Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11725 No. 6277
01-27-2016
ROBERT DONALD OUELLETTE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Jane B. Martinez, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Melissa Wohlfeil, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-13-3355 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Leslie Dickson, Judge. Appearances: Jane B. Martinez, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Melissa Wohlfeil, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. Judge MANNHEIMER.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Robert Donald Ouellette was convicted of fourth-degree assault for recklessly causing physical injury to his girlfriend, Priscilla Holbrook, by throwing a plate at her (which hit her in the head). On appeal, Ouellette contends that the trial judge committed error by allowing the State to introduce evidence that, during the preceding year, Ouellette had pleaded guilty to fourth-degree assault for hitting and kicking Holbrook.
AS 11.41.230(a)(1). --------
The trial judge admitted this evidence under Alaska Evidence Rule 404(b)(4), which authorizes the admission of prior acts of domestic violence in a prosecution for domestic violence. The judge expressly considered the problem of potential unfair prejudice, and the judge found that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jurors that this evidence had been admitted because it was "circumstantial evidence of [Ouellette's] likely conduct during the episode being litigated." The judge further instructed the jurors that "evidence of the defendant's other acts is never sufficient, standing alone, to justify the defendant's conviction", and that the government could not meet its burden of proving Ouellette's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt "simply by showing that [Ouellette had] committed similar acts in the past."
We have examined the record of the proceedings, and we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she concluded that the probative value of the challenged evidence was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.