Opinion
No. 14-02-01089-CR
Opinions of December 9, 2004. Opinion Filed March 10, 2005.
On Appeal from the 339th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 922,010.
Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices EDELMAN, FROST, and SEYMORE. (EDELMAN, J., concurs in result only.)
SUBSTITUTE OPINION
The majority and concurring opinions of December 9, 2004, are withdrawn and the court issues this substitute opinion.
A jury convicted appellant, John Brucewayne Oveal, of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. In four issues, appellant contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting absent complainant's "excited utterances" to her aunt and the investigating officer, (2) excluding absent complainant's handwritten document claiming someone other than appellant assaulted her, and (3) excluding the notes of an assistant district attorney. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Complainant, Tiffany Landers, resides outside of Texas and did not testify at trial. Therefore, the pertinent facts of this case were admitted into evidence through testimony of Landers's aunt, Theresa Griffin; Landers's cousin, Anikka Gray; and Houston Police Officer Charles Webb. On the afternoon of May 22, 2002, Landers telephoned Griffin from the apartment where they both lived. During this conversation, Griffin heard loud banging noises, as though someone was beating down a door. She also heard objects being thrown around and appellant's voice threatening Landers that he would harm her if he ever caught her with someone else.
Appellant and Landers were in a troubled relationship that ended approximately one week before the burglary.
Griffin's daughter, Anikka, arrived at the apartment after school. She was unable to enter the apartment with her key because the deadbolt was locked. Anikka saw appellant climbing out of an open bedroom window, and then Landers unlocked the door to let her in. Appellant later returned and demanded that Landers meet him outside. Anikka saw appellant slap Landers's face. Immediately thereafter, Anikka called Griffin and told her what had happened. Griffin instructed Annika to leave the apartment and go to her aunt's home. Anikka obliged.
Officer Webb and Griffin both spoke to Landers after the assault. At trial, they recounted Landers's description of the incident. Appellant entered the apartment through the bedroom window, and Landers ran and hid in a closet. Appellant kicked down a bedroom door, and when he found Landers, he grabbed her by her hair, pulled her out of the closet, and started beating and kicking her. He pulled a mattress on top of her and jumped on it repeatedly. He then pulled her into the bathroom where he beat her, used a pair of scissors to cut her hair out, and threw her into the wall. After dragging her into the living room, he retrieved a knife from the kitchen. He threatened to kill her, and then jammed the knife into the wall. He also pushed the clothes dryer down, threw clothes and a radio onto the floor, and hit her on the head several times with a broom handle. The jury found appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault and sentenced him to twelve years' confinement.
II. EXCITED UTTERANCES
In his first and second issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing Griffin and Officer Webb to testify over his hearsay objection regarding Landers's statements about the incident. The trial court admitted the testimony on the ground that Landers's statements were excited utterances, a hearsay exception. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). Whether an out-of-court statement is admissible under an exception to the general hearsay exclusion rule is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Our role is limited to determining whether the record supports the trial court's ruling. Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Therefore, we must reverse only when "the trial judge's decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree." Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992)).
In a post-submission memorandum, appellant also argues that Landers's out-of-court statements to Officer Webb should have been excluded under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Although appellant failed to raise a trial objection on confrontation grounds, he contends that we should consider the issue in light of Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), decided after submission of this case. Crawford held that out-of-court testimonial statements by a witness, who fails to testify at trial, are barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable under the rules of evidence. Id. at 1369-74. Although Crawford clarified the law with respect to the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of out-of-court "testimonial" statements under the rules of evidence, "the federal constitutional right to confront one's accuser's is neither new nor novel." Bunton v. State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet filed). Accordingly, by failing to object on Confrontation Clause grounds, appellant failed to preserve this issue for review. See Tex. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Bunton, 136 S.W.3d at 369 (holding appellant waived Confrontation Clause complaint by failing to object at trial and rejecting suggestion that because Crawford established a new constitutional rule, an objection would have been futile); Crawford v. State, 139 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) (approving of Bunton).
The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is founded on the belief that a statement made as a result of a startling event or condition is involuntary and does not allow the declarant an adequate opportunity to fabricate, thereby ensuring the trustworthiness of the statement. Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet ref'd). In other words, the statement is trustworthy because it represents an event speaking through the person rather than the person speaking about the event. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. The lapse of time between the event and declaration, and whether the statement is made in response to a question, are considerations in determining whether the statement is admissible as an excited utterance, but they are not dispositive. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The critical factor is whether the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event still dominated the declarant at the time of the statement. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. If the statement is made while the declarant is still in the grip of emotion, excitement, fear, or pain and the statement relates to the exciting event, it is admissible even after an appreciable amount of time has elapsed. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Jones v. State, 772 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ ref'd).
A. Statements to Griffin
Appellant contends that Landers's statements to Griffin were not excited utterances. Appellant claims no evidence was presented that Landers was dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event when she made the statements to Griffin. Appellant further avers that Landers talked to Annika about the incident before talking to Griffin, one to two hours passed between the assault and the time Landers spoke to her aunt, and Landers did not make any spontaneous statements to Griffin. When Griffin testified, no evidence had been admitted that Landers talked to Annika about the incident before talking to Griffin. Because that evidence was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling, we may not consider it. See Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (noting that a reviewing court should review a trial court's ruling on admission of evidence in light of the evidence before the trial court at the time it made its ruling). Additionally, there is no evidence to support appellant's assertion that Landers did not make spontaneous statements to Griffin. Griffin testified about what Landers told her; she gave no indication Landers was responding to questions.
Although Landers's statements to Griffin were made one to two hours after Landers had been assaulted, the period of time separating the startling event and the statement is only one factor to consider when determining if a statement was an excited utterance. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. Griffin testified that she arrived at the apartment before Officer Webb. Landers was lying on the couch crying, she looked scared, and she "seemed kind of out of it." Griffin further testified that Landers appeared to be suffering under the stress or excitement caused by the event. Evidence had already been presented through Officer Webb that Landers had visible injuries and the apartment was ransacked. Based on this testimony, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Landers's statements admissible because she was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event. See id.
We overrule appellant's first issue.
B. Statements to Officer Webb
Appellant also contends that Landers's statements to Officer Webb were not excited utterances. Officer Webb testified that when he arrived at Landers's apartment, Landers was quiet, in a frightened state of mind, not herself, and upset, and her eyes were watering. However, Officer Webb further testified that Landers was only "somewhat" stressed. When questioned by defense counsel, Officer Webb admitted that Landers was not excited and that it was not necessary for her to calm down. Based on Officer Webb's testimony, it appears that Landers may have been frightened, or perhaps upset, but she was not "dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event" as required by the excited utterance exception.
Moreover, the record indicates that Landers's statements to Officer Webb were not spontaneous and were made after she had the opportunity to reflect on the events surrounding the assault. Officer Webb arrived at Landers's apartment about two hours after the assault occurred. By that time, Landers had already recounted the details of the incident to Griffin. When Landers told Officer Webb about the incident, she did so in the context of a police interview. Officer Webb's questions during the interview were calculated to elicit information and details about the offense. Responses to such questions are normally considered reflective narratives and thus lack spontaneity required to be admissible as an excited utterance. See Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1966); Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 765 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). In fact, in this case, Officer Webb testified that Landers did not make any statements that were not responsive to his interview questions. Thus, we are persuaded that Landers's statements were triggered by the questions, not the startling event.
Based on the entire record, we find Landers's statements made in response to Officer Webb's questions lacked the requisite indicia of reliability to be admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly the trial court abused its discretion by admitting them.
The improper admission of Webb's hearsay testimony is governed by the harm analysis applicable to non-constitutional error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). We will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 417. In our review, we must consider the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how the alleged error might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Although Officer Webb's testimony was important to the State's case, the same evidence to which Officer Webb testified was properly admitted through Griffin's testimony. Additionally, the State presented the eyewitness testimony of Landers's cousin, Anikka Gray. Gray testified that upon arriving home from school, she saw appellant leave the apartment through an open bedroom window and run down the stairs. Gray further testified that, before either Griffin or Webb arrived at the apartment, appellant returned and struck Landers in the face.
Because Webb's testimony was cumulative of Griffin's testimony, and because there was eyewitness testimony from Gray that implicated appellant in the assault, we have a fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury's verdict or had but a slight affect. See Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (holding any error in admitting complained-of evidence was harmless in light of other properly admitted evidence proving the same fact); Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (same).
We overrule appellant's second issue.
III. EXCLUSION OF HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT
In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to admit a handwritten document as impeachment evidence. We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). We must review the trial court's ruling in light of the arguments, information, and evidence that was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made. Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). We must uphold the trial court's evidentiary ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Appellant also claims the document was admissible because it contained statements against interest. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). However, he did not make this complaint at trial, so we will not consider it on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
Appellant offered the following handwritten document as evidence:
My name is Tiffany Michelle Landers and I am 18 yrs old[.] I was born on 1-28-84[.] I would like to tell whoever this may concern what happen on May 22 of 02'[.] Everything that I told the W. Mongemery [sic] police was true except the part about who did it to me[.] James Lawson better known as JR — is the guy who did this to me. He told me if I "Gave them got damn people his name he would hurt me." And he told me to give John [sic] name "since he the cause of this shit." Being as scared as I was I did what he told me and Mrs. Thressa [sic] Griffin (my aunt) didn't like him from the start so of course she would believe me. /s/ Tiffany Landers. Sworn to and subscribed to before me this 23 day of September 2002 /s/ Russell Timmies, Notary Public
Appellant's sister testified that she was familiar with Landers's printing and signature, and she recognized the printing and signature in the document as Landers's. See TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(2).
When appellant offered the document at trial, the State objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. Appellant then informed the trial court that "this is offered as impeachment." However, the record reflects that appellant failed to cite any specific rule of evidence or argue why the statement constituted impeachment evidence.
After a hearsay statement has been admitted, the declarant's credibility may be attacked and if attacked, may be supported by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. TEX. R. EVID. 806. Because Landers was the declarant of hearsay statements admitted through Griffin and Officer Webb, appellant was entitled to impeach her credibility as if she had given live testimony. See Bee v. State, 974 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Appling v. State, 904 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref'd).
The proponent of an out-of-court statement, not the trial court, is required to specify which exception to the hearsay rule he is relying upon or to specify how the evidence is not hearsay. Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 845-46. The proponent "'must at the earliest opportunity, have done everything necessary to bring to the judge's attention the evidence rule [or statute] in question and its precise and proper application to the evidence in question.'" Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (quoting 1 Stephen Goode, Et Al., TEXAS PRACTICE: GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 103.2, at 14 (2d ed. 1993)).
On appeal, appellant presents two arguments for the admissibility of the statement to impeach Landers. He first contends that the entire statement was admissible to impeach Landers as a prior inconsistent statement under Texas Rule of Evidence 613(a). See TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). He also claims the entire statement was admissible to impeach Landers under Texas Rule of Evidence 613(b) because it contains evidence of Landers's motive, bias and interest for telling Griffin and Webb that appellant committed the offense. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(b).
The trial court reasonably could have determined that appellant was offering the entire statement as a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 613(a). Because only Landers's prior inconsistent statements can be used to impeach her under Rule 613(a), the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the statements in the document attributed to James Lawson were inadmissible, and thus excluded the entire document. See Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 846-47 (holding that when offered evidence contains admissible and inadmissible portions, the trial court may properly exclude the entire item of evidence).
To the extent the trial court determined that appellant was offering the entire document under Rule 613(b) as evidence of Landers's bias or motive, several of the statements do not have any tendency to show Landers's bias or motive. Therefore, the trial court reasonably could have determined that these statements were inadmissible, and thus excluded the entire document. See Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 846-47.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. We overrule appellant's third issue.
IV. EXCLUSION OF PROSECUTOR'S NOTES
In his fourth issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in excluding a handwritten note allegedly written by Andrea Kolski, an assistant district attorney. According to what is purported to be Kolski's note, included in the State's case file, Landers told Kolski that appellant was not the person who committed the assault. Appellant claims the note was admissible as impeachment evidence and as a statement against interest. See TEX. R. EVID. 613; TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
However, appellant did not offer the note as evidence at trial. Instead, he submitted it as an offer of proof to support his claim that he should have been allowed to call the prosecutor as a witness. When making the offer of proof, he submitted the note to show what Kolski would have testified to. Because appellant did not offer the note as evidence at trial, he has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's fourth issue.
Having overruled appellant's issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.