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Pamela C. v. Dep't of Child Safety

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO
Apr 19, 2019
No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0175 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2019)

Opinion

No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0175

04-19-2019

PAMELA C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.M., A.M., AND Q.M., Appellees.

COUNSEL Pamela C., Tucson In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety


THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JD165811
The Honorable Peter W. Hochuli, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL Pamela C., Tucson
In Propria Persona Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:

¶1 Pamela C. appeals from the juvenile court's August 2018 order terminating her parental rights to her children D.M., born in November 2004; A.M., born in December 2008; and Q.M., born in June 2011. We affirm the court's order.

¶2 Pamela's most recent involvement with the Department of Child Safety (DCS) began in September 2013, when DCS received a report that the children appeared malnourished and had been outside the house unsupervised in the middle of the night, the house was unkempt and unsanitary, and Pamela was depressed and had a history of using drugs. Pamela acknowledged her classification as seriously mentally ill, but she refused to sign a release for DCS to obtain her mental health records, saying it was "her personal business." After interviewing the children and school and daycare employees, DCS took physical custody of them, citing Pamela's "history of inconsistently []treated severe mental illness," a "documented history of inappropriate parenting practices," a "lack of follow through for appropriate/necessary services to address the children's emotional/behavioral needs, violence within the home which the children have witnessed, and substance use." DCS then filed a dependency petition in which it alleged the children had been abused or neglected. In March 2014, Pamela admitted the allegations in an amended petition, and the children were adjudicated dependent.

Child Protective Services (CPS) was formerly a division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), and it was CPS that took custody of the children. Effective May 29, 2014, the Arizona legislature repealed the statutory authorization for CPS and for ADES's administration of child welfare and placement services under title 8 and transferred powers, duties and purposes from those entities to the newly established Department of Child Safety. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, §§ 6, 20, 54. For simplicity, our references to DCS in this decision encompass both ADES and the former CPS.

Pamela's rights to another of her biological sons were terminated in 2004 on abandonment, substance abuse, and nine-month time-in-care grounds, after he was born with high levels of cocaine in his system. Since then, she has given birth to four more children, and DCS continued to receive reports that she was neglecting them, physically and verbally abusing them, and using drugs. Before the instant dependency proceeding, DCS had provided in-home services with varying results.

For example, D.M. told DCS that Pamela spanked her son F.M. "at least once per week" because "he is the 'most bad,'" and F.M. related an occasion when Pamela had scratched his face as a punishment and then told him to say the marks had been caused by a daycare worker. F.M. was originally adjudicated dependent as part of this proceeding, but Pamela relinquished her parental rights to him in January 2017.

¶3 The same month, Pamela underwent a psychological evaluation with psychologist Jill Plevell, who found her condition "most consistent with" a polysubstance dependence disorder and an unspecified personality disorder with borderline and antisocial traits. Dr. Plevell reported that Pamela's test results suggested "narcissism, rigidity, denial, a passive-aggressive orientation, and defensiveness." She wrote, "Antisocial characteristics do not respond to treatment," adding that "[b]orderline features are treatable, but take nearly a decade to stabilize." She further explained that "[b]orderline features elevate [a parent's] risk to depersonalize children, lack empathy, think in a rigid manner, manipulate others, alternately overvalue and devalue children and others, and use children to meet their own emotional needs," while "fail[ing] to recognize the children's feelings and needs."

¶4 More than a year later, the DCS case manager reported Pamela's lack of progress and her non-compliance with—or her failure to benefit from—the therapeutic and family-support services offered by DCS. And, after two years of services, Dr. Chuck Chiverton, who had assessed the prospect of family therapy, still declined to recommend parent-child relationship therapy. He emphasized that Pamela "has to demonstrate she has a capacity to change through individual therapy, adhere to her medication protocols, and develop emotional stability." He expressed concern that the children could suffer additional emotional harm in family therapy, noting that Pamela's "personality issues, affect instability, and self-oriented decision making would be risk factors that would increase the risk of behavioral and emotional problems for her children." In January 2016, the juvenile court discontinued Pamela's visitation with F.M. based on a report that F.M.'s doctor had opined the visits were "clearly a trigger for him due to his diagnosis of emotional abuse by [Pamela]."

¶5 Also in January 2016, psychologist Marion Selz conducted another evaluation to assess whether Pamela had benefitted from services and to identify any additional services to address her ability to parent. Dr. Selz diagnosed Pamela as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and borderline personality disorder. She described Pamela's prognosis as "poor," stating, "Her thinking and associated behavior cause her to interact with her children in emotionally destructive ways, and for her to either deny or not be aware of her behavior and its consequences." She opined that "[t]he children are at risk for enormous psychological damage" if returned to Pamela's care, and she "[saw] no grounds for optimism" that Pamela's condition would resolve.

¶6 In August 2017, DCS obtained a referral for Pamela to engage in an assessment and individual therapy with Dr. Elizabeth Wong, a PhD.-level therapist. Pamela missed many of the appointments however, and she told DCS she would be working with a recovery coach at HOPE Behavioral Health, where Nurse Practitioner Dale Hopkins had opined that she suffered only from mild depression and anxiety. In November, DCS filed a motion to suspend visitation and, in December, a motion to terminate Pamela's parental rights on grounds of disabling mental illness, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), and length of time in care, see § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

After a hearing continued over several months, the juvenile court granted DCS's motion to suspend visitation on April 4, 2018.

¶7 The juvenile court held a termination hearing that spanned fourteen trial days over four months. In defending against the termination motion, Pamela's counsel called the following witnesses in addition to Pamela: Chris Chavez, her HOPE recovery coach; Annette Church, her HOPE therapist; Samantha Reuser, her La Frontera recovery coach in 2014; her boyfriend; her father; and her sister.

¶8 In its eighteen-page ruling, the juvenile court granted the termination motion on both grounds, detailing the history of this proceeding and the factual bases for its findings and conclusions. We find the court's ruling supported by the record, and we need not repeat its analysis here. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16 (App. 2002) (quoting State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993)).

¶9 Pursuant to Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 106(G)(1), Pamela's counsel notified this court that she had reviewed the record, found no non-frivolous issue to raise on appeal, and did not intend to file an opening brief. We granted Pamela an opportunity to file a pro se brief, and she has done so.

¶10 On appeal, Pamela does not argue that the record does not support the juvenile court's findings. Rather, she maintains she had provided her former attorney with evidence that would have contradicted the evidence presented by DCS, including "audio recordings, visitation supervisors, individual therapist, visit reports, monthly progress reports from case aide doing visits and [other] witnesses."

¶11 As DCS correctly points out, unrepresented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. See Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017). An opening brief must contain a statement of the issues and an argument that includes citation to legal authorities and appropriate references to the record. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a) (requirements for opening briefs); see also Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 106(A) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from final orders of juvenile court). By failing to comply with Rule 13, a party waives arguments on appeal. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). We may reject an argument based on lack of proper and meaningful argument alone. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013).

¶12 Pamela makes only general assertions and has not identified any specific evidence that she contends was wrongly omitted by counsel. In addition, her limited citations to the record do not appear relevant to her argument. To the extent we are able to understand her arguments, we regard them as waived. And, to the extent evidence favorable to Pamela's defense against severance was admitted, and she is asking this court to reweigh that evidence on review, it is not our role to do so. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12 (resolution of conflicts in evidence "uniquely the province of the juvenile court").

We further note that "the decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic decision," properly made by an attorney, that generally does not give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 215 (1984). --------

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court's termination order is affirmed.


Summaries of

Pamela C. v. Dep't of Child Safety

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO
Apr 19, 2019
No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0175 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2019)
Case details for

Pamela C. v. Dep't of Child Safety

Case Details

Full title:PAMELA C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.M., A.M., AND Q.M.…

Court:ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

Date published: Apr 19, 2019

Citations

No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0175 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2019)