Opinion
No. 14-02-00585-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed August 21, 2003.
On Appeal from the 247th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 00-13565
Affirmed
Panel consists of Justices YATES, HUDSON, and FROST.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Abbas Pahlavan challenges the attorney's fees awarded in the trial court's order enforcing a divorce decree dissolving his marriage to appellee Shoreh Ghods. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The trial court signed a divorce decree containing the following relevant language:
After the date hereof, Respondent [Abbas Pahlavan] shall timely make, and shall be responsible for, all payments of principal, interest, utilities, property taxes, insurance, alarm[,] pool and yard upkeep on the Property (referred to in this paragraph as "Expenses") until the Property is sold . . . At the closing of the sale of the Property, the party who advanced and paid such Expenses and/or repairs after the date hereof shall be reimbursed 100% of all monies paid by him or her for payment of the Expenses and/or repairs. . . .
There is evidence in the record showing the following: (1) Pahlavan did not make payments of Expenses as required by the decree; (2) in July of 2001, Pahlavan began to pay Ghods $1,000 per month in child support rather than the $1,800 per month required by the decree; and (3) Pahlavan did not make any of the mortgage payments on the Property after September of 2001.
The "Property" refers to the residence Pahlavan and Ghods owned and occupied while married.
Ghods filed a motion to enforce the divorce decree. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion to enforce and granted judgment against Pahlavan and in favor of Ghods for $7,090.87, plus $3,791.25 in attorney's fees. Pahlavan now challenges the trial court's judgment.
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court's enforcement order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (reviewing enforcement order under abuse-of-discretion standard of review); Chavez v. Chavez, 12 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to award of attorney's fees under section 9.014 of the Texas Family Code). Under this standard, we must determine whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. See In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d at 265.
III. Issues and Analysis
A. Is the trial court's award of attorney's fees authorized under section 9.014 of the Texas Family Code?
In his first issue, Pahlavan argues that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was not authorized under section 9.014 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code § 9.014 ("The court may award reasonable attorney's fees as costs in a proceeding under this subchapter.") Pahlavan contends that section 9.014 does not apply because the trial court modified — rather than enforced the divorce decree. We disagree.
There was evidence before the trial court that Pahlavan violated the divorce decree. Although there is a reimbursement mechanism in the decree that allows Pahlavan or Ghods to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale of the Property, this reimbursement provision does not affect Pahlavan's duty to timely pay the Expenses before the sale of the Property. Moreover, the record contains evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that Pahlavan was obstructing the sale of the Property. Further, the divorce decree does not state that the reimbursement provision is an exclusive remedy.
We hold the trial court enforced the divorce decree when it awarded Ghods $7,090.87 plus attorney's fees. Therefore, the trial court was authorized under section 9.014 of the Texas Family Code to award Ghods reasonable attorney's fees in its enforcement of the decree. Accordingly, we overrule Pahlavan's first issue.
B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees because Ghods allegedly violated the divorce decree?
In his second issue, Pahlavan argues the trial court abused its discretion because Ghods cannot enforce the divorce decree, given that she allegedly violated it by delaying the sale of the Property. This argument ignores the standard of review. There was sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to find: (1) Pahlavan materially breached the decree before any alleged breach by Ghods, and (2) Pahlavan — not Ghods — caused the delay in selling the Property. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in enforcing the divorce decree as it did or in awarding Ghods's attorney's fees. Accordingly, we overrule Pahlavan's second issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.