Opinion
No. 3764.
Decided November 3, 1948.
An assessment of real estate is sufficiently definite which gives the acreage, location, and description by which the property may be readily identified. So also, an assessment of property to the deceased owner's "heirs" is in literal compliance with the provisions of R.L., c. 74, s. 21 authorizing such assessment "to the heirs generally." A method of assessment which has been substantially followed for a period of four years justifies the assessors reliance that the method used was consented to in the absence of any protest or indication of a desired change in such method. The statute (R. L., c. 74, s. 21) permits both real and personal property of deceased persons to be assessed "to the heirs generally" and makes no distinction between resident and nonresident ownership of real property. A notice of tax sale, sent to the "heirs" of the deceased owner of real property by registered mail and received by the wife of the deceased's son who was an heir, the administrator, and the one to whom former assessments had been made and by whom the taxes had been paid for four previous years, was sufficient compliance with R.L., c. 80, s. 19.
PETITION, under R.L., c. 80, s. 39, as amended by Laws 1947, c. 3, to quiet title to property conveyed under a tax deed from the defendant town of Farmington to the plaintiff for a consideration of $4,500. The property in dispute was owned by Napoleon Guilmette who died intestate in 1934 survived by his widow, four daughters and a son Rudolph who was appointed administrator. In 1944 the widow died and in the same year one daughter, Imelda, died leaving her husband, Eugene Coulombe, and three children who were also made defendants in this proceeding.
Each year from 1935 to 1939 the tax collector sent the tax bills to Rudolph who paid them. In 1940 the property was assessed to Napoleon Guilmette heirs and described as 210 acres, farm, L B (land and buildings) Bennett Hill Road and the tax bill was likewise sent to Rudolph. The tax not being paid it was advertised for sale in 1941 after a "courtesy notice" had been sent Rudolph and a notice of sale by registered mail sent to him which was signed for him by his wife. The property was bid in for the taxes by the town which received a deed from the tax collector in June, 1946. In October of that year pursuant to a vote of the town, the property, being unredeemed, was sold at public auction to the plaintiff as highest bidder at $4,500.
The rulings of the Trial Court are as follows:
"The Court rules that Imelda Coulombe, being a tenant in common and in occupancy of the premises on April 1st, 1940, the assessment should have been made in the specific name of Imelda Coulombe in her capacity as the occupying tenant in common. (Randall v. Watson, 70 N.H. 236).
"It is further ruled that the assessment as made was made generally to the heirs and if intended as a nonresident assessment was improper for failure to specify the occupant of said premises and if intended as a resident assessment it is invalid as not being specific. The assessment being invalid, all proceedings held thereafter by the Tax Collector are ruled invalid and the tax sale and the deed delivered thereunder by the Tax Collector is ruled to be invalid.
"It is further ruled that no proper notice of said tax sale was given to the owners. The tax sale is set aside and the petition is dismissed." The bill of exceptions by the plaintiff and the town of Farmington were allowed by Leahy, J. Other facts appear in the opinion.
Cooper, Hall Cooper (Mr. John M. Brant orally), for the plaintiff.
Errol S. Hall, for the town of Farmington.
Frank S. Batchelder, for Eugene Coulombe and William Coulombe, filed no brief.
Green, Green Romprey (Mr. Meyer Green orally), for Yvonne Roy, Laura Bonsaint and Eva Vachon, daughters of Napoleon Guilmette.
The validity of plaintiff's tax deed is governed by the Public Laws, as amended, which were in effect in 1940 and 1941 but references to the Revised Laws will be given where no changes have occurred in the revision of such Public Laws to the Revised Laws. R. L., c. 74, s. 21, provides as follows: "Estates of persons deceased may be taxed to the widow, to any of the children, to the heirs, or to any other person who will consent to be considered as in possession thereof; otherwise to the heirs generally of such deceased person." The Court has correctly ruled that the assessment was made "to the heirs generally" of Napoleon Guilmette. The assessment was in literal compliance with this statute and in the form approved and held valid in Greeley v. Beckman, 75 N.H. 413. While this alone is enough to substantiate the validity of the assessment its reasonableness is further evidenced by the circumstances. No inventory was filed by anyone interested in the property (R. L., c. 75, s. 6), nor did any child or heir request to be taxed as a part owner (R. L., c. 74, s. 19). No child or widow consented to be considered in possession of the property and consented to its taxation. Furthermore this method of assessment had been substantially followed for the previous four or five years and the selectmen were justified in believing that this method had been consented to in the absence of any protest or indication of a desired change in the method of assessment. See Sawyer v. Gleason, 59 N.H. 140; Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Marston, 94 N.H. 375, 377. The statute, R.L., c. 74, s. 21 applies to both real and personal property and insofar as the former is concerned makes no distinction between resident and nonresident ownership. While some of the cases emphasize that this statute was enacted for the purpose of taxing property where "there was no representative of the estate" (Crosby v. Charlestown, 78 N.H. 39, 41) it is by no means limited to that situation. Greeley v. Beckman, supra.
In support of the decision below it is argued that the assessment violates R. L., c. 74, ss. 17, 19, in that the occupant or the person in possession was neither taxed nor listed in the assessment. Section 17 has no application because it involves a situation where the occupant is not an owner and in the present case Imelda was a part owner. Section 19 does not apply because it refers to a taxation of fractional shares of part owners not in possession where the part owner in possession refuses to be taxed beyond his share. There was no such procedure or assessment in this case. The assessment was valid under section 21 and not required to be made under sections 17 and 19. While it does not affect the result of this case it may be noted that the reference to resident and nonresident in these latter sections is unnecessarily confusing and points up the desirability of legislative clarification. Formerly there were two methods of procedure for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes of residents and nonresidents. P.S., cc. 60, 61. Without passing on the validity of the assumption it will be noted that it has been generally assumed that Laws 1925, c. 61 attempted to abolish all distinction of tax sales of resident and nonresident property. This attempted change was carried into the Public Laws and Revised Laws, P. L., c. 66; R.L., c. 80. Over a long period of time the Tax Commission has advised the municipal tax authorities as follows: "There being now no distinction between the procedure for the sale of lands of residents and nonresidents, the words `residents,' and `nonresident,' in section 17 and 18 are superfluous." (Statutes Relating To Taxation With Court Decisions and Forms, 1946, p. 53). As already indicated we do not need to decide the merits of this general understanding and administrative construction. But superfluous or confusing words in the complicated business of tax sales are not helpful either to property owners or taxing officials.
The assessment was sufficiently definite since it gave the acreage, the location, and the description by which it could be readily identified. It is unlike the defective description in Greeley v. Beckman, supra, which was buildings and homestead without any acreage or further description or location.
The notice of the tax sale was sent to the heirs of Napoleon Guilmette, Farmington, New Hampshire by registered mail and was received by the wife of Rudolph who was a child, an heir, the administrator and the person who had previously paid the taxes for four years. The notice was sufficient. R.L., c. 80, s. 19.
It appears that the municipal authorities not only complied with the tax statutes in both assessment and sale but also took other steps not required by statute to give notice of the tax sale at least to a representative of the heirs. Consequently the plaintiff's tax title is valid and the order is
Exceptions sustained.
All concurred.