Opinion
No. 05-10-00399-CR
Opinion Filed July 22, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 196th Judicial District Court, Hunt County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 26055.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Eduardo Parra of indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child. He received a life sentence. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying him a jury determination of competency, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the factual background of the case is not relevant for our analysis. Therefore, we need not address the details of the charges against him. Rather, our analysis will focus on those facts relevant to his competency determination. In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court violated his due process rights by denying him a jury determination of his competency to stand trial. The state responds the competency findings by qualified experts and the trial judge's own observations of appellant support his ruling. The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Thus, to protect a defendant's constitutional rights, a trial court must inquire into the accused's mental competence once the issue is sufficiently raised. Id. These due process standards are built into the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B (West 2006). Article 46B.003 states a person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006). Further, a defendant is presumed competent unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b). A judge must inquire into a defendant's mental competence once the issue is sufficiently raised. McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 709. The initial inquiry is informal and required when evidence suggesting incompetency comes to the trial court's attention and creates a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind as to whether the defendant is competent. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b), (c); Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A bona fide doubt may exist if the defendant exhibits truly bizarre behavior or has a recent history of severe mental illness or at least moderate mental retardation. Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425. After an informal inquiry, if the court determines evidence exists to support a finding of incompetency, the court shall order an examination. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(a). A trial court's decision to hold a competency inquiry is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and violate appellant's due process rights. Prior to voir dire, defense counsel objected and argued he did not believe appellant was competent. The State responded that it "stands behind the doctor's reports." The trial judge also stated, "I stand by the reports that I've read." The reports referred to by the parties are discussed below. The issue of competency was raised early in the proceedings as evidenced by an agreed order, signed April 2, 2009, appointing a qualified expert. On April 17, 2009, Dr. Michael Pittman examined appellant in the Hunt County jail. He provided his report to the court on April 29, 2009. In his report, Dr. Pittman described two past head injuries that caused a mild personality change in appellant. However, "[appellant] can consult with counsel in a rational and reasonable manner, should he choose to do so." Appellant understood the proceedings against him and seemed capable of cooperating with his attorney and formulating a defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. "In short, the examination indicated that Mr. Parra was competent to stand trial." On August 4, 2009, defense counsel filed a request for a reevaluation of appellant's diminished capacity and requested an MHMR expert to assist in the defense. He also filed a motion for evaluation of insanity at the time of the alleged offense. The trial court stayed further proceedings and ordered Dr. J. Randall Price and Dr. Pittman to examine appellant. Dr. Pittman again examined appellant at the Hunt County jail on October 2, 2009. While appellant said that he saw a brown recluse spider on the complainant's pants and that is what caused him to contact the boy's penis, Dr. Pittman noted, "I did not believe that real or imagined spiders, other arachnids, insects, or other creatures were a factor in Mr. Parra's actions." In Dr. Pittman's opinion, appellant was sane at the time of the alleged offense. Dr. Price evaluated appellant on December 15, 2009, less than a month before appellant's January 5, 2010 trial date. Dr. Price noted appellant showed some paranoid concerns and answered some questions with grandiosity. For example, appellant claimed that he could cure the world of AIDS, that he could make electricity from nothing, and that he could control gravity. However, appellant laughed when he spoke of these ideas "and did not appear completely serious . . . Rather, he appeared to enjoy the attention." Dr. Price concluded that at the time of the offense, appellant knew his conduct was wrong, and he did not have a severe mental disease or defect. Based on the trial judge's statement, "I stand by the reports that I've read," the record is clear the judge reviewed the expert reports and did not have a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competence. While appellant may have exhibited some odd behavior by making grandiose claims, Dr. Pittman believed the statements were to get attention rather than signs of a mental illness. Further, the record does not indicate any other bizarre behavior or a recent history of severe mental illness or moderate mental retardation. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425. Based on three different reports stating appellant was competent, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion by not ordering a formal competency hearing. In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant's assertion that the supplemental clerk's record "contains additional evidence from which the trial court should have relied upon to refer the matter for jury determination on competence." Appellant has failed to cite to any specific part of the record showing his incompetency. Moreover, the trial judge was free to consider his first-hand interactions and knowledge of appellant's behavior in determining his competency. McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 713 ("We cannot ignore the trial court's first-hand factual assessment of appellant's mental competency."); Martin v. State, 05-10-00386-CR, 2011 WL 1549561, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting trial judge was in a position to observe appellant's behavior at all times). During pretrial proceedings, appellant stipulated to a prior conviction for indecency with a child in 1993 and admitted he understood he was facing a life sentence if convicted. During trial, appellant testified that he understood the charges against him, talked coherently about the events in question, and said he did not believe he was "crazy." Thus, nothing in the record demonstrates an inability to communicate with his attorney or a lack of understanding regarding the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a). Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by not referring the competency issue to the jury. Appellant's first issue is overruled. In his second issue, appellant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a jury determination of competency. As discussed above, the evidence presented did not raise a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competency. Consequently, we cannot conclude counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a hearing to which appellant was not entitled. We overrule appellant's second issue. Having overruled appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The indictment was not filed until April 24, 2009.