Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00545-CV
08-31-2017
SHERRIE L. O'QUINN, Appellant, v. MARK W. O'QUINN, Appellee.
On appeal from the 378th District Court of Ellis County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Contreras
By three issues, appellant, Sherrie L. O'Quinn (Sherrie) challenges the trial court's order awarding her spousal maintenance pursuant to her divorce from appellee, Mark W. O'Quinn (Mark). Specifically, by three issues, Sherrie contends (1 and 2) the trial court erred in limiting the amount and the duration of her spousal maintenance award; and (3) the basis for the spousal maintenance is vague because it fails to reference Sherrie's disability. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is before this Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to an order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
After approximately twenty-seven years of marriage, Sherrie and Mark separated in December 2012. In March 2013, Sherrie filed for divorce. Following a bench trial in June 2016, the trial court issued a divorce decree on August 24, 2016. In addition to dividing the parties' community assets and liabilities, the decree ordered Mark to provide $600 monthly spousal maintenance to Sherrie for six years. In October 13, 2016, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review the trial court's decision to award spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. See Lopez v. Lopez, 55 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds for asserting error; however, they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court's decision, we ask: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in the application of its discretion. Gonzalez v. Villarreal, 251 S.W.3d 763, 774 n.16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. dism'd); In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). The sufficiency review is related to the first inquiry. In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d at 872. If it is revealed in the first inquiry that there was sufficient evidence, then we must determine whether the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id.
In making our determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the actions of the trial court and indulge every legal presumption in favor of the judgment. Smith v. Smith, 115 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). The trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the decision or if reasonable minds could differ as to the result. Id. at 305.
Findings of fact entered in a case tried to a court have the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon special issues. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 214. Therefore, we apply the same standards when reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's fact findings as we do when reviewing the evidence supporting a jury's answer to a special issue. Id.
Spousal maintenance is an award of "periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other spouse." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.001(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.). The purpose of spousal maintenance is "to provide temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability for self-support is lacking or has deteriorated over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose capital assets are insufficient to provide support." Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citing O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)).
A trial court may exercise its discretion to award spousal maintenance only if the party seeking maintenance meets specific eligibility requirements. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 214-15. Section 8.051 of the family code provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may order spousal maintenance for either spouse "only if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient property, including the spouse's separate property, on dissolution of the marriage to provide for the spouse's minimum reasonable needs and," among other things, the spouse seeking maintenance "is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse's minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability[.]" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
Courts consider several factors in determining spousal maintenance. See id. § 8.052 (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.). These factors include: the financial resources, age, employment history, earning ability, and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income; the contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other spouse; the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; any history or pattern of family violence; and the comparative financial resources of the spouses. Id.
The term "minimum reasonable needs" is not defined in the family code. Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). A trial court determines whether a party's minimum reasonable needs are met on a fact-specific, individualized, case-by-case basis. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law which are relevant to the issue of spousal maintenance are:
Findings of Fact—Spousal Maintenance
6. The Court finds Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating mental disability.
7. The following factors were taken into consideration in determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of periodic payments:
All current income resources available to Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, on date of divorce.
a. Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, receives current income in the amount of $1,700.00 per month from the Social Security Disability Office as a result of a mental disability.
b. Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, receives current income in the amount of $351.00 per month from a disability policy provided by AT&T.
c. Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, was awarded a portion of Mark W. O'Quinn, Respondent's IBM pension and 401(k) benefits and will be receiving a monthly sum from those benefits.
d. All other income for which Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, is eligible and for which Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner, will become eligible in the future.
e. Sherrie L. O'Quinn, Petitioner's ability to work part-time.
. . . .
Conclusions of Law- Spousal Maintenance
16. The Court finds that Sherrie L. O'Quinn has established that because of an incapacitating mental disability, she is unable to earn sufficient income to prov[ide] for her minimum reasonable needs with her current income resources. Considering the income she receives and for which she is and will become eligible, as well as the resources awarded herein, and considering the factors in Family Code Section 8.052, the Court orders Mark W. O'Quinn, Respondent, to pay spousal maintenance in the amount of $600.00 per month for (6) six years with the first payment being due on August 1, 2016, and like payment on the
first of each month thereafter for 72 months or until terminated under Family Code Section 8.056.(emphasis in original).
A. Amount of Award
By her first issue, Sherrie contends that the $600 per month spousal maintenance award was insufficient to meet her minimum reasonable needs. At the time of the hearing, Sherrie was sixty-one years old, unemployed, and had been receiving social security disability payments for twenty-two years. Sherrie worked for AT&T for approximately eighteen years, but stopped working because of her disability. She stated that she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia. Sherrie testified that she is unable to work and has received monthly long-term disability payments from AT&T since 1993. When Sherrie reaches age sixty-five, her long-term disability payment will cease, but she will receive a monthly retirement pension from AT&T in approximately the same amount as the disability payment.
Sherrie defined agoraphobia as not wanting to leave her home and not wanting to be around people.
Testimony at the hearing showed that Mark is a service systems representative for IBM and makes approximately $100,000 per year. At the time of the hearing, Mark was fifty-nine years old and had no immediate plans to retire.
Sherrie complains on appeal that the trial court "failed to consider all of the statutorily required relevant factors" in determining the spousal maintenance award. However, we note that the trial court's findings specifically identify factors that were considered, but do not state that other factors were not considered. Moreover, Sherrie has cited no authority requiring the trial court to make specific findings as to each factor.
Sherrie testified that she receives approximately $1,400 per month in social security disability benefits. In addition, she receives approximately $351 monthly in disability benefits from AT&T. She testified that her health care needs are covered by Medicare. In the division of community property, Sherrie was awarded the marital residence, which was valued at $265,000, with $92,013.50 in equity. She was also awarded a one-half interest in Mark's IBM pension benefits and IBM 401k benefits. At the hearing, Sherrie was asked why she did not want to begin withdrawing $1,400 per month from Mark's pension benefits, as she was entitled to do; she responded that she feared she would lose other benefits if she did so, but was unable to identify specific benefits she would lose. Sherrie testified that she was requesting $2,400 per month in spousal maintenance for fifteen years. Sherrie submitted an exhibit purporting to show that her monthly expenses totaled $5,495.
Sherrie complains that the trial court found that she received $1,700 per month in social security disability benefits. We find no documentary evidence in the record verifying the exact amount Sherrie receives in social security disability benefits.
Sherrie cites several cases in which a trial court upheld spousal maintenance awards. See Lopez, 55 S.W.3d at 199 (upholding spousal maintenance award of $840 monthly for three years where wife suffered from diabetes and depression); Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 216 (upholding spousal maintenance award of $1,500 monthly for an indefinite period where wife had incapacitating permanent physical disability); see also Stafford v. Stafford, No. 12-04-00128-CV, 2005 WL 3201894, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 30, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upholding spousal maintenance award of $368 monthly for three years where wife had disability); Kniffin v. Kniffin, No. 05-99-00348-CV, 1999 WL 993933, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1, 1999, no pet. (mem. op., not designated for publication) (upholding spousal maintenance award of $120 monthly where wife was seventy-two and suffered from health problems). However, as Sherrie concedes, given "the fact specific nature of the analysis at hand," "there are numerous cases whose given facts might tend to support the [t]rial [c]ourt's rationale [in this case] as well."
After reviewing all of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Sherrie $600 per month in spousal maintenance. We overrule Sherrie's first issue.
B. Duration of Award
By her second issue, Sherrie contends the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the duration of her spousal maintenance award to six years. Section 8.054(b) of the family code provides that "[t]he court may order maintenance for a spouse to whom Section 8.051(2)(A) [a spouse unable to earn sufficient income because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability] or (C) applies for as long as the spouse continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed by the applicable provision." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.). Even if a spouse is permanently disabled, extended maintenance is discretionary. O'Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Tellez v. Tellez, 345 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Here, the trial court limited the duration of the spousal maintenance to six years, at which point Sherrie will be sixty-seven and Mark will be sixty-five. As noted, Sherrie was awarded a half-interest in Mark's pension benefits and his 401k benefits. The trial court could reasonably have concluded that, after six years, Sherrie would be receiving benefits from those sources and spousal maintenance would no longer be necessary.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the action of the trial court, see Smith, 115 S.W.3d at 305, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the duration of the spousal maintenance award to six years. We overrule Sherrie's second issue.
C. Vagueness
By her third issue, Sherrie complains that "the divorce decree is vague as to the basis for spousal maintenance." According to Sherrie, the decree should "reference the disability basis for the [maintenance] order to give Sherrie an opportunity to request a continuance of the spousal maintenance order in the future."
We find Sherrie's complaint to be without merit. Section 8.054(c) of the family code provides that "[o]n the request of either party or on the court's own motion, the court may order the periodic review of its order for maintenance under Subsection (b)." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.). Thus, Sherrie is entitled to seek a continuation of her spousal maintenance award, regardless of what basis the award was made. See Hackenjos v. Hackenjos, 204 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); see also Wiedenfeld v. Markgraf, No. 04-16-00172-CV, 2017 WL 685762, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Sherrie's third issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS
Justice Delivered and filed the 31st day of August, 2017.