Opinion
CASE NO.: 1:08cv196-MEF (WO).
March 5, 2009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Remand (Doc. # 13) filed on April 18, 2008, by Plaintiff Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. ("Palm Harbor"). Defendants Michael Walters, Jennifer Walters, and Chester Driskell removed this action from the Circuit Court for Coffee County, Alabama on March 19, 2008, invoking this Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). For several reasons, Plaintiff contends that the statute does not provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees and finds that the Motion for Remand is due to be GRANTED.
JURISDICTION AND REMAND STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
Federal district courts have federal question jurisdiction over civil actions that arise "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions in which only state law claims are alleged if the civil action arises under the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The diversity statute confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in civil actions "between citizens of different states," in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. Additionally, President George W. Bush signed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law on February 18, 2005. The CAFA expands federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions and specifically amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to give federal district courts diversity jurisdiction over class actions where at least one member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of a different state from any defendant and the total amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Specifically, that provision states that
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which — (A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state.Id. (emphasis added). For purposes of this provision, the term "class action" is defined as meaning "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action." 28 U.S.C. § 1332)(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
When a case is originally filed in state court, a party may remove it if the case originally could have been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, the non-moving party may move for remand, which will be granted if "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
DISCUSSION
In support of remand, Palm Harbor presents a variety of arguments concerning whether this case is properly before this Court. In this Court's view, the CAFA does not extend jurisdiction to this action because it is not a Rule 23 class action as that term is defined in the plain language of the statute. This action was filed by a single plaintiff, Palm Bay against three individual defendants. When filing suit, Palm Bay did not invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, or any similar State statute. Moreover, Palm Bay did not invoke any procedure authorizing the action to be brought by it in a representative capacity. For this reason, the Court cannot find that this case fits the narrow definition of class action provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that this case is a class action, the Court cannot find that it meets the jurisdictional grant provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). That provision only applies, by its terms, to class actions brought by plaintiffs on behalf of classes of plaintiffs. It does not extend to class actions brought against classes of defendants.
In opposition to remand, Defendants mischaracterize Plaintiff's argument on this issue and expand 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) far beyond what is textually supportable. Defendants submit that because the case "involves" a class action the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The text of the statute provides no support for such a contention. Here, it matters not at all that this lawsuit is a declaratory judgment that is related to an arbitration between the parties wherein class allegations have been made. That does not magically convert this lawsuit into a class action. The statute provides jurisdiction if the case is a class action, not if it is related to a class action. The fact that Courts might consider the amount in controversy in an underlying action is a wholly separate inquiry. This declaratory judgment action cannot be judicially construed to be that which it is not in order to create subject matter jurisdiction where Congress did not intend it to exist.
In light of the Court's finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) provides no subject matter jurisdiction over this action for the aforementioned reasons, the Court need not, and does not address the other arguments advanced in support of the motion for remand. For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1) The Motion for Remand (Doc. # 13) is GRANTED.
(2) All other pending motions are left for disposition by the Circuit Court of Coffee County, Alabama after remand.
(3) This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Coffee County, Alabama.
(4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , , , , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).