Opinion
20AP-559 21AP-33 21AP-34
09-30-2021
Ronnie Parris, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tasha Chapman, Defendant-Appellant. Tasha Chapman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie Parris, Defendant-Appellant. Ronnie Parris, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tasha Chapman, Defendant-Appellant.
Tasha Chapman, pro se.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch C.P.C. Nos. 17JU-9026, 21DV-41, 17JU-9026
On brief:
Tasha Chapman, pro se.
DECISION
KLATT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Tasha Chapman, appeals three judgments rendered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch. For the following reasons, we dismiss all three of Chapman's appeals.
{¶ 2} Chapman and appellee, Ronnie Parris, are the parents of two minor children: A.P., born May 25, 2008, and D.P., born June 5, 2009. Parris established that he is the father of both children by signing affidavits of paternity.
{¶ 3} On July 17, 2017, Parris filed a complaint for allocation of parental rights/custody in the juvenile court. Chapman neither answered the complaint nor appeared for the hearing. In a judgment issued December 28, 2017, the juvenile court found that Parris had had possession of the children since they were toddlers, and that Chapman was unable to care for the children. The juvenile court granted Parris' complaint, and it designated Parris the legal custodian and residential parent of the children. The juvenile court allowed Chapman parenting time as agreed with Parris, at a minimum of four hours per week, when Chapman was in Ohio, and reasonable telephone communication with the children. Chapman did not appeal the December 28, 2017 judgment.
{¶ 4} Almost three years later, on October 16, 2020, Chapman reinitiated the litigation by filing two motions in the juvenile court. In the first motion, Chapman sought a reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. That motion was set for a hearing on January 25, 2021. In her second motion, Chapman sought an ex parte hearing so she could obtain emergency custody of her children. That motion was scheduled for a hearing on October 27, 2020, but it is unclear from the record whether that hearing actually occurred.
{¶ 5} On November 10, 2020, Chapman filed another motion for emergency temporary custody. The juvenile court held a hearing on that motion on December 2, 2020. In a decision issued the same day, the juvenile court held that Chapman had not sufficiently set forth just cause for emergency relief. The court noted, however, that its ruling had no impact on Chapman's motion for reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities, which was scheduled for a hearing on January 25, 2021.
{¶ 6} On December 29, 2020, Parris filed a motion with the juvenile court seeking the court's assistance in regaining physical custody of his children. As Parris explained in his motion, Chapman had obtained an ex parte domestic violence civil protection order against him on October 28, 2020. At that time, Chapman was staying at Parris' home with Parris, his mother, and the children. To comply with the civil protection order, Parris vacated the house, leaving his children in the care of Chapman and his mother. On December 6, 2020, Parris met with an officer from the Columbus Division of Police, and together they went to Parris' house to collect the children. Chapman, however, refused to release the children to Parris' custody. In his motion, Parris asked the juvenile court to modify or dismiss the civil protection order.
{¶ 7} On January 6, 2021, the juvenile court issued an "Order Clarifying Custody." In relevant part, the order states:
It is hereby clarified that, under the current law of the State of Ohio, RONNIE PARRIS (Plaintiff) is legally recognized as the sole legal custodian and residential parent of [A.P.] * * * and [D.P.] * * *.
* * *
TASHA CHAPMAN (Defendant) has no rights and/or responsibilities with respect to these children except the very limited parenting time previously conferred by this Court in the December 28, 2017 Order.
* * *
Local law enforcement is hereby ORDERED to accompany and assist RONNIE PARRIS (Plaintiff) in retrieving the child(ren) if necessary. Plaintiff is hereby temporarily relieved from the no-contact provisions of the pending Civil Protection Order (see case number 20DV-10-1916) for the limited/express purpose of regaining physical possession of the above-named minor children.(Jan. 6, 2021 Order Clarifying Custody.)
{¶ 8} On January 8, 2021, Chapman filed a domestic violence civil protection petition on behalf of A.P. and D.P. She named Parris as the respondent in the petition. After an ex parte hearing on the petition, the juvenile court rendered a judgment denying Chapman an ex parte civil protection order, but ordering a full hearing on the merits of the petition. According to Chapman, Parris moved the children out of the house while she was at the court attempting to obtain the ex parte civil protection order.
{¶ 9} In appeal No. 20AP-559, Chapman appeals the December 2, 2020 judgment denying her motion for emergency temporary custody, and she assigns the following errors:
1. In the courts December 2, 2020 Decision and Entry in responde to my 11/10/20 "Motion for an Emergency Custody Order" (is what I called it) the Court erred finding "…Defendant has not sufficiently set forth just cause for such and extraordinary grant of relief. Is the Plaintiffs (father, custodial) new domestic violence cases and crime spree against me and outstanding warrant in New York "extraordinary" enough to warrant immediate relief in the Juvenile matter?
2. Did custodial have "good cause" shown for an adjournment of all matters, including the juvenile matter on November 10, 2020? The lower court found that "RESPONDENT WAS NOT TRANSPORTED BY SHERIFF" as good cause for a continuance (see CPO and CONTINUANCE ORDER 20DV1916 , Nov. 10, 2020).
{¶ 10} In appeal No. 21AP-34, Chapman appeals the January 6, 2021 judgment clarifying custody, and she assigns the following errors:
[1.] RESULTING IN THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "KIDNAPPING" IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2905.01
[2.] RESULTING IN THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "CONSPIRACY" IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2923.01.
[3.] RESULTING IN THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "COMPLICITY" IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2923.03
[4.] RESULTING IN THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE" IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2921.32
[5.] RESULTING IN THE CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF "INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY" IN VIOLATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE 2919.23
[6. and 7.] Judge Browne's January 6th and 8th, 2021 orders violates OHIO REVISED CODE 3109.051(G) AND her Dec. 27, 2017 Order both for a "RELOCATION NOTICE" and hearing before relocation determining the best interest of the minors involved in these proceedings.
[8.] Judge Browne's January 6th, 2021 order violated the Social Security Protection Act of 2004, P.L. 108-203 .
[9.] On Jan. 6, 2021 with Judge Browne's order, ordering my children removed from their home of 4 years and of record with this court and where they had been safe did violate Governor Mike DeWine's current STAY-AT-HOME order pursuant to D.C. Code Ann. § 453505 (k) and § 7-2304.01
[10.] Judge Kim Browne held an ex parte hearing on Jan. 6, 2020with Parris because I was not served with or notified of a January 6th, 2021 hearing date, only a January 25, 2021 hearing date on Parris' OSC/Motion for contempt. Is a call from Judge Browne's chamber on Jan. 6, 2021, by Martha, sufficient process of service PURSUANT to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure?
[11.] In Judge Kim Browne's Jan. 6, 2021 Order Clarifying Custody (which was actually in order to kidnap my children) in violation of Ohio Rule of Civil Practice, Judge Kim Browne erred when not considering AT ALL my December 15, 2020 Motion for Summary Judgement in response to Parris' December 7, 2020 (or later "emergency" filings) for an Order to Show Cause/Motion for Contempt or Custodial Interference.
[12.] Judge Kim Browne's January 6th, 2021 and January 8, 2021 orders are in violation of my Oct. 28, 2021 Civil Protective Order PURSUANT to 3113.31 and is also currently allowing Ronnie Parris to violate that order in violation of the Ohio Revised Code 2919.27 and is a misdemeanor in the first degree (depending).
[13] Resulting in DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF TITLE in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 242
We quote all of Chapman's assignments of error verbatim, without correcting any of the spelling or grammatical errors therein.
{¶ 11} In appeal No. 21AP-33, Chapman appeals the January 8, 2021 judgment denying her an ex parte civil protection order on behalf of her children, and she assigns the same errors as in appeal No. 21AP-34.
{¶ 12} In appeal No. 20AP-559, Chapman challenges the judgment denying her motion for emergency temporary custody. Because that judgment is not a final, appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal of it.
{¶ 13} An order ruling on the temporary allocation of custody between parents is an interlocutory order, not a final, appealable order. Bonn v. Bonn, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1047, 2013-Ohio-2313, ¶ 12; In re J.L.R., 4th Dist. No. 08CA17, 2009-Ohio-5812, ¶ 29. If an appealed judgment does not constitute a final, appealable order, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review it. Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, ¶ 14. Consequently, in the absence of a final, appealable order, an appellate court must dismiss the appeal. Browder v. Shea, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1217, 2005-Ohio-4782, ¶ 11.
{¶ 14} Here, Chapman appealed an interim judgment wherein the juvenile court denied her custody of the children during the pendency of her motion for reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities. That judgment is not a final, appealable order, so we must dismiss appeal No. 20AP-559 for lack of jurisdiction.
{¶ 15} In appeal No. 21AP-34, Chapman appeals the January 6, 2021 judgment clarifying custody. That appeal, however, is moot.
{¶ 16} As a general matter, courts do not decide moot appeals. Rithy Properties, Inc. v. Cheeseman, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-641, 2016-Ohio-1602, ¶ 14. Moot appeals involve no actual genuine live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations. In re L.W., 168 Ohio App.3d 613, 2006-Ohio-644, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). An appeal becomes moot when it becomes impossible for a court to grant meaningful relief, even if it were to rule in favor of the party seeking relief. Dublin v. Friedman, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-516, 2017-Ohio-9127, ¶ 21. When an appeal is moot, dismissal of the appeal is appropriate because a justiciable controversy no longer exists. Cheeseman at ¶ 14.
{¶ 17} In large part, the January 6, 2021 judgment merely repeated the rulings made in the December 28, 2017 judgment. Because Chapman did not timely appeal those rulings, they are final. However, the January 6, 2021 judgment also temporarily lifted the no-contact restriction contained in the civil protection order Chapman had obtained against Parris so Parris could retrieve his children without violating the order. That ruling was new and, consequently, challengeable on appeal. However, once Parris regained physical custody of his children, which according to Chapman, occurred on January 8, 2021, all issues regarding that ruling became moot. At this point, a reversal of the January 6, 2021 judgment would grant Chapman no meaningful relief.
{¶ 18} We recognize that in analyzing whether appeal No. 21AP-34 is moot we have considered evidence not contained in the certified record. A court, however, may consider evidence from outside the record in determining whether an appeal is moot. Loc.R. 9.1 of the Tenth District Court of Appeals; State ex rel. Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 159 Ohio St.3d 47, 2020-Ohio-354, ¶ 5; Darr v. Livingston, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-315, 2017-Ohio-841, ¶ 16. Accordingly, we find appeal No. 21AP-34 moot, and we dismiss it.
{¶ 19} In appeal No. 21AP-33, Chapman appeals the January 8, 2021 judgment denying her ex parte petition for a civil protection order on behalf of her children. However, the refusal to grant an ex parte civil protection order is not a final, appealable order. R.C. 3113.31(G)(1). The denial of such an ex parte civil protection order does not give rise to a right to appeal because "when a court does not issue an ex parte [civil protection] order after an ex parte hearing, the court shall proceed as in a normal civil action and grant a full hearing on the matter." R.C. 3113.31(D)(3). The parties, therefore, may appeal from the judgment the trial court renders after the full hearing.
{¶ 20} Here, because the January 8, 2021 judgment denying Chapman an ex parte civil protection order is not a final, appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal of it. Accordingly, we dismiss appeal No. 21AP-33.
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss appeal Nos. 20AP-559, 21AP-33, and 21AP-34.
Appeals dismissed.
SADLER and JAMISON, JJ., concur.