 669-70, 261 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1980) where the defendant was given a preliminary hearing in District Court, Criminal Division, and was held for action by a Grand Jury, being indicted and subsequently convicted in the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court in Jones stated that Code Sec. 16.1-241(I) vested exclusive original jurisdiction in Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts to conduct preliminary hearings in cases of adult defendants charged with felonious offenses against juvenile victims except murder and manslaughter. The Lower Court denied the writ and the prisoner appeals.
Where an accused is directly indicted by a Grand Jury, without having been previously arrested and charged, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is thereby invoked, and no preliminary hearing is required. This is true although the defendant indicted or the victim of the crime involved may be a juvenile, the legislative purpose of Code Sec. 16.1-241, to afford juvenile defendants and juvenile victims the protection and expertise of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court during the preliminary, or certification, hearing stage of a criminal prosecution, being afforded by a Court of Record following a Grand Jury's direct indictment of a defendant. Jones v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 666, 261 S.E.2d 538 (1980), discussed, distinguished, and reaffirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Arlington County. Hon. William L. Winston, judge presiding.
Affirmed.
Edward D. Barnes; Guy A. Sibilla (Nikas, Englisby Barnes, on brief), for appellant.
Jerry P. Slonaker, Assistant Attorney General (Marshall Coleman, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The issue in this case is whether a preliminary hearing in a juvenile and domestic relations district court is jurisdictionally required when an adult, charged with offenses committed against a juvenile, is directly indicted by the grand jury.
Marcus Albert Payne is presently confined in the penitentiary, serving sentences imposed for rape, sodomy, and abduction of a female under sixteen years of age for purposes of prostitution. Payne v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 601, 260 S.E.2d 247 (1979). Payne filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his detention arises from proceedings that were violative of the jurisdictional requirements of Virginia's Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law and that his incarceration operated as a denial of his due process rights guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Virginia. His petition was denied, and this appeal ensued.
The victim in this case was thirteen years old at the time of the alleged offenses against her. Defendant contends that her age triggered the application of Virginia's juvenile law, specifically Code Sec. 16.1-241 (formerly Sec. 16.1-158), which, in pertinent part, provides:
Except as hereinafter provided, each juvenile and domestic relations district court shall have, within the limits of the territory for which it is created, exclusive original jurisdiction . . . over all cases . . . involving: * * *
1. The prosecution and punishment of persons charged with ill treatment, abuse, abandonment or neglect of children or with any violation of law which causes or tends to cause a child to come within the purview of this law, or with any other offense against the person of a child; prided that in prosecution for felonies over which the court shall have jurisdiction, such jurisdiction shall be limited to determining whether or not there is probable cause.
Payne relies primarily upon the following language found in Jones v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 666, 669-70, 261 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1980):
In our opinion, the language of Code Sec. 16.1-241(l) is clear and unambiguous. In no uncertain terms, the language vests in juvenile and domestic relations district courts exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct preliminary hearings in cases of adult defendants charged with felonious offenses, except murder and manslaughter, committed against juvenile victims. . . .
The phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" in Code Sec. 16.1-241 must be given its plain meaning. When given such meaning, the phrase imports requirements of a jurisdictional, rather than procedural, nature and it signifies exclusivity of jurisdiction in a juvenile and domestic relations district court to conduct a preliminary hearing in the type of case involved here.
In Jones the adult defendant was given a preliminary hearing in district court, criminal division, and held for action by a grand jury. He was thereafter indicted by the grand jury and then tried in the circuit court upon his pleas of not guilty. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that, because the victim was a juvenile and the preliminary hearing had not been held in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, the circuit court was without jurisdiction in the case. The court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. Jones was subsequently arrested again, charged with the same offenses, and given a preliminary hearing in juvenile and domestic relations district court. After his indictment he moved for its dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and we affirmed, holding that "the defect in the initial preliminary hearing in this case was jurisdictional in nature and that, as a result, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the defendant's case in the first trial. Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach in that proceeding." 220 Va. at 672, 261 S.E.2d at 541.
The effect of our decision in Jones is that if a preliminary hearing is to be held in a case involving a felonious offense by an adult defendant against a juvenile victim, the exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct such a preliminary hearing is vested, by operation of Code Sec. 16.1-241, in the juvenile and domestic relations district court. There was no occasion for us to consider or decide what would have been Jones' status had he been indicted directly by a grand jury, and we did not decide that question. Our reservation of decision on the issue prompted the reference to Nottingham v. Zahradnick, 573 F.2d 193, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), in footnote 2 of the Jones opinion.
"2 We note a statement in the Fourth Circuit's opinion to the effect that this court has held that an indictment by a grand jury 'preempts an adult defendant's right to a preliminary hearing.' 573 F.2d at 195. No decision of this court is cited, and we disavow any application of the statement to the situation where the charges against an adult defendant involve a juvenile victim."
220 Va. at 671, 261 S.E.2d at 541.
Our disagreement with Nottingham was to the Fourth Circuit's holding that Code Sec. 16.1-158(7) (now Code Sec. 16.1-241(I)) was procedural only. It was, and is, our conclusion that giving Jones a preliminary hearing in general district court, criminal division, instead of in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, constituted a jurisdictional defect and was not a procedural one.
It is well settled in Virginia that no preliminary hearing is required prior to direct indictment by a grand jury. In Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 31, 129 S.E.2d 22, 28 (1963), we said:
The primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ascertain whether there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the person charged is the one who has committed it. . . . The grand jury here found that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a felony before she was arrested and its action preempted the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing. (authorities omitted) See also Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 688-89, 251 S.E.2d 202, 206, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979).
In the instant case, as in Webb, the grand jury found reasonable cause to believe that Payne had committed the felonies, and its action preempted his right to a preliminary hearing. The circuit court's jurisdiction was thereby invoked. This would not have been true if prior to being indicted he had been arrested and charged with committing the offenses against his juvenile victim. Under those circumstances a preliminary hearing in the juvenile and domestic relations district court would have been required before certification of the case to the grand jury.
The legislative purpose of Code Sec. 16.1-241 is to afford juvenile defendants and juvenile victims the protection and expertise of the juvenile court during the preliminary, or certification, hearing stage of a criminal prosecution. There is logical reason for the requirement. Juvenile courts are staffed with trained personnel who have the necessary expertise to deal with juveniles. This is generally not true of general district courts. However, we can perceive of no protections or considerations that can be given a juvenile victim in a juvenile and domestic relations district court that cannot be afforded in or commanded by a court of record following a grand jury's direct indictment of a defendant.
We therefore hold that where an adult accused is directly indicted by a grand jury, without having been previously arrested and charged, the jurisdiction of the circuit court is thereby invoked, and no preliminary hearing is required, even though the victim of the crime involved may be a juvenile. We affirm the judgment of the lower court denying defendant's petition for habeas corpus.
Affirmed.