We find this recommendation valid today. However, the purpose of the statute is met if the notice describes the property to be sold in a manner to enable one to identify it. Smith v. Messer, 17 N.H. 420, 427 (1845); Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266, 269, 62 A.2d 318, 320 (1948). On the record in this case, the trial court could properly find and rule, as it did, that the notice was in compliance with the statute.

Rivard v. Ross, 99 N.H. 299, 302. If the collector has complied with the requirements of the statutes necessary to the exercise of his power to sell the land of a delinquent taxpayer, his deed conveys a valid title to these premises. Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266. However a claimant whose title is derived under such a deed must show affirmatively that all the prerequisites of the statutes authorizing the sale and conveyance have been strictly complied with. "Trace it ever so far, and through ever so many hands, whoever sets up a tax title must show that he has complied with all the requirements of the statute.

Incurrence of liability for such indemnification cannot be presumed to have been in the interest of the town or within the power of the selectmen in managing its prudential affairs so as to be binding in the absence of an authorizing vote by the inhabitants thereof. ASSUMPSIT, by writ dated March 24, 1955, to recover taxes paid, and legal expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the course of litigation which culminated in the decision on November 3, 1948, of Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266, establishing his title to real estate acquired from the defendant by deed dated June 6, 1946. The declaration alleges representations by the defendant's selectmen, before sale of the property to the plaintiff, that the town would reimburse him for any loss or expense on account of defective title or adverse claims to the property; and failure of the town to make such reimbursement on demand.

Gulick, American Forest Policy, 187 (1951). What was said in Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 548, 551, is pertinent here: "While we do not pass on the wisdom or advisability of the proposed bill, it may be helpful to note that the bill as drafted is unnecessarily ambiguous . . . Such confusion is `not helpful either to property owners or taxing officials' (Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266, 269) and should be resolved." For the above reasons it is impossible to give a specific answer to the question you have raised as applied to the act in its present form but it is believed that the foregoing may be sufficient for the main purposes of your general inquiry. Because of the defects of the act as a whole we have not attempted to answer all of the specific questions that could arise under it in its present form.

The defendant does not dispute the finding of the Master that the plaintiff had no notice of the tax sale as required by R. L., c. 80, s. 19, and the finding that there was a fatal defect in the tax sale. Cf. Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266. The defense is based upon chapter 103 of the Laws 1947, which is as follows: "1. DEED. Amend chapter 80 of the Revised Laws by adding after section 33 the following new section: 33-a. INCONTESTABILITY. A tax collector's deed shall be incontestable after three years from the date of record, in regard to defects of form or procedure in the tax assessment and the tax sale upon which such deed is based; provided however, that all towns, cities and other incorporated places shall be amenable to process in the superior court for the redress of any actual injury other than those purely technical or nominal in nature resulting from the foregoing provisions. 2.

It may not be clear to either the taxpayer or the tax collector whether (1) the exemption is limited to the "landing area" with or without buildings thereon and (2) whether such area is available for public use upon payment of fees or is to be "free" as provided in Maine Laws 1947, c. 241. Such confusion is "not helpful either to property owners or taxing officials" (Palmer v. Coulombe, 95 N.H. 266, 269) and should be resolved. Your inquiry concerning House Bill 164 is answered in the affirmative.

7. Here the charge is that the defendant did "forge" the check in question by forging the name of L.H. Hamilton thereto. "To forge," says Coke (3 Inst. 169) "is, metaphorically, taken from the smith who beateth upon the anvil and forgeth what fashion or shape he will." ( State v. Young, 46 95 N.H. 266, 88 Am. Dec. 212.) Thus the act of forging refers only to the writing of the instrument and has nothing to do with its use after it is forged. The indorsement on a check is no part of the instrument ( People v. Cole, above), and the allegations found in the information as to publishing, uttering and passing the check, and thereby defrauding Poullos, are but allegations of evidence which, if proved, might warrant a jury in finding that the defendant had the intent to defraud at the time he forged the check.