Opinion
CN21-04133
03-07-2024
O. S. Petitioner, v. T. S. Respondent.
Patrick J. Boyer, Esq., Attorney for Petitioner Sean M. Lynn, Esq., Attorney for Respondent
Date Submitted: December 7, 2023
Petition No.: 23-07695
Joint Motion for Declaratory Relief
Patrick J. Boyer, Esq., Attorney for Petitioner
Sean M. Lynn, Esq., Attorney for Respondent
ORDER
Jennifer B. Ranji, Family Court Judge
The Court issues this decision regarding a Joint Motion for Declaratory Relief filed on April 28, 2023 by O------S------("Husband"), represented by Patrick Boyer, Esq., and T------S------("Wife"), represented by Sean Lynn, Esq.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Husband and Wife were married on February 3, 2020, and divorced on February 14, 2022. The parties' ancillary matters were resolved via a Stipulated Order Regarding Ancillary Matters and Child Support ("Ancillary Stipulation") which was made an Order of this Court in July 2022. The Ancillary Stipulation includes the following relevant provisions:
WHEREAS, the parties intend by means of this Stipulation and Order to compromise, adjust and settle all questions between them as to their respective property rights and interests and all other rights, privileges and duties arising out of their marital relationship.
I. Marital Assets
D. Household Furnishings and Belongings/Personal Effects: Wife may retrieve her wedding dress and paintings within 30 days of this Stipulation and Order. Wife shall notify Husband of her intent to retrieve these belongings, which Husband shall make available to her. Except as otherwise stated herein, each party shall retain the personal property that is presently within their possession.
F. Other Assets: Unless otherwise specified herein, the parties shall retain whatever other assets or proprietary interests they currently possess or have any interest in, and forever waive any right to the assets and proprietary interests in the possession of other.
See S------v. S, Del. Fam. CN21-04133, 21-20874, Ranji, J. (July 26, 2022).
On November 4, 2022, Wife, by and through Mr. Lynn, filed a Complaint for Replevin in the Justice of the Peace Court. In her Complaint, Wife asserted that she was attempting to retrieve the following items from Husband:
• A silver pearl bracelet Husband had given to her as a birthday gift, prior to their marriage;
• The engagement ring Husband presented to her prior to their marriage;
• The wedding ring Husband gave her on their wedding day;
• A gold chain with a diamond cross on it that Husband gifted to her during the marriage;
• A gold chain that Husband's mother gifted to her during the marriage.
Wife asserted that Husband took possession of these items of jewelry and since they were gifts and therefore non-marital property, the Ancillary Stipulation did not address them.
On November 28, 2022, Husband, by and through Mr. Boyer, filed a Motion to Dismiss Wife's Complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court. Husband asserted that Wife failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as the Ancillary' Stipulation resolved all financial matters incident to the parties' divorce, including the retention of personal property. Husband further asserted that the Justice of the Peace Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over agreements made between former spouses concerning the division and distribution of marital property, marital debts, and any other matters incident to a marriage, separation, or divorce.
On December 23, 2022, Wife filed an Answer to Husband's Motion to Dismiss. Wife asserted that the disposition of the jewelry items at issue are not controlled by the Ancillary Stipulation, as they are gifts and not marital property, and that the proper venue to hear this legal issue is therefore the Justice of the Peace Court.
On April 28, 2023, the parties filed the pending Stipulation Regarding Joint Motion for Declaratory Relief with this Court. The parties asserted that they appeared before the Justice of the Peace Court to address the replevin action on March 21, 2023, and the Magistrate requested that the parties approach this Court to determine whether Family Court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over that action. The matter was therefore stayed in the Justice of the Peace Court. The Joint Motion requested that this Court "determine which Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Wife's Replevin Action" and "if this Court determines that it has subject-matter jurisdiction, the parties jointly move for a determination of whether Wife states a claim upon which relief can be granted."
See S------ v. S, Stipulation Regarding Joint Motion for Declaratory Relief, Del. Fam. CN21-04133, 21-20874, Ranji, J. (April 28, 2023).
After a Case Management Conference and several continuances, oral argument regarding the parties' contentions was held on December 7, 2023.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Declaratory Judgment
Title 10, Section 6501 provides, "Except where the Constitution of this State provides otherwise, courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." For a matter to merit declaratory relief, "(1) it must be a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial declaration."
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire. Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 623 A.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Marshall v. Hill, Del.Super., 93 A.2d 524 (1952)). See also Richard C. L. v. Lalette C., 1990 WL 34699 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 13, 1990).
In the pending action, the controversy relates to the property rights of the parties, their interests are real and adverse, and the claims are ripe for judicial decision. As such, declaratory relief may be granted.
Family Court Jurisdiction
When establishing the Family Court over fifty years ago, the General Assembly was specific in stating that its intention was to create "1 court" that would have "original statewide civil and criminal jurisdiction over family and child matters..." The Family Court's general jurisdiction to address divorce and its ancillaries is set forth in 10 Del. C. §921(11), which provides that this Court has exclusive civil jurisdiction over "[a]ll proceedings relative to divorce and annulment under Chapter 15 of Title 13..." The purpose of that jurisdiction, as set forth in 13 Del. C. § 1502 is, inter alia, "To promote the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage" and '"mitigate the potential harm to spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage." More specific language within Chapter 15 grants the Court authority to "equitably divide, distribute and assign the marital property between the parties..." (emphasis added).
Stipulations between parties in a divorce action, however, are further addressed in Section 507 of Title 13, titled "Jurisdiction in Family Court; termination of Chancery Court jurisdiction." The relevant language of that Section states, "The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the construction ... [and] enforcement of agreements made between future spouses, spouses and former spouses concerning ... the division and distribution of marital property and marital debts and any other matters incident to a marriage, separation or divorce." (Emphasis added). It is this language that is at the heart of the parties' dispute.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES
Wife argues that the language of Section 1513 cited above limits this Court's jurisdiction in a property division action to marital property, thereby leaving non-marital property to be addressed via, for example, a replevin action in the Justice of the Peace Court. Wife further asserts that since at least some (if not all) of the items at issue are non-marital, those items were not disposed of via the Ancillary Stipulation signed by this Court. Wife asserts that requiring parties going through a divorce to address non-marital property in the Family Court would make the identification of property as marital or non-marital meaningless.
The Court need not determine whether each of the items is marital or non-marital at this time, as Husband appears to agree that at least some of the items are non-marital and the facts presented support that determination.
Husband notes that the Ancillary Stipulation states that it addresses "all questions between [parties] as to their respective property rights and interests ... arising out of their marital relationship," and further provides that the parties will retain "whatever other assets or proprietary interests they currently possess or have any interest in" and waive their right to any property in the possession of the other party. As such, Husband asserts that the items Wife seeks to recover are within these catch-all terms of the Ancillary Stipulation and to the extent they were not in Wife's possession when the Ancillary Stipulation was entered, she waived her right to them.
As it relates to the Court's jurisdiction, Husband asserts a distinction between orders entered by the Court after a trial on the merits, in which the Court is limited to addressing property within the marital estate, and orders entered based on a stipulation of the parties, in which case the Court can enforce a distribution of property that it could not award outright. Husband asserts that the property Wife seeks was obtained "incident to a marriage" and therefore falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 507, cited above, and he further asserts that requiring parties to address certain provisions in their agreements in Family Court and others in a different trial court would result in piecemeal litigation and make it difficult for parties to reach a holistic agreement resolving matters.
Wife argues in response that the "incident to" language of Section 507 is limited by the language preceding it related to the division and distribution of "marital property." Wife asserts that a contrary holding would result in a significant broadening of this Court's jurisdiction, such that any property owned or arguably owned by a party to a divorce would have to be addressed in a divorce action.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
As noted above, the parties request that the Court issue a declaration as to two issues: Whether it has jurisdiction over this replevin action and, if so, whether Wife states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Jurisdiction Over Replevin Action
The determination as to the Court's jurisdiction over the replevin action, however, also requires the resolution of two issues. The first is whether, pursuant to 13 Del. C. §507, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over non-marital property included in a negotiated agreement reached by parties to a divorce, where that property is owned incident to the parties' marriage or divorce. If that question is answered in the affirmative, the second question is whether the jewelry items at issue in this case fall within the "incident to a marriage, separation or divorce" language of Section 507.
The Court concludes that its jurisdiction for purposes of construction and enforcement of an agreement between former spouses, such as the Ancillary Stipulation at issue, extends to terms that the Court could not "divide, distribute or assign" following a trial. That extension may include non-marital property, provided that the property is owned or obtained "incident to" the parties' marriage, separation, or divorce.
The Court further concludes that the jewelry items at issue in this matter were obtained "incident to" the parties' marriage and that the claim for their return arises "incident to" their divorce.
Family Court Jurisdiction Pursuant to Section 507
Statutory Language
The Court's conclusion in this matter starts necessarily with the plain statutory language.
The Court agrees with Wife that its jurisdiction to "divide, distribute, and assign" property ancillary to a divorce is limited to addressing "marital property" as defined in 13 Del. C. §1513(b).
Id.
Section 507 of Title 13, however, addresses the Court's jurisdiction when its role is not to divide, distribute, and assign property, but to construct and enforce agreements negotiated and entered by the parties. As set forth above, in relevant part that Section grants this Court jurisdiction "over the construction [and]... enforcement ... of agreements made between ... former spouses concerning ... the division and distribution of marital property .... and any other matters incident to a marriage, separation or divorce." The language goes on to state, "The Court shall have jurisdiction to resolve any issues resulting from the construction, reformation, enforcement or rescission of an agreement."
As such, in establishing the Court's jurisdiction over agreements negotiated by parties to a divorce, the General Assembly did not stop at authorizing the Court to construct and enforce agreements related to marital property. Rather, the legislation promulgated in Section 507 included additional language giving this Court authority to construct and enforce agreements related to "any other matters incident to" the parties' marriage or divorce.
Wife argues that the "incident to" language is not intended to broaden the Court's jurisdiction but is to be read as a subset of the earlier language in Section 507 related to marital property. The Court cannot agree. To adopt Wife's logic would ignore the additional language in Section 507 or to consider it redundant - neither of which is permissible under the rules of statutory construction.
The Court concludes that the plain language of Section 507 expands this Court's jurisdiction for purposes of constructing and enforcing agreements between divorcing parties to include non-marital property that is owned or received "incident to" the marriage or divorce.
Legislative Purpose
The General Assembly's intention in creating the statewide Family Court was to provide "1 court" with jurisdiction over child and family matters, with such court having exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll proceedings relative to divorce." The stated purpose of the Family Court as it relates to divorce actions is to "promote the amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage" and "mitigate the potential harm to spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage."
The conclusion that this Court is not permitted to enforce agreements addressing non-marital property negotiated by divorcing parties seeking to resolve their differences would be contrary to those stated intentions. Such a holding would necessarily require more than "1 court" to address the divorcing parties' attempt at resolving matters, and it would not promote the amicable settlement of the parties' disputes as they would not be able to fully negotiate and address the issues in one agreement. And further, requiring parties to litigate disputes in more than one forum would not serve to mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children that would be caused by the process of the legal dissolution of their marriage. Rather, such an interpretation would lead to piecemeal litigation and make it difficult for the parties to reach an agreement on the entirety of issues incident to their marriage.
The breadth of Family Court jurisdiction and the desire to have one court address all family-related disputes was addressed by the Superior Court in the case of Matthaeus v. Matthaeus, in which a father filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his children's mother. In dismissing the plaintiff's action, the Court noted that permitting the father to pursue Superior Court relief that was fundamentally related to the parties' custody action in Family Court "would undermine the legislative intent of creating a special court uniquely trained in the handling of family matters and the resolution of such disputes."" The Superior Court opined regarding the General Assembly's intent in creating Family Court, stating, "The legislature gave Family Court ... the exclusive authority to 'make such adjudications and dispositions as appear appropriate' in the resolving of matters relating to the family unit." The Superior Court went on to note that "Delaware's legislature clearly envisioned that the Family Court, and only the Family Court, would 'have original statewide civil and criminal jurisdiction over family and child matters and offenses...'"
Matthaeus v. Matthaeus, 2003 WL 1826285 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003) J Carpenter.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
The Court agrees that the relevant statutory scheme and stated purposes weigh in favor of keeping matters related to family dissolution in the court established to address those specialized matters, and the reading of Section 507 as permitting the Court to enforce agreements regarding non-marital property that is owned or received "incident to" marriage is consistent with that scheme and purpose.
Case Law and Legislative History Regarding Section 507
When Section 507 was enacted in 1976, it read as follows:
The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to construction and enforcement of agreements relating to payments for support between spouses, between persons formerly spouses, between parents and children, and between parents and children's spouses or former spouses.
Del. S.B. 674, 128th Leg., 1st Sess., 60 Del. Laws, ch. 455 § 1 (1976).
As such, the statute as initially enacted gave the Family Court jurisdiction over agreements related to spousal and child support and other matters that had formerly been decided by the Court of Chancery, but it did not include the "incident to" language that is relevant to this matter.
Section 507 was modified in 1990, however, following a Supreme Court decision which held that Family Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce a stipulation between divorcing parties, and that such jurisdiction continued to reside with the Court of Chancery. Shortly after that decision, the General Assembly amended Section 507 to its present form as follows:
Sanders v. Sanders, 570 A.2d 1189, 1189-90 (Del. 1990).
Section 1. Amend Subsection (a), §507, Chapter 5, Title 13 of the Delaware Code, by deleting the second sentence thereof in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the construction, reformation, enforcement and rescission of agreements made between future spouses, spouses, and former spouses concerning the payment of support or alimony, the payment of child support, the division and distribution of marital property and marital debts and any other matters incident to a marriage, separation or divorce. The Court shall have jurisdiction to resolve any issues resulting from the construction, reformation, enforcement or rescission of an agreement. In this regard, the Court shall apply the statutory factors set forth in 13 Del. C., Chapters 5, 6 and 15.
Del. H.B. 744, 135th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., 67 Del. Laws, ch. 446, § 1 (1990). In its legislative synopsis, the General Assembly stated that § 507 was amended to "clarif[y] the kinds of agreements within the Family Court's jurisdiction." Id.
The General Assembly's quick action following the Sanders decision and the addition of the language regarding matters "incident to a marriage, separation, or divorce" made clear that the General Assembly wished to provide for the broader jurisdiction of Family Court and avoid the splitting of jurisdiction between this Court and other trial courts when determining issues related to a family dissolution.
The interpretation of the language in Section 507 was addressed in 2006 by the Court of Chancery in Savage v. Savage. In that case, divorced spouses were disputing ownership of the home in which they had resided while married, with the former wife asserting that there had been an agreement between the parties that there would be joint ownership of the residence. Wife filed a complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to add her name to the title of the home. However, because the parties had already had the opportunity to address such claims in the Family Court but failed to do so, the Court refused Wife's later request to reopen the matter.
Savage v. Savage, 920 A.2d 403 (Del. Ch. 2006).
While the facts in the Savage case differ from the present case in that the property at issue was not alleged to be non-marital, the Chancery Court's discussion of Section 507 and the Family Court's jurisdiction generally is instructive. In refusing to hear Wife's claim the Chancery Court stated, "To permit [Wife] now to present her claims to this court would disrespect clear statutes of this State empowering the Family Court and would undermine the General Assembly's desire to create a single court with comprehensive authority to address marital relations." The Chancery Court noted, "The creation of the Family Court largely flowed from the General Assembly's desire to create a court that could address all of the difficult issues attendant to the break-up of marriages."
Id. at *405.
Id. at *413.
The Chancery Court further addressed Section 507 specifically, referring to its "capacious contours" and stating that it "grants broad jurisdiction over agreements between spouses or former spouses and "is of particular significance because it was at the center of the debate over the extent of the Family Court's jurisdiction." The Court explained the genesis of the broader language added to Section 507 related following the Supreme Court decision in Sanders and stated, "[T]he General Assembly's subsequent amendment of § 507 in 1990 that placed additional matters within the Family Court's jurisdiction clearly reflected a desire to clarify that the Family Court's authority over property disputes between former spouses was broad and exclusive."
Id. at *408.
Id. at *409.
Id. at *410.
Id. at *411.
While the Matthaeus and Savage cases stressed the breadth of the Family Court jurisdiction over matters related to marriage and divorce, a case that more closely resembles the facts of the current matter was decided in the Chancery Court in 2008 in Brown v. Rembert.
2008 WL 5182307 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008).
In Brown. Husband argued that Wife had violated her role as his Power of Attorney related to sales of pre-marital property owned by Husband and the subsequent expenditure of the funds received. Wife argued that the Chancery Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the matter regardless of whether the property at issue was determined to be marital, pointing to the language of Section 507 for support for her claim that the property was at least "incident to" the parties' marriage and, therefore, Family Court held exclusive jurisdiction over it.
The Court of Chancery agreed with Wife and dismissed the action, finding that the premarital sales proceeds were subject to Family Court's jurisdiction under Section 507. In doing so, the Court reiterated the General Assembly's desire to create one court to address disputes related to marriage, stating, "Section 507 was amended to eliminate any doubt as to the Family Court's role as the primary forum for these matters by entrusting it with exclusive jurisdiction over the construction and enforcement of agreements between spouses or former spouses concerning matters incident to their marriage, separation, or divorce and concurrently ending the Court of Chancery's involvement in such controversies."
Id. at *6.
Similar to Wife's claims in the current matter, in Brown, Husband argued that the "incident to" language found in Section 507 is limited by the language before it related to the "division and distribution of marital property." The Court of Chancery rejected that argument stating:
[N]othing in the plain language of Section 507(a), its legislative history, or the case law supports Brown's position. The statute expressly confers upon the Family Court exclusive jurisdiction over 'the construction, reformation, enforcement and rescission of agreements made between future spouses, spouses and former spouses concerning ... matters incident to a marriage, separation or divorce.' It does not limit that category of agreement to matters involving marital property, and I see no reason to import such a
limitation into the statute. Nor has Brown identified anything in the legislative history that suggests an intent to so limit § 507(a).
Id. at * 10.
The undersigned concludes that Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters included in the parties' Ancillary Stipulation that are incident to their marriage and divorce and that pursuant to 13 Del. C. §507, that jurisdiction includes non-marital property'.
Contrary to Wife's assertion, such a holding does not make irrelevant the designation of property as marital or non-marital. As stated above, had the parties' property been divided by the Court following a trial on the merits, non-marital property would be considered by the Court as appropriate pursuant to 13 Del. C. §1513(a), but the Court would not order the division or distribution of non-marital property. As to agreements between former spouses, however, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to address non-marital property incident to the marriage that is included in such negotiated agreements.
Jewelry Received "Incident to" the Parties' Marriage
Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "incident" as used in this setting as "dependent on or relating to another thing in law." The phrase "relate to" is further defined as "to connect (something) with (something else)."
Incident, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
Relate to, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020).
Wife received the jewelry at issue during or shortly before the parties' marriage, as gifts from Husband and from her mother-in-law. Two of the jewelry items - her engagement and wedding rings - are directly related to the marriage, and the remaining items are gifts to Wife from Husband or his mother, during or shortly before their marriage. The Court concludes that these gifts were related and connected to the parties' marriage, as the marriage was the legal recognition of the relationship that led to the gifts being given. As such, the Court concludes that those items were received by Wife "incident to" the parties' marriage.
Conclusion as to Jurisdiction Over Replevin Action
The Court concludes that it has exclusive jurisdiction over non-marital property received or owned "incident to" a marriage and included in a stipulation entered between the parties, and the Court concludes that the jewelry at issue was received incident to the parties' marriage. As such, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Wife's replevin action related to that jewelry.
Wife's Claim in Replevin
The second question raised by the parties is whether Wife's replevin action states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under these facts, this question depends upon whether the jewelry at issue falls within the terms of the Ancillary Stipulation and, if it does, whether that agreement grants those items to Wife such that she may rightfully seek their return from Husband.
The Court concludes that the jewelry at issue was covered by the terms of the Ancillary' Stipulation, which granted ownership of those items to whoever had possession of them at the time the Stipulation was entered. Given Wife's claim that those items were in Husband's possession at that time, the Court concludes that Wife has no claim in replevin to seek their return.
The Ancillary Stipulation states that the parties intended for their negotiated agreement to "settle all questions between them as to their respective property rights and interests and all other rights, privileges and duties arising out of their marital relationship." As it relates to personal property, the agreement describes specific items - at least some of which are non-marital - and their agreed-upon disposition, and it concludes, "Except as otherwise stated herein, each party shall retain the personal property that is presently within their possession." A later provision of the Ancillary Stipulation states, "Unless otherwise specified herein, the parties shall retain whatever other assets or proprietary interests they currently possess ... and forever waive any right to the assets ... in the possession of the other."
S------v. S, Del. Fam. CN21-04133, 21-20874, Ranji, J. (July 26, 2022).
The breadth of the parties' intent as captured in the cited language, which asserts that they are settling all questions as to their respective property rights and that the parties are to retain whatever other assets they currently possess, and the fact that the Ancillary Stipulation quite specifically addresses multiple pieces of non-marital property owned by both parties, lead the Court to conclude that the parties did in fact intend to include non-marital property items that arose from their marital relationship. And, similar to the Court's determination that the ownership of this jewelry is "incident to" the parties' marriage, the Court finds that the necklaces, rings, and bracelet gifted during and just prior to a marriage as between a husband, wife, and mother-in-law, fall within the broad "arising out of their marital relationship" language included within the Ancillary Stipulation.
The Court notes that while the relevant language as to distribution of personal property is contained within a portion of the Ancillary Stipulation that is titled "Marital Property," as noted by both parties, the relevance of such titles within a contract is limited in relevance, and it is certainly outweighed by the broad language found elsewhere in the agreement as well as the fact that other provisions within that section quite clearly address the distribution of non-marital items, including vehicles, Wife's wedding dress, and a pre-marital painting of Wife's.
The jewelry at issue is personal property that is not specifically identified within the Ancillary Stipulation, and as such it is included within the catch-all phrases providing that personal property not otherwise addressed would be retained by whoever had possession of the property at the time the agreement was entered, and that each of the parties waived the right to obtain any property not in their possession.
The Court concludes that Wife fails to state a claim for replevin, as the jewelry is already addressed within the terms of the Ancillary Stipulation entered by the parties. Pursuant to those terms, Wife waived the right to recover personal property that was not in her possession at the time the agreement was entered. As such, if Wife did not have possession of those items at that time, she has no right to retrieve them in a replevin action.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that it has exclusive jurisdiction over this action in replevin and that Wife has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.