Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-001580-MR
04-25-2014
GLENN D. ODOM APPELLANT v. PHILIP PARKER APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Glenn D. Odom, pro se Eddyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PHILIP PARKER: John Marcus Jones Kentucky Department of Corrections Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-00105
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: COMBS, MAZE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: Glenn Odom, pro se, has appealed from the Lyon Circuit Court's denial of his petition for a declaration of rights and upholding a prison disciplinary finding of guilt. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Odom is an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary. He was the subject of two disciplinary reports stemming from different instances of inappropriate sexual behavior, each observed by a different female correctional officer. Following hearings before a prison disciplinary committee, Odom was found guilty of the charges against him and assessed forty-five days' disciplinary segregation on each charge to be served consecutively. His appeal to Warden Philip Parker was unsuccessful. Odom subsequently filed his declaration of rights action pursuant to KRS 418.040 in the Lyon Circuit Court to contest the disciplinary actions taken against him. He raised a number of challenges regarding due process and sufficiency of the evidence. In addition to seeking a declaration of rights, Odom requested an order vacating his convictions, a new disciplinary hearing, and monetary damages. The circuit court denied the petition in a four-page order and this appeal followed.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Odom contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. He contends footage from recordings of his cell at the time of the alleged infractions revealed his innocence and the committee improperly found guilt in the face of this exonerating evidence. He claims the committee's decision was inappropriately based solely on statements by the attesting correctional officers. Further, Odom contends he was denied due process by the committee's failure to provide a meaningful explanation of the finding of guilt and an overall failure of the proof. Additionally, Odom argues he is entitled to payment for "lost wages and undue stress, punitive damages, nominal damages, and any other just cause a court may find reasonable." Finally, Odom contends the trial court erred in dismissing his action. Having reviewed the record, we discern no error and affirm.
It is the duty of prison officials to determine guilt or innocence in prison disciplinary proceedings. Courts are charged only with review of such decisions and prison officials are afforded broad discretion. This Court must affirm if there is "some evidence" supporting the charge. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). See also Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. App. 1997) (adoption by Kentucky courts of the federal standard). "[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (citations omitted). Even "meager" evidence has been found to meet this burden. Id., 472 U.S. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775. "Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence." Id., 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.
Prison discipline proceedings are not the equivalent of criminal prosecutions and "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). "Minimal due process is all that is required regarding a person detained in lawful custody." McMillen v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 233 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007). The requirements of due process are satisfied if the "some evidence" standard is met. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.
Odom argues he was denied procedural due process because the committee failed to rely on surveillance footage of the incidents. However, he has failed to allege any facts that would demonstrate a due process violation occurred. The committee reviewed the videotapes as Odom requested but obviously found them unpersuasive. Prisons are highly charged environments populated with individuals who have proven a propensity to violate criminal laws and have been incarcerated for doing so. Such environments must be tightly controlled for the protection of prison workers as well as inmates themselves. As stated earlier, prison officials are given broad discretion by this Court, and that discretion extends to determinations of how best to maintain order and safety within the walls of penal institutions. We cannot say the decision of the committee deprived Odom of a protected liberty or property interest. Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 1995).
Likewise, we are unconvinced Odom has demonstrated a violation of his due process rights by the committee's alleged failure to provide a meaningful explanation of the finding of guilt in its written report following his hearing. Odom is correct that written findings are required in prison disciplinary proceedings as to the facts relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2963. However, the findings may be brief, Gilhaus v. Wilson, 734 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Ky. App. 1987), and a disciplinary committee or adjustment officer may incorporate by reference the findings of the investigating officer contained in his report. Yates v. Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2003). This was the procedure followed in the instant case. The findings were sufficient and the requirements of minimum due process were satisfied.
Next, Odom contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction of the charged infractions. However, the evidence submitted at the adjustment hearing was sufficient to satisfy the "some evidence" standard. The committee reviewed the record before it, ultimately adopting the facts set forth by Officers Melissa DeMasseo and Cherie Rose in the disciplinary report forms, and these facts supported the committee's findings of guilt. Given our limited authority to review such cases, we need consider nothing.
Odom further contends he is entitled to monetary compensation in the event he is required to serve his sentence for these infractions. As the trial court correctly noted, KRS 454.405 prohibits inmates from sustaining "a civil action for monetary damages in any state court for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury." No allegation or proof of physical injury was proffered, and Odom has made no allegation that the statute should not apply or is in any way infirm. Clearly, Odom was not entitled to monetary damages, and the trial court properly applied the relevant statute in denying his request.
Finally, Odom contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claim. In support of his contention, Odom claims the trial court misinterpreted the holding in Yates; he then goes on to make several uncorroborated and offensive assertions attacking the honesty and integrity of the trial court. His attacks appear to be centered on assumptions and supposition and fail to address the core issue and are not rooted in sound logic or an accurate reading of applicable law. Bald assertions, lacking any evidentiary support and deficient in legal and logical reasoning, carry no weight and form an insufficient basis for relief. Our review of the record reveals the trial court recognized and applied the correct standard of review and, in accordance with Yates, accurately determined "some evidence" existed to support the disciplinary decision. Therefore, we hold the trial court was correct to dismiss Odom's petition. Although Odom's displeasure with the outcome is understandable, mere unhappiness with a trial court's ruling is insufficient to form a basis for relief. There simply was no error.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Glenn D. Odom, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PHILIP
PARKER:
John Marcus Jones
Kentucky Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky