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holding that Plaintiffs failed to perfect a "jurisdictional requirement" of Delaware's long-arm statute by not sending a second notice of suit to Defendant following return of the first notice as "unclaimed"
Summary of this case from Plummer v. ShermanOpinion
C.A. No. 01C-10-291 RRC
Submitted: July 29, 2002
Decided: October 25, 2002
Upon Defendant Thomas A. Lilly's Motion to Dismiss. GRANTED.
Bruce C. Herron, Esquire, Sawyer, Akin Herron, P.A. Attorney for Plaintiffs
William L. Doerler, Esquire White and Williams LLP Attorney for Defendants Thomas A. Lilly and Nixon Uniform Service, Inc.
Dear Counsel:
Currently before the Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by defendant Thomas A. Lilly ("Lilly"). It is the second such motion that Lilly has filed during the progression of this and an earlier, related case. Because the Court finds that plaintiffs Louis A. and Carol D. O'Donnell ("Plaintiffs") failed to perfect service upon Lilly under Delaware's nonresident motorist "long-arm" statute (title 10, section 3112 of the Delaware Code) within the year following this Court's granting of Lilly's original motion to dismiss, the protection of Delaware's "saving statute" (title 10, section 8118 of the Delaware Code) is unavailable to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Lilly's motion is GRANTED.
Although Lilly was apparently an employee of Nixon Uniform Service, Inc. at the time of the accident allegedly forming the basis of the subject lawsuit, the motion currently under consideration was filed only on behalf of Lilly.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs and Lilly were involved in an automobile accident on March 11, 1998. On March 7, 2000, Plaintiffs, then represented by H. James Childerston ("Childerston"), filed a complaint against Lilly and Nixon Uniform Service, Inc., alleging that Lilly was negligent and was otherwise acting within the course and scope of his employment with Nixon Uniform Service, Inc. when the accident occurred. Lilly was a resident of Pennsylvania, and Plaintiffs attempted to serve him via Delaware's nonresident motorist "long-arm" statute. Because Plaintiffs failed to comply with the technical requirements of that statute, on August 24, 2000, this Court granted Lilly's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to perfect service upon him.Following dismissal of the complaint against Lilly, Nixon Uniform Service, Inc. sought dismissal of the complaint in that earlier case against it as well. It argued that Plaintiffs could not maintain an independent cause of action against it once Lilly was dismissed as a party to the case because the only claim lodged against it under the complaint was one for vicarious liability. No opposition was filed to this motion. The Court granted the motion by short letter opinion and order on November 14, 2000.
The Court sent a letter to counsel indicating that "[i]n light of Plaintiffs' failure to have filed a timely response to [d]efendant [Nixon Uniform Service, Inc.'s] Motion to Dismiss, the Court deems . . . [the] motion as unopposed." Letter from the Court to Counsel of 11/14/00. The Court simultaneously entered an order granting Nixon Uniform Inc.'s motion. O'Donnell v. Lilly and Nixon Unif. Serv., Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 00C-03-072, Cooch, J. (Nov. 14, 2000) (ORDER).
Plaintiffs did not appeal or seek reargument of either the Court's August 24, 2000 decision dismissing the complaint against Lilly or of the Court's November 14, 2000 decision dismissing the complaint against Nixon Uniform Service, Inc.
In March 2001, Childerston's law practice went into receivership because Childerston had been suspended from the practice of law and was therefore unable to prosecute any of his then-open files. As part of the receivership, those open files were distributed to various members of the Delaware bar. Plaintiffs' current counsel came to represent Plaintiffs during the week of August 27, 2001 through that distribution process.
Letter from Donald E. Reid, Esquire, Receiver, to Marc S. Casarino, Esquire of 3/20/01 (Dkt. #16, C.A. No. 00C-03-072 RRC).
On October 31, 2001 Plaintiffs' current counsel filed a second complaint against Lilly and Nixon Uniform Service, Inc.; again the basis for the suit was the March 11, 1998 automobile accident. (Counsel's basis for filing the second complaint was the "savings statute," which generally provides for an additional one-year time period within which to re-file a lawsuit under certain circumstances). Pursuant to the nonresident motorist "long arm" statute, the summons and complaint were served upon the Delaware Secretary of State on November 13, 2001, and the writ evidencing such service was returned on November 27, 2001. Plaintiffs thereafter sent by registered mail a copy of the complaint and returned writ of service to Lilly on November 30, 2001.
Dkt. #3, O'Donnell v. Lilly and Nixon Unif. Serv., Inc., C.A. No. 01C-10-291 RRC.
The process served upon Lilly by registered mail was returned to counsel for Plaintiffs marked "unclaimed" on December 4, 2001. On December 10, 2001, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the Court an amendment to the complaint reflecting service upon the Secretary of State, proof of the "unclaimed" service of process upon Lilly, and an affidavit reflecting same. Plaintiffs' counsel took no further steps to serve Lilly. The current motion to dismiss was filed on January 8, 2002.
Dkt. #7, O'Donnell v. Lilly and Nixon Unif. Serv., Inc., C.A. No. 01C-10-291 RRC.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Lilly argues that the second complaint must be dismissed on three different grounds. First, Lilly argues that the second complaint against him was not filed within one year of the Court's August 24, 2000 order previously dismissing the complaint, and therefore the second complaint must be dismissed as having been filed outside the one-year period afforded after abatement of the writ under the savings statute, title 10, section 8118 of the Delaware Code. Second, Lilly argues that "[e]ven if the Court assumes [that] the second complaint was filed within one year after the writ . . . abated, the [`]Saving[s] Statute['] does not grant . . . [Plaintiffs] an automatic right to file a new complaint for the March 11, 1998 auto accident," i.e., the Court must "look at the equitable considerations in allowing the complaint to be filed." Lilly argues that the equities favor him, since he has never received notice of either lawsuit. Third, Lilly argues that "the Court lacks jurisdiction over him because of [P]laintiffs' failure to serve the complaint in accordance with the long-arm service requirements," i.e., "when the receipt was returned [`]unclaimed['] to [P]laintiffs' counsel, to perfect long arm service, the [P]laintiffs were required to send a second notice [to Lilly] within seven days."
Def.'s Resp. Mem. "Pursuant to this Court's May 28, 2002 Order" at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Counsel for Plaintiffs concedes (and Lilly agrees) that for purposes of Delaware's "savings statute," "[t]he [`]writ['] [consisting of the summons and complaint] as to defendant Lilly [`]abated['] when the Court granted . . . [the] motion to dismiss . . . defendant Lilly . . . on August 24, 2000." Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that they "should not be penalized for the misdeeds of their former attorney" since current counsel did not undertake their representation until after the passage of the one-year period from the August 24, 2000 abatement of the writ as to Lilly. Second, Counsel for Plaintiffs contends that he has "fully complied" with the technical requirements of Delaware's "long arm" statute. Specifically, counsel for Plaintiffs contends that he complied with the statute when on December 10, 2001 he filed proof of the process that was returned to him as "unclaimed." Counsel for Plaintiffs contends that he was "not required to [ ]send a second notice" of the suit to Lilly. Third, counsel for Plaintiffs argues that even if the Court grants Lilly's motion to dismiss because of a lack of proper service, "[P]laintiffs can still proceed against Lilly's employer, defendant Nixon Uniform Service[,][Inc.]," so that "the issue of service on defendant Lilly in the current action is rendered moot."
Pls.' Mem. "Pursuant to the Court's Order of May 28, 2002" § 1.
Pls.' Mem. "Pursuant to the Court's Order of May 28, 2002" § 3.
Pls.' Resp. to Def. Lilly's June 28, 2002 Letter Mem. at 3.
Id.
Letter from Bruce C. Herron, Esquire to the Court of 7/18/02, at 1.
DISCUSSION
Because the Court finds the issue of present jurisdiction over Lilly to be dispositive, it need not decide whether the "savings statute" applies to this particular case, and, consequently, whether the equitable considerations underlying the statute favor Lilly or Plaintiffs. A general discussion of how the "savings statute" normally operates is however warranted, given that both parties rely on it under the several arguments that each now makes.
Delaware's "savings statute" provides, in pertinent part, [i]f any action duly commenced within the time limited therefor[e] [by the applicable statute of limitations] . . . the writ is abated, or the action otherwise avoided or defeated . . . for any matter of form . . . a new action may be commenced, for the same cause of action, at any time within one year after the abatement or other determination of the original action. . . .
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (1999).
In other words, if there has been a suit filed within the statutory period and "something operates to interfere with maintenance of the suit[,] [a] plaintiff is given an extra year within which to file [a] second suit." The statute has a remedial purpose and should be liberally construed.
O'Lear v. Strucker, 209 A.2d 755, 758 (Del.Super.Ct. 1965).
Gosnell v. Whetsel, 198 A.2d 924, 927 (Del. 1964); Gaspero, 1981 WL 10228, at *1.
Delaware's nonresident motorist "long arm" statute codifies a detailed procedure whereby a person injured in Delaware as a result of a motor vehicle operated by a nonresident motorist has a means of civil redress against that nonresident motorist. Under the statute, a plaintiff must first perfect service upon the Delaware Secretary of State and mail notice of same to the nonresident motorist within seven days after the return of service upon the Secretary of State. When receipt of the mailing of the notice to the nonresident motorist is returned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 4(h), must file within 10 days an amendment to the complaint with an affidavit reflecting same. Where the notice to the nonresident motorist is returned "nonreceived," however, a plaintiff is "required to make two mailings to the [nonresident] defendant in order to effectuate . . . jurisdictional notice," i.e., "not later than [seven] days following . . . the filing with the court of the proof of the nonreceipt of notice . . . the plaintiff . . . [must] send by registered mail to the nonresident defendant . . . a [second] notice consisting of a copy of the process and complaint [already] served upon the Secretary of State. . . ." Thus "the mailing of a second notice after a non-receipt of the first . . . is a jurisdictional requirement under the Delaware [n]on-resident [m]otorist [s]tatute." "While judicial construction of the [nonresident motorist] statute should be approached with a view toward accomplishing its purpose, the Court has no power to enlarge statutory time or excuse non-compliance with jurisdictional norms."
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3112 (1999).
Superior Court Civil Rule 4(h) provides in pertinent part that in an action in which a plaintiff serves process pursuant to title 10, section 3112 of the Delaware Code, "the defendant's return receipt and the affidavit of . . . plaintiff's attorney of the defendant's nonresidence and the sending of a copy of the complaint with the notice required by the statute shall be filed as an amendment to the complaint within 10 days of the receiving by the . . . plaintiff's attorney of the defendant's return receipt. . . ."
Purnell v. Dodman, 297 A.2d 391, 394-395 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972);Muzzi v. Lewis, C.A. No. 95C-01-017 WSL, 1997 WL 127010, at *4 (Del.Super. Jan. 23, 1997).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3112(b) (1999).
Griffin v. Granger, 306 A.2d 725, 728 (Del. 1973); Muzzi v. Lewis, C.A. No. 95C-01-017 WSL, 1997 WL 127010, at *4 (Del.Super. Jan. 23, 1997).
Purnell, 297 A.2d at 394.
Here, the Court finds that the technical violations of the nonresident motorist "long arm" statute require it to grant Lilly's motion to dismiss. When current counsel failed to send the second notice of suit to Lilly following return of the first notice as "unclaimed," counsel failed to perfect a "jurisdictional requirement" under title 10, section 3112 of the Delaware Code. The Court has no power to excuse non-compliance with the statute. Accordingly, Lilly's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Court expresses no opinion on the viability of Plaintiffs' remaining claim against Nixon Uniform Service, Inc. (as the current motion was filed only on behalf of Lilly), despite an assertion that Plaintiffs' claims of vicarious liability "must [ultimately] be dismissed because the negligence of . . . [Lilly] can never be proven given the time bar to . . . [Plaintiffs'] claim." Letter from Seth J. Reidenberg, Esquire to the Court of 7/29/02, at 2.
Griffin, 306 A.2d at 728.
Purnell, 297 A.2d at 394.