Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-04-009 JRS.
Submitted: May 11, 2004.
Decided: August 4, 2004.
On Appeal From a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas. AFFIRMED.
Raymond J. Otlowski, Esquire, Newark, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant, Augustus C. Patterson, III.
Kathleen M. Miller, Esquire, Smith, Katzenstein Furlow L.L.P., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellee, Super Dog Pet Food Co.
MEMORANDUM OPINION.
I.
Defendant, Augustus C. Patterson, III, owner of Germantown Dog Training School ("the School"), appeals from an adverse judgment after trial in the Justice of the Peace Court, affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, requiring the School to pay an outstanding invoice to plaintiff, Super Dog Pet Food Company ("Super Dog"). Because the Court of Common Pleas' decision is the product of an orderly and logical deductive process and is sufficiently supported by competent evidence of record, it is AFFIRMED.
II.
Mr. Patterson signed a credit application with Super Dog in 1992, in which he personally guaranteed the monetary obligations of the School to Super Dog. It is undisputed that Mr. Patterson paid Super Dog's invoices in a timely manner up until the events giving rise to this litigation. On January 20, 1997, the School generated an invoice from Super Dog in the amount of $1,157.27, and the order was delivered the following day. When Super Dog did not receive payment for the order, it mailed "friendly" reminder letters to Mr. Patterson in an attempt to collect. In response, Super Dog received several calls on behalf of the School from "Gus," who explained that he had been in the hospital and did not know of the outstanding invoice. "Gus" promised payment and gave a contact address.When Super Dog still did not receive payment, it filed a complaint in October of 1998 in the Justice of the Peace Court. The School did not respond and the Justice of the Peace Court entered a default judgment in Super Dog's favor. Mr. Patterson filed a Motion to Vacate the default judgment, which was granted. A new trial was held in November of 1999 and judgment again was entered in favor of Super Dog. Mr. Patterson appealed from that decision to the Court of Common Pleas in March of 2003. The Court of Common Pleas found that Super Dog had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Patterson was responsible for payment of the $1,157.27 invoice. Once again, Mr. Patterson appeals the lower court's decision.
III.
Mr. Patterson alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the lower court's decision. In the proceedings below and in this appeal, Mr. Patterson argues that he was not responsible for payment of the invoice because he did not own the School as of December 31, 1996. Consequently, Mr. Patterson asserts that he could not have made the January 20, 1997 order. He also contends that he was not the "Gus" who made calls to Super Dog. According to Mr. Patterson, he is not liable for payment of the $1,157.27 order because the invoice was signed by a minor (his brother, Jeffrey Patterson) who was incapable of entering into a legal contract. Furthermore, he argues that the size of the order was so disproportionately large compared to past orders that it should have placed Super Dog on notice that it was dealing with a new customer.
IV.
At the proceedings below, Deb Hall, Super Dog's Account Manager, testified on behalf of Super Dog. She stated that after the $1,157.27 invoice was generated and not paid, she sent several "friendly" reminder letters to the School before receiving a call from "Gus," who stated that "he had been in the hospital since January, and that his brother was taking care of the store. . . ." Ms. Hall claimed that she knew "Gus" was Mr. Patterson because she had spoken with him in the past. According to Ms. Hall, "Gus" called again ten days later, and stated that he had "sold the store to Rubin McCoy. . . ."
D.I. 4 at 31-32.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Mr. Patterson testifed on his own behalf. He claimed that he turned over the School to Rubin McCoy on December 31, 1996 or January 1, 1997. According to Mr. Patterson, he never made the calls to Super Dog, nor did he ever place an order as large as the one at issue. He acknowledged that he never wrote a letter to Super Dog informing it of the School's closure, but claims that he communicated this to Super Dog orally. Mr. Patterson did not have any documentation related to the sale.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 59, 61.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
The Court of Common Pleas concurred with the Justice of the Peace Court's conclusion that Mr. Patterson was liable for the School's indebtedness. The $1,157.27 order was shipped by Super Dog and received by Jeffrey Patterson on January 21, 1997. Super Dog was not aware of Mr. Patterson's sale of the School because neither Mr. Patterson nor any other representative of the School ever bothered to notify Super Dog of the sale. The Court of Common Pleas found that the size of the $1,157.27 order was not disproportionately large (as compared to previous orders) so as to put Super Dog on notice of the School's change of ownership. The court found that the "most credible and reasonable story" was that the School had placed the order in question and Mr. Patterson, as the personal guarantor of the School's debts, was obligated to pay the bill for $1,157.27.
See id. at 106-113 (court's findings of fact and conclusions of law).
V.
Mr. Patterson's appeal focuses on the factual findings of the court below. Under these circumstances, the Court's function is to examine the record to determine whether the decision was clearly erroneous in its findings of fact. "[F]indings of fact are reviewed only to confirm and verify that they are supported by substantial evidence." The Court "must not make its own factual conclusions, weigh evidence, or make credibility determinations." "[T]he Court's role is to . . . review the factual findings of the court below simply to determine if they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process." If so, then the lower court's findings must be accepted even though the Court may have reached a different conclusion if presented with the evidence in the first instance.VI.
First, the Court will examine the record below for evidence supporting the Court of Common Pleas' finding that Mr. Patterson was responsible for payment of the invoice. At trial, Mr. Patterson testified that he began closing the School in August of 1996 when he removed some equipment. He maintained that his involvement with the School completely ended by December 31, 1996. There was a conflict, however, between the dates Mr. Patterson testified to and the dates he presented in his Motion to Vacate the default judgment. The Motion to Vacate represented that the close of operations began on December 1, 1996, and that the process was complete on March 1, 1997. This sequence, if accurate, would have allowed Mr. Patterson, as the owner, to place the January 20, 1997 order. This conflict, coupled with the fact that there was no documentation regarding the sale of the School, led the court below to conclude that Mr. Patterson placed the January 20, 1997 order. The Court will not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. The court below properly evaluated conflicting evidence and made a well-supported factual determination.Next, the Court will consider the Court of Common Pleas' finding that the calls made by "Gus" acknowledging the debt and promising payment were, in fact, made by Mr. Patterson. Mr. Patterson testified that he had been in the hospital for approximately two weeks at the time the calls were made. He denied making any calls to Super Dog during this time. Super Dog, however, presented telephone logs indicating that "Gus" called during this time, stated that he was in the hospital, and promised payment. Again, the court below properly evaluated the conflicting testimony and made a well-supported finding of fact.
D.I. 4 at 56.
Id. at 57.
D.I. 12, Ex. 4.
Finally, the Court will address the Court of Common Pleas' finding that Super Dog proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Patterson made the order in question based in part on past orders. Mr. Patterson testified that he did not provide Super Dog with written notification that he closed his business. He argued, however, that the order was disproportionately large as compared to past orders, and that the disparity should have put Super Dog on notice that it was dealing with a different owner. The record clearly refutes this. Past invoices indicate that two orders placed in 1996 were in the amounts of $799.84 and $904.07. The January 20, 1997 order was for $1,157.27. It was not so disproportionately large compared to prior orders that Super Dog should have questioned the order. The finding of the court below to this effect is not clearly erroneous.
Mr. Patterson's contention that the contract was invalid because his seventeen year-old brother, Jeffrey, signed the invoice is without merit. It was Mr. Patterson, not Jeffrey, who agreed to be bound by the credit application. D.I. 12, Ex. 1. As stated by the lower court, Jeffrey's signature acknowledges receipt of the order; it does not create the contract to pay the debt generated by the order. D.I. 4 at 108.
Id. at Ex. 3.
VII.
The Court of Common Pleas' findings were well-supported by substantial evidence of record, and were the product of an "orderly and logical deductive process."
Adirondack Group, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 154, at *16.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.