Opinion
NO. 2018-CA-001726-MR
05-24-2019
STACY L. PARTIN APPELLANT v. RANDY WHITE, WARDEN; LT. WILLIAM MORRISON; AND LT. KERWYN WALSTON APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Stacy Partin, pro se Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Oran S. McFarlan, III Justice and Public Safety Cabinet Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-00141 OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KRAMER, NICKELL AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES. THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: Stacy L. Partin, pro se, appeals from an order dismissing petition rendered by the Lyon Circuit Court. Partin (hereinafter "Appellant") argues that the Circuit Court erred in failing to vacate the decision of a prison adjustment committee and erred in failing to expunge the matter from his institutional records. For the reasons addressed below, we find no error and AFFIRM the order on appeal.
In April, 2017, Appellant was an inmate confined at the Kentucky State Penitentiary in Eddyville, Kentucky. He was assigned the job of janitor at the Garment Plant. On April 28, 2017, Garment Plant Production Coordinator Barbara Marshall reported to other prison staff that for the preceding two weeks, Appellant had been following her around the Garment Plant questioning her as to why she talked to certain Garment Plant workers. Marshall stated that Appellant's behavior made her nervous and uncomfortable, and that the matter culminated when Marshall refused Appellant's request to go with him into the stock room so he could tell her something.
Kentucky State Penitentiary staff investigated the matter and interviewed Appellant, Marshall and another inmate. Appellant then received notice that he was charged with the institutional violation of pursuing or having a non-correctional relationship with a non-inmate. The matter was adjudicated by an adjustment committee, which found Appellant guilty of an amended charge of disruptive behavior. The committee imposed the penalty of serving 20 hours of extra duty to be completed within 60 days. Appellant was not required to forfeit any good behavior or "good time" credit.
When a prisoner is alleging a violation of due process arising from the deprivation of good behavior credit, due process is satisfied by 1) 24-hour notice of the charges, 2) a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and 3) a brief written finding suitable for judicial review. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Appellant appealed the matter to Warden Randy White. White ruled against Appellant upon finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt and that Appellant had otherwise received due process. Appellant then filed a petition for declaration of rights with the Lyon Circuit Court. Appellant sought to have the disciplinary penalty vacated and the disciplinary report and conviction expunged from his record. The focus of Appellant's petition was his contention that the investigation was unfairly and improperly conducted, and reached the wrong result.
On March 12, 2018, Warden White, et al., ("Appellees") filed a response and motion to dismiss. In support of the motion, Appellees asserted that the record reasonably supported the finding and penalty imposed by the disciplinary committee. Upon considering the Motion, the Lyon Circuit Court found that the penalty did not fall within the narrow range of liberty interests possessed by inmates and was not an atypical or significant hardship. It determined that Appellant could not demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest sufficient to sustain a claim that his right to due process was violated. The Court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.
The record employs the terms "adjustment officer" and "adjustment committee" interchangeably depending on the context. --------
Appellant, pro se, now argues that the Lyon Circuit Court committed reversible error in sustaining the decision of the adjustment officer and Warden White. He contends that the circuit court overlooked or ignored the primary claim of his petition, i.e., that the adjustment committee and Warden White improperly failed to follow proper policies and procedures in investigating the matter and that he was not allowed to call witnesses and present evidence. Further, Appellant maintains that there was no substantial evidence to support the conviction for disruptive behavior. The focus of Appellant's argument is that he was treated unfairly by the officer investigating the disciplinary write-up, as well as the adjustment committee and the Warden, and that this treatment constituted a violation of his due process rights. In sum, Appellant requests that the decision of the adjustment committee be vacated and the matter expunged from his institutional record.
"Prisoners claiming a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment must demonstrate that they have been deprived of a protected liberty or property interest by arbitrary governmental action. Such a liberty interest can arise from the Constitution or from state statutes, policies and practices." Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). While prisoners are entitled to due process of law pursuant to both the United States and Kentucky constitutions, these rights are greatly diminished in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. App. 1997). Both the United States and Kentucky due process standards are satisfied if there is "some evidence" in the administrative record to support the prison's disciplinary decision. Id. at 356-58.
Due to these diminished standards, prison disciplinary authorities are generally not required to make detailed findings in order to support their decisions. See Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 277-78 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985)). If there is some evidence to support the outcome, the court should not interfere with the disciplinary proceedings. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. And finally, "[s]ince a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court's determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the issue de novo." Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnote omitted). Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is inappropriate "unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim." Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union v. Ky. Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977).
Pursuant to Williams v. Bass, supra, Appellant was required to demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest by arbitrary governmental action. He failed to meet that burden. As a prisoner's right to due process is greatly diminished in prison disciplinary proceedings, Appellant's right to due process is satisfied merely by proof of "some evidence" in support of the violation. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d at 356. Ms. Marshall's testimony, taken alone, constitutes "some evidence" that Appellant committed the disciplinary violation. Ms. Marshall reported that Appellant followed her around the Garment Plant for several days and repeatedly tried to tell her which inmates she could talk too. According to Ms. Marshall, Appellant became upset if she talked to certain individuals, and the matter became progressively worse in the two weeks leading up to Ms. Marshall's disciplinary write-up of Appellant.
We draw no conclusion as to the veracity of Ms. Marshall's claim nor whether Appellant committed the disciplinary violation. Rather, our sole duty is to review the matter de novo to determine if Appellant suffered a deprivation of his right to due process. Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7. Since only "some evidence" in support of the charge is required to satisfy Appellant's right to due process, and as Ms. Marshall's testimony constitutes such evidence, we find no error in the Lyon Circuit Court's dismissal of Appellant's petition for declaration of rights. As to Appellant's claim that he was improperly deprived of the right to offer witness testimony, prison officials may exclude witnesses because of irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in a particular set of circumstances. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2980. We find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order dismissing petition of the Lyon Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Stacy Partin, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Oran S. McFarlan, III
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky