Opinion
24A-CR-128
10-08-2024
Ester Osegueda, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Courtney Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Lisa Diane Manning Plainfield, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Stephenie LeMay Luken, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D05-2104-F2-15
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Lisa Diane Manning
Plainfield, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PYLE, JUDGE.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Ester Osegueda ("Osegueda") appeals, following a jury trial, her convictions for Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. Osegueda argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence: (1) drugs found during a search of her car; (2) Osegueda's statements made to law enforcement; and (3) testimony regarding an address found on Osegueda's cell phone. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1.
[¶2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence drugs found during a search of Osegueda's car.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence Osegueda's statements to law enforcement.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence testimony regarding an address found on Osegueda's cell phone.
Facts
[¶3] In April 2021, Indiana State Trooper Yan Dravigne ("Trooper Dravigne") was parked in a grass median along Interstate 70 while monitoring traffic. Trooper Dravigne initiated a traffic stop on a van because the driver of the van had failed to signal before changing lanes. Upon stopping the vehicle, Trooper Dravigne approached the passenger side of the van and saw that Osegueda was in the front driver's seat and Adam Lopez ("Lopez") was in the front passenger's seat. Trooper Dravigne saw that Osegueda's "hands [were] shaking uncontrollably" and saw that Osegueda was "rapid[ly] breathing." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202).
[¶4] Trooper Dravigne identified himself to Osegueda and Lopez and informed them that he had initiated the stop because Osegueda had failed to signal before switching lanes. Trooper Dravigne asked if the van belonged to Osegueda and Lopez, and Osegueda responded that they had rented the van. Osegueda further explained that they were from California and had mistakenly purchased plane tickets to Memphis, Tennessee instead of Indianapolis, Indiana. Osegueda told Trooper Dravigne that after arriving in Memphis, they had rented the van and had driven it to Indiana. Osegueda and Lopez told Trooper Dravigne that they were visiting Indianapolis to see Lopez's brother. Trooper Dravigne collected Osegueda's license and the van's registration from Osegueda, informed her that he was writing her a warning, and asked her to follow him back to his car.
[¶5] Osegueda stood at the passenger side window of Trooper Dravigne's car. Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda how long she planned on visiting Lopez's brother, and she responded that she planned on staying for around one week. Trooper Dravigne also asked Osegueda what Lopez's brother's name was, and she responded, "um, what-he has a weird name. Be-Benovio? Something like that?" (State's Ex. 1). Trooper Dravigne walked back to the van in order to verify the VIN on the car before returning to his police car. Trooper Dravigne noticed that the van contained "large amounts of trash bags[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 206). Trooper Dravigne also noticed that there was no luggage in the van. When Trooper Dravigne returned to his police car, he asked Osegueda if she kept her clothes in the trash bags, and she responded that she did. Trooper Dravigne told Osegueda that he was going to finish up her warning and that she could return to the van.
[¶6] At about seven minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Dravigne called for a K-9 unit because he was "suspicious of the occupants of the vehicle." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 207). Trooper Dravigne also was on his phone checking both Osegueda and Lopez for active warrants and was checking the license plate of the rented van. At about twelve minutes into the traffic stop, Indiana State Trooper Kyle Hall ("Trooper Hall") arrived on the scene with a K-9 unit. Trooper Hall directed Osegueda to sit with Trooper Dravigne in his police car and directed Lopez to stand several yards away from the van. Trooper Dravigne remained on the phone, and Trooper Hall and his K-9 unit approached the van around fifteen minutes into the traffic stop.
[¶7] While still on his phone, Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda, "do you have anything illegal inside the car?" (State's Ex. 1). Osegueda told Trooper Dravigne that while she had been staying at a hotel in Memphis, "some guys" had put "some bags in our car" and had told her to drive to Indiana. (State's Ex. 1). Osegueda told Trooper Dravigne that those same guys had said that they were going to kill her. In response, Trooper Dravigne ended his phone call, Mirandized Osegueda, and explained that she was not under arrest. After Mirandizing Osegueda, Trooper Dravigne asked her if she understood her rights. Osegueda replied, "Yes." (State's Ex. 1). Trooper Dravigne told Osegueda, "so it's up to you if you want to make any statements." (State's Ex. 1). Trooper Dravigne then asked Osegueda "so, do you want to talk to me?" (State's Ex. 1). Osegueda replied, "Yes." (State's Ex. 1).
[¶8] After being Mirandized, Osegueda told Trooper Dravigne that she had mistakenly flown to Memphis instead of Indianapolis. Osegueda again explained that, while she was at a Holiday Inn hotel parking lot in Memphis, three people had put the bags in her van and had told her to drive to Indiana. Osegueda said that she and Lopez had not known the men. Osegueda also told Trooper Dravigne that she had not known what was in the bags and had not looked inside of the bags. Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda if he could search her van, and Osegueda consented verbally and in writing. During Trooper Dravigne and Osegueda's conversation, Trooper Hall's K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the van.
[¶9] Officers searched the van and found 58.3 kilograms of methamphetamine and 39.27 kilograms of fentanyl inside of several large trash bags. Officers also located a convenience store receipt from Mississippi dated around 5:00 a.m. that morning. Officers found a single backpack in the van, and Osegueda and Lopez told Trooper Dravigne that the backpack belonged to both of them. Osegueda also told Trooper Dravigne that the men who had placed the bags in her van had told her that they were going to follow her. Osegueda told Trooper Dravigne that she had seen a gray SUV with Mississippi license plates following her. Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda if the men in the gray SUV were the same men who had placed the bags in her van in Memphis. Osegueda said that she could not tell, but that the men in the SUV were African-Americans with bandanas.
[¶10] Drug Enforcement Administration Agent Craig Frothingham ("Agent Frothingham") arrived on the scene and spoke with Osegueda. Osegueda told Agent Frothingham that the men who put the trash bags in her van had not called either her or Lopez while she had been driving up to Indiana. She told Agent Frothingham that the men had put an address in her phone and had told her to drive to that address. Osegueda also told Agent Frothingham that she did not know where Lopez's brother lived and had never met Lopez's brother. Osegueda also could not identify the Memphis hotel in which she had spent the night and where the men had placed the bags in her van. However, Osegueda told Agent Frothingham that she had checked into her hotel around midnight and had left the hotel around 4:00 A.M. Osegueda consented to a search of her cell phone, and Agent Frothingham acquired a federal search warrant to do so as well a few days later.
[¶11] The State charged Osegueda with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. In February 2022, Osegueda filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence seized during the search of her van and her statements made to law enforcement officers. Specifically, Osegueda argued that officers had violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when they had prolonged the traffic stop. Further, Osegueda argued that she had not "knowingly and fully waive[d] her right to remain silent" under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In April 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Osegueda's motion to suppress. In May 2022, the trial court denied Osegueda's motion to suppress.
[¶12] In November 2023, the trial court held a jury trial. At trial, the State moved to admit the video recording of the traffic stop as State's Exhibit 1. Osegueda lodged a standing objection, arguing that the evidence had been obtained in violation of "the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution[] as well as Article 1, Section[s] 11, 12, and 13 of the Indiana Constitution[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 204). Osegueda, as part of her objection, also incorporated all of her arguments from her motion to suppress. The trial court admitted the video recording over Osegueda's objection. Osegueda also objected to all of Trooper Dravigne's testimony under the same objection, and the trial court overruled her objection.
[¶13] Also, at the trial, Trooper Dravigne testified that Osegueda had been "overly nervous" compared to motorists that he typically interacts with during traffic stops. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202). Trooper Dravigne further testified that Osegueda had been so nervous that it was "like [Osegueda] was having an anxiety attack at the roadside." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202). Trooper Dravigne also testified that he had found Osegueda's travel plans to be "suspicious[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 205). The State asked Trooper Dravigne if Osegueda had expressed any "surprise or astonishment" at what the officers had found in the trash bags, and Trooper Dravigne responded, "No, sir." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 216).
[¶14] Agent Frothingham testified that the Mississippi address on the convenience store receipt was directly south of Memphis and in the opposite direction of Indiana. During Agent Frothingham's testimony, the State moved to admit into evidence the methamphetamine and fentanyl found in Osegueda's van, and Osegueda renewed her standing objection. The trial court admitted the evidence over Osegueda's objection. Agent Frothingham further testified that there had been an "absolute[ly] insane amount" of drugs in the van and that the estimated value of the drugs was "hundreds of thousands of dollars[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 233). Agent Frothingham also testified that Osegueda gave him permission to search her cell phone and that he had also obtained a search warrant to search Osegueda's cell phone.
[¶15] Drug Enforcement Agency Forensic Chemists testified that they had analyzed the drugs that the officers had seized from Osegueda's van and that there had been a total of 39.27 kilograms of fentanyl and 58.3 kilograms of methamphetamine. Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Erik Collins ("Agent Collins") testified that he had traveled to the address that was in Osegueda's cell phone's GPS when she had been stopped by Trooper Dravigne. Osegueda objected, arguing that the admission of any testimony related to information found on the cell phone was hearsay and that no evidence had been admitted establishing that the cell phone seized and analyzed belonged to Osegueda. The trial court overruled Osegueda's objection. Agent Collins testified that the address in Osegueda's cell phone's GPS led to an unoccupied house that he believed to be a "stash location" which he defined as "a location that maybe a person doesn't actually live, but it's established for the sole purpose of . . . holding narcotics for further distribution[.]" (Tr. Vol. 3 at 40).
[¶16] At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Osegueda guilty on all counts. At her sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated Osegueda's two possession convictions due to double jeopardy concerns and imposed concurrent sentences on her two dealing convictions. Specifically, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of seventeen (17) years, with seven (7) years executed (five (5) years in the Indiana Department of Correction and two (2) years on work release) and ten (10) years suspended.
[¶17] Osegueda now appeals.
Decision
[¶18] Osegueda argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence: (1) drugs found during a search of her car; (2) Osegueda's statements made to law enforcement; and (3) testimony regarding an address found on Osegueda's cell phone. We address each of her arguments in turn.
1. Drugs
[¶19] Osegueda first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence drugs found during the search of her car in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). "However, when a party argues the admission of evidence constituted a constitutional violation, we apply a de novo standard of review." Miller v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 687 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022).
[¶20] Osegueda first challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of her car under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
[¶21] "The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings." Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). This protection has been "extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). "As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260. "When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search." Bradley, 54 N.E.3d at 999 (cleaned up).
[¶22] "It is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle." Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). It is also well settled that a dog sniff is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. "'Accordingly, no degree of suspicion is required to summon the canine unit to the scene to conduct an exterior sniff of the car or to conduct the sniff itself.'" Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 255-56 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (quoting State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied.
[¶23] A narcotics dog sweep, however, becomes "an unreasonable investigatory detention if the motorist is held for longer than necessary to complete the officer's work related to the traffic violation and the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the motorist is engaged in criminal activity." Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034. "[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's mission[.]" Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The mission in a traffic stop is "to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop" and to "attend to related safety concerns[.]" Id. Also, the mission includes checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355. "While these checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly, a canine sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." Tinker, 129 N.E.3d at 256 (cleaned up). "Thus, a traffic stop prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop's mission is unlawful." Id. (cleaned up). "The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff prolongs-i.e., adds time to-the stop." Id. (cleaned up). The burden is on the State to show that the time for the traffic stop was not increased due to a canine sniff. Wells v. State, 922 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied.
[¶24] Osegueda argues that the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. Specifically, Osegueda alleges that Trooper Dravigne intentionally delayed the traffic stop "to await the canine officer." (Appellant's Br. 14). We disagree.
[¶25] Our review of the record reveals that Trooper Dravigne was on the phone because he was checking both Osegueda and Lopez for active warrants as well as checking the license plate of the van when Trooper Hall started the dog sniff. Trooper Hall approached the van around fifteen minutes into the traffic stop. At this point, Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda if she had anything illegal in the van, and her response prompted him to request a reference number and end his phone call. Trooper Dravigne was still in the midst of completing the mission of the traffic stop, and therefore, we hold that the dog sniff did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. See Chauncy v. State, 204 N.E.3d 311, 319 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (holding that a dog sniff occurring around seventeen minutes after the traffic stop did not prolong the traffic stop where the initiating officer had not yet printed the warning ticket). See also Tinker, 129 N.E.3d at 258 (holding that a dog sniff did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop where the canine officer arrived fourteen minutes after the stop began and the dog alerted while the traffic stop was still ongoing); Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (holding that a dog sniff did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop where the canine officer arrived approximately fourteen minutes after the stop began and the dog alerted two minutes later while the initial officer was still checking for warrants), trans. denied. We hold that the traffic stop was not prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[¶26] Osegueda also challenges the admission of the evidence seized during the search of her car under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]" IND. CONST. ART. 1, § 11. "The purpose of this section is to protect those areas of life that Hoosiers consider private from unreasonable police activity." State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008), reh'g denied. Although Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, we interpret Article 1, Section 11 independently. See Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010). "[W]e focus on the actions of the police officer[] and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's actions." Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034 (cleaned up). The reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's search or seizure requires balancing three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
[¶27] Here, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred was significant. Trooper Dravigne initiated a traffic stop on Osegueda's van due to a traffic violation. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) (noting that "even a minor traffic violation is sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle"). Further, Trooper Dravigne testified that Osegueda was "overly nervous" compared to other drivers that he had stopped for a traffic violation and that Osegueda's travel plans were suspicious. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202). Trooper Dravigne also saw a large number of trash bags in Osegueda's van and did not see any luggage despite Osegueda's plan to visit Lopez's brother for one week. Further, Trooper Hall's K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in Osegueda's van.
[¶28] The degree of intrusion on Osegueda was moderate. Osegueda was lawfully detained for a traffic violation until the dog sniff occurred around fifteen minutes later. Further, the extent of law enforcement needs were high. "Intra-and international drug trafficking are significant issues facing law enforcement and public safety officials at the federal, state, and local levels." Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1036. "And given that [drug traffickers'] stock-in-trade is inherently fungible and highly mobile, but their centers of organization are scattered and secretive, law enforcement's best chance of uncovering the latter is to interdict the former as it moves about our nation's highways." Id. As a result, the search of Osegueda's van did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the drugs found in Osegueda's van.
2. Statements
[¶29] Osegueda also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence her statements made to law enforcement. The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Crocker v. State, 989 N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. We will only reverse a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though it was not the reason enunciated by the trial court. Moore v. State, 839 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied.
[¶30] Osegueda first argues that she was in custody for purposes of Miranda and that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence her preMiranda statements to Trooper Dravigne. We disagree.
[¶31] A person must be informed of the right to remain silent and to an attorney and that what she says may be used against her any time "law enforcement officers question a person who has been 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of h[er] freedom of action in any significant way.'" Luna v. State, 788 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). Statements given in violation of Miranda are normally inadmissible in a criminal trial. Morris v. State, 871 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied. "Miranda warnings do not need to be given when the person questioned has not been placed in custody." State v. Hicks, 882 N.E.2d 238, 241 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008).
[¶32] In determining whether a person was in custody or deprived of freedom such that Miranda warnings are required, our ultimate inquiry is whether there is a formal arrest or a restraint of the freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). We make this determination by examining whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances would believe she is not free to leave. Id. We examine all the circumstances surrounding an interrogation, and are concerned with objective circumstances, not upon the subjective views of the interrogating officers or the suspect. Id. "If the police, by means of physical force or show of authority in some way restrained the liberty of the suspect, we will conclude that the suspect was seized and in custody." Hicks v. State, 5 N.E.3d 424, 429 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. "Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a person was in custody." State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up). We note that, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person temporarily detained in an ordinary traffic stop is not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 336 (citing Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988)). In fact, our Court has identified relevant factors to be considered for determining whether a person is in custody, which includes:
whether and to what extent the person has been made aware that he is free to refrain from answering questions; whether there has
been prolonged coercive, and accusatory questioning, or whether police have employed subterfuge in order to induce selfincrimination; the degree of police control over the environment in which the interrogation takes place, and in particular whether the suspect's freedom of movement is physically restrained or otherwise significantly curtailed; and whether the suspect could reasonably believe that he has the right to interrupt prolonged questioning by leaving the scene.Crocker, 989 N.E.2d at 819.
[¶33] Here, our review of the record reveals that Osegueda was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Trooper Dravigne stopped Osegueda's van during a valid traffic stop. About twelve minutes into the stop, Trooper Hall and his K-9 unit arrived on the scene, and the officers directed Osegueda to sit in the front passenger seat of Trooper Dravigne's car during the dog sniff. Although Trooper Dravigne did not tell Osegueda that she was free to refrain from answering questions, his questioning was not prolonged, coercive, or accusatory. Trooper Dravigne also did not employ subterfuge. Instead, Trooper Dravigne simply asked Osegueda if she had anything illegal in her van, a question commonly asked during a routine traffic stop. Further, Trooper Dravigne did not place Osegueda in handcuffs.
[¶34] Instead, Trooper Dravigne continued checking Osegueda and Lopez for active warrants as well as checking the van's license plate. Trooper Dravigne asked Osegueda if she had anything illegal in her van as Trooper Hall began walking his K-9 unit around the van. Osegueda then told Trooper Dravigne about some men who had placed the trash bags in her van, had told her to drive to Indiana, and had threatened to kill her. Trooper Dravigne then Mirandized Osegueda, told her that she was not under arrest, told her that it was up to her if she wanted to make a statement, and asked her if she wanted to talk with him. Osegueda agreed and repeated the same narrative about the men and the trash bags. We hold that Osegueda was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when she had made her pre-Miranda statements, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence her pre-Miranda statements to Trooper Dravigne.
[¶35] Osegueda also argues that her "statements made both prior to and subsequent to her Miranda advisement should have been excluded, specifically all her statements about strangers placing trash bags in her van, following her to Indiana, and forcing her to deliver the bags to Indiana." (Osegueda's Br. 18). In support of her contention that her pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements should not have been admitted into evidence, she directs us to King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). In King, officers arrested King in a church parking lot on the same evening that the church had been set on fire. Id. at 94. Officers interrogated King at the county jail and Mirandized him only after he had admitted that he had been inside of the church during the fire. Id. A panel of this Court held that the post-Miranda statements should be suppressed. Id. at 99. But King is distinguishable from the case before us because King was subjected to a custodial interrogation in the county jail. Here, Osegueda was not in custody when she had made her pre-Miranda statements to Trooper Dravigne. After Osegueda had made her pre-Miranda statements, and Trooper Dravigne Mirandized Osegueda, she was in custody because, at that point, no reasonable person would believe that she was free to leave. However, the post-Miranda statements are still admissible because Osegueda had waived her rights under Miranda when she continued to speak with Trooper Dravigne. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted her postMiranda statements into evidence.
3. Cell Phone Testimony
[¶36] Osegueda also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence Agent Collins' testimony about what he had discovered at the address recovered from Osegueda's cell phone's GPS. Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence Agent Collins' testimony, we find any error to be harmless. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A) provides:
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.See also Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied. To convict Osegueda of Level 2 felony dealing in narcotics and Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, the State had to show that the amount of the drug was at least ten grams. See I.C. § 35-48-4-1(e)(1); I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1). Here, the 58.3 kilograms (58,300 grams) of methamphetamine and the 39.27 kilograms (39,270 grams) of fentanyl recovered from Osegueda's van were properly admitted into evidence by the trial court and far exceeds the ten grams required by both statutes. Thus, the probable impact of Agent Collins' testimony about the stash house, which is evidence of intent to deliver, does not undermine our confidence in the outcome at trial. Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. See also Crocker, 989 N.E.2d at 823 (concluding that the illegal possession of drugs in an amount so far above the statutory threshold supports a reasonable inference that the possessor had the intent to deliver).
[¶37] Affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.