Opinion
24A-CR-1360
10-31-2024
Phillip Lee Owens, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Kristina L. Lynn Lynn Law Office, P.C. Wabash, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court The Honorable Davin G. Smith, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 35C01-2306-F4-182
Attorney for Appellant Kristina L. Lynn Lynn Law Office, P.C. Wabash, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAILEY, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Phillip Lee Owens appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Level 4 felony. Owens raises one consolidated issue for our review, namely, whether the court erred under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when it admitted evidence that officers had obtained during two searches of his home. We affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). While Owens was convicted of other charges, his arguments on appeal only relate to his conviction for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Owens lives in a trailer located at 303 Vernon Manor in Andrews. Robert Malott and his wife live in a neighboring trailer located at 301 Vernon Manor, but they did not know Owens. On June 16, 2023, Malott and his wife were home with their granddaughter, Ember Long, and her daughter. At some point that evening, the door to Malott's trailer "burst[]" open. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. Owens, who was intoxicated, "stepped his foot inside" Malott's door. Id. at 3839. Owens was "mad" and "[a]ggressive," and he asked Long if she was "Willie's cousin." Id. at 39, 84. Long responded in the negative, and both Long and Malott's wife told Owens to leave. Owens complied, and Malott's wife closed and locked the door behind him.
[¶3] Malott then went to his window and watched Owens. Owens was "wild looking" and "upset." Id. at 42. He then started to walk down the street toward the back of the trailer park. Owens appeared to be "arguing with his self [sic]." Id. Owens then turned around and started walking back in the direction of Malott's trailer. Malott believed that Owens was "seriously upset about something" because of his "mouth" movements and his "hand gestures." Id. at 43. Malott was "scared," and he believed that there was "something crazy about" Owens. Id. at 45. Owens then opened the door to his vehicle, which was parked in front of his trailer. Owens sat down in the vehicle, "reached underneath the seat" and "pulled out something." Id. Owens looked directly into Malott's window and put the object "in his waistband." Id. at 47. Malott believed that Owens had just retrieved a firearm from the car, so he instructed Long to call the police. At that point, Owens entered his trailer.
[¶4] Andrews Town Marshal Joshua Platt received the dispatch, and it "maybe took [him] a minute, two minutes" to arrive at Owens' trailer. Id. at 102. Marshal Platt made contact with Malott, who warned Marshal Platt about the possible firearm. Marshal Platt returned to his vehicle. At that point, he heard a gunshot that came from "inside" Owens' trailer. Id. at 103. Marshal Platt notified dispatch and opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to retrieve his rifle, and he heard a second gunshot "from the trailer." Id. Marshal Platt then announced himself as an officer and instructed anyone inside the trailer to exit. Owens complied. Marshal Platt searched Owens and did not find any firearms.
[¶5] Other officers began arriving to assist Marshal Platt. While Marshal Platt placed Owens in handcuffs, Huntington City Police Officer Isaac Brown and Reserve Sheriff Deputy David Scott entered the trailer. The officers were concerned that "there was an injured individual inside the home." Id. at 110. When Officer Brown and Deputy Scott entered the first bedroom, which was Owens', Deputy Scott observed spent shell casings on the floor. They then continued their protective sweep and moved into the other bedrooms. When Marshal Platt entered the mobile home, he smelled "burnt gunpowder." Id. at 116. Officer Brown and Deputy Scott were in the back bedroom and had not yet informed Marshal Platt of the shell casings. After they had completed their sweep, they moved back toward the front of the trailer and informed Marshal Platt of the casings in the front bedroom.
[¶6] The officers all returned to the bedroom to look for bullet holes and to determine if a bullet had exited the residence and potentially injured a neighbor. Officers were not able to locate any bullet holes in the room, but they observed a handgun in plain sight in a laundry basket near the spent casings. Officers then exited the trailer, and Deputy Scott began checking the neighbors for any injuries.
[¶7] Marshal Platt obtained a warrant to search both Owens' trailer and his car. Officers found a large safe in Owens' room with his name on it, which contained two handguns, ammunition, additional gun parts, and other items belonging to Owens.
[¶8] The State charged Owens with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, as a Level 4 felony (Count 1); residential entry, a Level 6 felony(Count 2); criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony (Count 3); and public intoxication, as a Class B misdemeanor (Count 4). During the ensuing jury trial, Owens objected to the admission of any evidence that officers had obtained following the initial, warrantless entry into his home on the ground that the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. In particular, he asserted there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into his home because officers had secured Owens and because officers did not have any information to show that another person was in the trailer. Owens also objected to any evidence officers obtained following the execution of the search warrant on the ground that the search violated his Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 rights because the search warrant was based on information that was unlawfully obtained during the warrantless search. The court overruled both objections and admitted all evidence that officers had obtained from both searches.
I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5.
I.C. § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(A).
I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(3).
[¶9] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Owens guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 4 but not guilty of Count 3. The trial court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Owens to an aggregate term of twelve years executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] Owens asserts that both the warrantless search of his home and the subsequent search pursuant to a search warrant violated his federal and state constitutional rights. As we have explained:
[The defendant's] arguments that police violated his Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 rights raise questions of law we review de novo. As the United States Supreme Court has explained with respect to the Fourth Amendment, as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal, while findings of historical fact underlying those legal determinations are reviewed only for clear error. The Indiana Supreme Court applies the same standard under Article 1, Section 11. In other words, we review whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists under a standard similar to other sufficiency issues-whether, without reweighing the evidence, there is substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision.Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1106 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), trans. denied.
Warrantless Search
Owens first asserts that it was error for the court to admit the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his home because the search violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.
The Fourth Amendment
[¶11] The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness." Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021). "That standard generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant before a law enforcement officer can enter a home without permission." Id. (quotation omitted). The warrant requirement, however, is subject to certain exceptions. Id.
[¶12] One "important" exception is for exigent circumstances, which applies when "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Id. (quotation omitted). This exception enables law-enforcement officers to handle "emergenc[ies]-situations presenting a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." Id. (quotations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has identified several exigencies. For example, an officer may enter a home without a warrant to (1) render emergency assistance to an injured occupant, (2) protect an occupant from imminent injury, (3) ensure the officer's own safety, (4) make a warrantless entry to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, and (5) prevent a suspect's escape. Id.
[¶13] The exigent-circumstances exception is applied on a "case-by-case basis." Id. (quotation omitted). This approach reflects the nature of emergencies. Id. "Whether a 'now or never situation' actually exists-whether an officer has no time to secure a warrant-depends upon facts on the ground." Id. (quotations omitted). The issue is therefore "most naturally considered by look[ing] to the totality of circumstances confronting the officer as he decides to make a warrantless entry." Id. (quotation omitted).
[¶14] On appeal, Owens asserts that exigent circumstances "did not exist in this case" because officers had secured him, he was not in possession of a firearm, there was "no objective basis to believe that anyone else was in the mobile home," and officers had "already 'cleared' the first bedroom when they went back and discovered the spent shell casings and handgun in the same bedroom." Appellant's Br. at 14. We cannot agree. Rather, we agree with the State that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless search.
[¶15] Here, Malott had Long call the police because Owens was visibly upset, had entered Malott's house without permission, and had obtained what Malott believed to be a gun. Marshal Platt responded to the dispatch and arrived within one to two minutes. After he made contact with Malott, Marshal Platt heard two gunshots come from Owens' house. At that point, Marshal Platt asked all occupants to leave, and Owens complied. And while we acknowledge that Owens indicated to officers that there was no one else in the trailer, the fact that two shots were fired from inside the trailer and that officers did not find a gun when they searched Owens reasonably led officers to believe that the firearm was still inside the house. Based on the totality of those circumstances, it was reasonable for officers to enter the trailer to check for any possible victims and to render assistance if needed.
[¶16] Still, Owens asserts that any possible belief that an exigent circumstance existed ceased after officers completed their initial sweep of the residence and that there was no reason for the officers to return to the first bedroom without a warrant. However, during the initial sweep of the trailer, Officer Scott observed shell casings on the floor of Owens' bedroom. It was reasonable for Officer Scott to complete his initial sweep of the home to ensure that there were no victims or further threats in the home before taking any action related to the spent casings. However, it was also reasonable for officers to "determine if a projectile left that residence and potentially hit another residence[.]" Tr. Vol. 2 at 119. In other words, the officers were concerned that, even though no one in Owens' trailer was injured, a neighbor may be in need of immediate assistance. And the only way for officers to determine this was to return to the bedroom and see if there were any bullet holes leading outside the trailer. Because an exigent circumstance existed to both enter the trailer and to return to the bedroom with the shell casings, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment when officers conducted the warrantless search.
Article 1, Section 11
[¶17] Owens next argues that the warrantless search of his home violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated ...." Although Article 1, Section 11 is worded similarly to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret it independently and "ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances." Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021). In doing so, we employ the framework provided in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). Id. Although there may be other relevant considerations, we evaluate the reasonableness of a law-enforcement officer's search or seizure by balancing three factors: "1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs." Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.
[¶18] Owens asserts that, while there may have been a reasonable degree of concern "[i]nitially," the officers "had no information that any other persons were inside the home" and that he had been detained such that the "moment the officers entered the home," there was "a low degree of concern." Appellant's Br. at 16. He also contends that the degree of intrusion was "significant" because a "person's expectation of privacy is greatest in his home." Id. And he maintains that the extent of law enforcement needs was "minimal" because there "was no reason that officers could not secure the home and wait" for a search warrant. Id. at 17. We again cannot agree.
[¶19] As for the first factor, the officers had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred. Indeed, Marshal Platt personally heard two gunshots come from inside Owens' trailer. And even though Owens exited the trailer on Marshal Platt's order, officers knew that a firearm had been discharged and that the firearm was not on Owens' person. Additionally, they believed the firearm was still in the trailer and that there was a reasonable likelihood that someone had been injured by the bullets. That concern was further heightened when officers entered the home and observed two shell casings on the ground and smelled burnt gunpowder.
[¶20] Regarding the second factor, "when examining the degree of intrusion into [a] citizen's ordinary activities, we consider the intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy." Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 944 (Ind. 2020). "Houses and premises of citizens receive the highest protection." Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1002 (Ind. 2014). "For this reason, warrantless searches of a home are presumptively unreasonable." Id. Under this standard, the officer's entry into Owens' home was highly intrusive.
[¶21] As for the final factor, police "sometimes act not to further an investigation of wrongdoing but rather to prevent imminent harm or to provide emergency assistance." Id. Here, officers entered the home without a warrant because they heard two gunshots from inside the trailer and were concerned that someone had been harmed and needed emergency assistance. Further, they remained in the trailer past the initial sweep to determine the trajectory of the bullets and determine whether the bullets had exited the trailer and injured a neighbor.
[¶22] Balancing the three Litchfield factors, we find that the officers acted reasonably under the Indiana Constitution when they conducted the warrantless search of Owens' home. Because there was neither a violation of the Fourth Amendment nor the Indiana Constitution, the trial court properly admitted the evidence obtained as a result of this search.
Subsequent Search
[¶23] Finally, Owens briefly asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained from a subsequent search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Owens does not make any argument that the search warrant lacked probable cause. Rather, his entire argument rests on his contention that any evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree because the initial warrantless search was invalid and therefore the evidence obtained from this initial search should not have been allowed to serve as the basis for the subsequent warrant. However, as discussed above, the warrantless search of Owens' home was not illegal, and the evidence used to support the search warrant was properly obtained. As such, the search warrant was not invalid, and the evidence officers obtained during the second search was not fruit of the poisonous tree. The court did not err when it admitted evidence from the second search.
Conclusion
[¶24] The officers' warrantless search of Owens' trailer did not violate his rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11, and the court did not err when it admitted evidence obtained during that search. And because the evidence used to support the search warrant was properly obtained, the evidence officers gathered during the subsequent warranted search was not fruit of the poisonous tree. The court did not err when it admitted evidence from either search. We therefore affirm the trial court.
[¶25] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.