Opinion
2016-03887
07-26-2017
Maryann Patisso, appellant, v. Matthew P. Brady, respondent.
Costella & Gordon, LLP, Garden City, NY (Roy C. Gordon of counsel), for appellant. Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, NY (Jennifer M. Belk and David Holland of counsel), for respondent.
L. PRISCILLA HALL LEONARD B. AUSTIN BETSY BARROS, JJ. (Index No. 7797/14)
Costella & Gordon, LLP, Garden City, NY (Roy C. Gordon of counsel), for appellant.
Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, NY (Jennifer M. Belk and David Holland of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Diamond, J.), dated March 3, 2016, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In addition, the defendant established, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine were not caused by the subject accident (see Gouvea v Lesende, 127 AD3d 811; Fontana v Aamaar & Maani Karan Tr. Corp., 124 AD3d 579; see generally Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d), and as to whether the alleged injuries to the cervical region of her spine were caused by the subject accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., HALL, AUSTIN and BARROS, JJ., concur. ENTER: Aprilanne Agostino Clerk of the Court