Opinion
2013-06496, Index No. 16924/10.
04-08-2015
Gladys M. GOUVEA, appellant, v. Juan J. LESENDE, defendant, City of Peekskill, respondent.
Anthony R. Tirone, Esq., P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Rachelle R. Gruenberg of counsel), for appellant. Edward P. Dunphy, Corporation Counsel, Peekskill, N.Y. (Marie R. Hodukavich of counsel), for respondent.
Anthony R. Tirone, Esq., P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Rachelle R. Gruenberg of counsel), for appellant.
Edward P. Dunphy, Corporation Counsel, Peekskill, N.Y. (Marie R. Hodukavich of counsel), for respondent.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Opinion In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (DiBella, J.), dated April 1, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendant City of Peekskill for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant City of Peekskill for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is denied.
The defendant City of Peekskill met its prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). In support of its motion, the City submitted the affirmation and affirmed medical reports of an orthopedic surgeon, who opined, based upon his review of the plaintiff's magnetic resonance imaging films, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine were degenerative in nature and not caused by the accident (see Fontana v. Aamaar & Maani Karan Tr. Corp., 124 A.D.3d 579, 1 N.Y.S.3d 324 ; Tomao v. Sanchez, 121 A.D.3d 882, 994 N.Y.S.2d 402 ; Rovensky v. Tamar Transp. Corp., 107 A.D.3d 779, 966 N.Y.S.2d 691 ).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine were caused by the accident (see Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 218–219, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424 ; Khaimov v. Armanious, 85 A.D.3d 978, 979, 925 N.Y.S.2d 623 ; Jilani v. Palmer, 83 A.D.3d 786, 787, 920 N.Y.S.2d 424 ; Fraser–Baptiste v. New York City Tr. Auth., 81 A.D.3d 878, 879, 917 N.Y.S.2d 670 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.