Opinion
CV126030853S
03-09-2016
Scott Nuterangelo v. Eric Scott et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Richard E. Burke, J.
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle owned by and operated on behalf of a municipality. In an amended complaint, dated January 4, 2013, the plaintiff, Scott Nuterangelo, alleges the following relevant facts against the defendants, Eric Scott, the City of New Haven, and Maria Nuterangelo. In Count One, directed against Scott and sounding in negligence, the plaintiff claims that on or about December 9, 2011 at approximately 7:25 p.m., he was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Maria Nuterangelo and traveling southbound on College Street, in New Haven. At that same time, another vehicle, operated by Scott and owned by his employer, New Haven, was eastbound on George Street. As the Nuterangelo vehicle entered the intersection of College Street and George Street, it was struck by the Scott vehicle, which had entered the intersection against the overhead traffic signal. As a result of Scott's negligence, the plaintiff was caused to suffer numerous injuries. The remaining counts are derived from those same facts. Count Two is brought against New Haven pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465. Count Three, directed against Maria Nuterangelo, is also one of negligence.
General Statutes § 7-465(a) provides in relevant part: " Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality . . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person's civil rights or for physical damages to person or property, except as set forth in this section, if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty . . ."
On August 28, 2012, the municipal defendants, Scott and New Haven, filed special defenses as to Counts One and Two. The first special defense alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of Maria Nuterangelo, who breached numerous common-law duties of care, and further failed to grant the right of way to an emergency vehicle, as required by General Statutes § 14-283(e). The second special defense alleges that Scott was exempt from the duty to obey the traffic signal imposed by General Statutes § 14-299 because at the time of the collision he was operating an emergency vehicle in compliance with the liability shield requirements of § 14-283(b).
On April 22, 2015, nearly three years after that pleading was filed, and a mere six days before the start of jury selection, the municipal defendants sought leave to amend the answer and special defenses. The municipal defendants attempted to add a third special defense of governmental immunity pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B), claiming that at the time the accident occurred, Scott was performing a discretionary government function. The plaintiff filed an objection to the leave to amend on April 24, 2015, which was sustained by the court, Lager, J., in an order dated May 12, 2015. (#132.10.) The court rejected a subsequent request by the municipal defendants to file a third special defense on July 21, 2015.
The trial commenced on July 28, 2015. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the municipal defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied, reserving judgment and inviting a written motion on the issue of governmental immunity. The trial ended on July 31, 2015 with a jury verdict for the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff was awarded $47, 897.48 in economic damages and $77, 216.80 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $125, 114.28. The jury assessed the relative negligence of the drivers as 60% to Scott and 40% to Maria Nuterangelo.
On September 22, 2015, the municipal defendants filed a motion to reduce the verdict by collateral source amounts (#146), to which the plaintiff filed an objection on October 1, 2015. Additionally, on September 24, 2015, the municipal defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Counts One and Two of the amended complaint. (#147.) The plaintiff filed an objection on October 14, 2015. An evidentiary hearing was held and arguments regarding both motions were heard at the short calendar on December 7, 2015.
DISCUSSION
I
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT (#147)
The court will begin with those issues raised in the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict. " After the acceptance of a verdict and within the time stated in Section 16-35 for filing a motion to set a verdict aside, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . If a verdict was returned, the judicial authority may allow the judgment to stand or may set the verdict aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed . . ." Practice Book § 16-37.
" A directed verdict is justified if, on the evidence the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached any other conclusion . . . In reviewing the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . While it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation . . . The standard of review governing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same because a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a new motion, but the renewal of a motion for a directed verdict." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 400, 766 A.2d 416, 423 (2001).
A
As a preliminary matter, the court will discuss the claim of governmental immunity, which the municipal defendants, having failed to timely plead before the close of pleadings, have since raised repeatedly. The court, Lager, J., previously sustained the plaintiff's objection to the defendants' request for leave to amend. (See #132.10.)
The defendants argue that consideration of the special defense is appropriate here because it does not inject any new factual issues into the case, but instead raises a purely legal issue. The defendants further argue that the special defense concerns General Statutes § 52-557n, which is an applicable statute and one that the court may be obligated to consider. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the court's previous denials of the defendants' request to amend to add a special defense of government immunity should stand as the law of the case, thus precluding the defendant from raising it in support of the instant motion.
The law of the case doctrine " refers to the binding effect of a court's prior ruling in the same case. Traditionally the doctrine held that until reversed the ruling would bind the parties and could not again be contested in that suit . . . The law of the case is not written in stone but is a flexible principle of many facets adaptable to the exigencies of the different situations in which it may be invoked . . . In essence it expresses the practice of judges generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided and is not a limitation on their power . . . A judge should hesitate to change his own rulings in a case and should be even more reluctant to overrule those of another judge." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bowman v. Jack's Auto Sales, 54 Conn.App. 289, 292-93, 734 A.2d 1036 (1999). " The law of the case doctrine provides that [w]here a matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bacon Construction Co., 160 Conn.App. 75, 80 n.6, 124 A.3d 941, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 953, 125 A.3d 532 (2015).
" A judge is not bound to follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is again raised he has the same right to reconsider the question as if he had himself made the original decision . . . This principle has been frequently applied to an earlier ruling during the pleading stage of a case . . . According to the generally accepted view, one judge may, in a proper case, vacate, modify, or depart from an interlocutory order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon a question of law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 98-99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982).
The defendants' argument, essentially, is that the governmental immunity statute may require the court to depart from its earlier orders as a matter of law. At this juncture, however, that issue is academic because the limited circumstances by which the court may consider the question of governmental immunity do not apply. " We have previously determined that governmental immunity must be raised as a special defense in the defendant's pleadings . . . Governmental immunity is essentially a defense of confession and avoidance similar to other defenses required to be affirmatively pleaded [under Practice Book § 10-50] . . . The purpose of requiring affirmative pleading is to apprise the court and the opposing party of the issues to be tried and to prevent concealment of the issues until the trial is underway." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 321, 907 A.2d 1188, 1195 (2006). " In certain limited circumstances, an appellate court will address the issue of whether governmental immunity is available to a defendant where the defense was not specially pleaded. If the question of governmental immunity was fully litigated at trial, without objection from the plaintiff, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived its objection to the requirement that the defense be specially pleaded." Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 24-25, 664 A.2d 719 (1995) (declining to review governmental immunity claim where defendant did not raise the issue of governmental immunity at trial and the plaintiff could not be deemed to have waived its objection). In the instant matter, the municipal defendants' governmental immunity defense was not timely pleaded. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's request for leave to amend the answer so as to include a defense of governmental immunity. The plaintiff's objection was sustained, and that issue was not fully litigated at trial. Therefore, the court shall not consider whether governmental immunity should be applied as a matter of law. Rather, it shall consider merely whether to follow the law of the case.
As noted above, the issue of whether to allow the municipal defendants to add a governmental immunity defense has already been decided. " Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 184, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). In the order and memorandum of decision sustaining the plaintiff's objection, Judge Lager thoroughly explained why the defendant would not be permitted to raise the special defense of governmental immunity. In particular, the court noted that the defendants' claimed legal basis for moving to amend the answer and special defenses existed " at the earliest from January 23, 2013 (some two years, 90 days before it so moved) and at the latest from July 24, 2014 (approximately one year, 212 days before it so moved), but failed to do so." Nuterangelo v. Scott, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6030853-S, (May 12, 2015, Lager, J.). Although the length of the delay, without more, was sufficient to deny the request to amend, the court further noted that the plaintiff would be prejudiced by the late amendment. Id.
No new circumstances have arisen since that the court's May 12, 2015 order. Moreover, the legal criteria that a party must meet to be permitted to amend its pleadings have not changed. Therefore, the court declines to vacate, modify, or depart from that earlier order because it was correctly decided. The defendants' claim of governmental immunity is not properly before the court, and will not be considered in support of the defendants' motion to set aside.
B
In support of the motion to set aside the verdict, the municipal defendants challenge the propriety of the court's jury instructions. In particular, the municipal defendants argue that the jury charge failed to properly instruct that Scott's compliance with General Statute § 14-283 provided a complete defense to the plaintiff's claims of negligence. The municipal defendants raised numerous other arguments with respect to portions of the jury instructions. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the charge was correct in the law, adapted to the issues, and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.
" A jury instruction must be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts . . . [T]he test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper . . . Therefore, [o]ur standard of review on this claim is whether it is reasonably probable that the jury was misled." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn.App. 158, 171 n.11, 884 A.2d 12 (2005). " [J]ury instructions . . . are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge . . . The whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the jurors in guiding them to a proper verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonan v. Goldring Home Inspections, Inc., 68 Conn.App. 862, 873, 794 A.2d 997 (2002).
At the core of the municipal defendants' argument is the assertion that Scott's compliance with General Statutes § 14-283 establishes a defense to claims of statutory and common-law negligence. Section 14-283 provides, in relevant part: " (a) As used in this section, 'emergency vehicle' means . . . any state or local police vehicle operated by a police officer . . . (b)(1) The operator of any emergency vehicle may . . . (B) . . . proceed past any red light or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping to the extent necessary for the safe operation of such vehicle, (C) exceed the posted speed limits or other speed limits imposed by or pursuant to section 14-218a or 14-219 as long as such operator does not endanger life or property by so doing, and (D) disregard statutes, ordinances or regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specific directions . . . (c) The exemptions granted in this section shall apply only when an emergency vehicle is making use of an audible warning signal device, including but not limited to a siren . . . and visible flashing or revolving lights . . . and to any state or local police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible warning signal device only. (d) The provisions of this section shall not relieve the operator of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property . . ."
It is important to note that scope of the exemption is limited. " [E]mergency vehicle legislation provides only limited shelter from liability for negligence. The effect of the statute is merely to displace the conclusive presumption of negligence that ordinarily arises from the violation of traffic rules. The statute does not relieve operators of emergency vehicles from their general duty to exercise due care for the safety of others." Tetro v. Stratford, 189 Conn. 601, 609, 458 A.2d 5 (1983). Thus, while § 14-283 may shield an emergency vehicle operator from liability for statutory negligence, it is not an absolute defense to negligence. Any instruction implying that the limited shelter could be extended beyond what is provided for by § 14-283 would be inaccurate.
In its charges to the jury, the court gave the following instructions: " We have a statute, Section 14-283 which provides in relevant part that the operator of any emergency vehicle may proceed past any red light but only after slowing down or stopping to the extent necessary for the safe operation of such vehicle, and exceed the posted speed limits or other speed limits as long as such operator does not endanger life or property by so doing.
" The parties have stipulated that Defendant Eric Scott was operating what our legislature has defined as an 'emergency vehicle.'
" If you find that the defendant Eric Scott, as the operator of an emergency vehicle, proceeded past a red light without slowing down or stopping to the extent necessary for the safe operation of such vehicle, or exceeded the posted speed limits or other speed limits, endangering life or property by doing so, then the defendant Eric Scott is not entitled to the statutory exemption for emergency vehicles.
" Further, Section 14-283 provides in relevant part that the exemption for emergency vehicles shall apply only when an emergency vehicle is making use of an audible warning signal device and visible flashing lights, or lawfully making use of an audible warning signal device only.
" If you find that defendant Eric Scott, while operating the emergency vehicle, did not make use of an audible warning signal device and visible flashing light, or an audible warning signal only, then the defendant Eric Scott is not entitled to the statutory exemption for emergency vehicles." (Jury Instructions, p. 19.)
" It is well established that [a] request to charge which is relevant to the issues of the case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given . . . Conversely, it also is true that a court is under no duty to give a requested jury instruction that is an improper statement of law. Accordingly, if [a] court concludes that the requested jury instruction was an improper statement of law, the defendant is not entitled to the requested jury instruction and the court's refusal was proper." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Scribner, 72 Conn.App. 736, 740, 805 A.2d 812 (2002).
The court's instruction, considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts, explained that § 14-283 required Scott to make use of an audible warning signal device. While using such a device, Scott would be permitted to proceed past a red traffic signal, provided that he slowed down or stopped to the extent necessary for the safe operation of the vehicle, and also permitted to exceed speed limits, provided that he did not endanger life or property. If Scott acted within those parameters, then he would be entitled to the statutory exemption for emergency vehicles.
The instructions given were correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. Section 14-283 is not a defense to all negligence, and should not be portrayed as such to a jury. The instructions properly limited the scope of § 14-283 to exemptions for certain statutory violations, not all negligent acts.
C
The municipal defendants further argue that the charge on exceeding the speed limit allowed the jury to speculate impermissibly on Scott's speed. The municipal defendants argue that there was not a sufficient foundation on which the jury could find that Scott exceeded the posted speed limit.
" [A] trial court should instruct a jury on [every] issue for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even if weak or incredible . . . The trial court has a duty not to submit any issue to the jury upon which the evidence would not support a finding . . . Accordingly, the right to a jury instruction is limited to those theories for which there is any foundation in the evidence . . . In determining whether any such foundation exists, [w]e must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to supporting the [party's] request to charge." Umsteadt v. GR Realty, 123 Conn.App. 73, 79, 1 A.3d 243 (2010).
A vehicle operator may violate § 14-218a by either traveling unreasonably fast or by exceeding the posted speed limit. " Testimony that a car is going 'fast' or 'slow' is admissible, and, while it has little weight as indicating any definite speed, in general the weight to be given it depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and is for the jury." Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 101, 68 A.2d 366 (1949). Thus, testimony that is not sufficient to prove that a vehicle was operated in excess of the posted speed limit, may still be sufficient to prove that the vehicle was traveling unreasonably fast.
General Statutes § 14-218a(a) provides, in relevant part: " No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state . . . at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions . . . Any speed in excess of such limits, other than speeding as provided for in section 14-219, shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is not reasonable, but the fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than such limits shall not relieve the operator from the duty to decrease speed when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions."
The vehicle's speed was a proper issue for the jury. At trial, there was testimony regarding the speed of Scott's vehicle, with Maria Nuterangelo testifying that Scott appeared to be traveling " fast" as he approached them. This testimony provided sufficient foundation, even if weak or incredible, on which the jury could weigh evidence of the vehicle's speed based on the particular circumstances of the case.
D
In light of the foregoing, the municipal defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and order judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied. Following the law of the case, the municipal defendants waived the defense of governmental immunity, and no new legal or factual consideration have arisen to merit consideration of the issue here. Furthermore, the jury instructions given were correct in law, adapted to the issues, and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. Finally, there was sufficient evidentiary foundation for the jury to consider the speed of the vehicle with respect to § 14-218a.
II
MOTION TO REDUCE THE VERDICT (#146)
The municipal defendants additionally seek to reduce the verdict by any amounts received by plaintiff for his medical expenses, all of which were paid in full through his medical insurance, and for lost wages paid by his employer. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that a collateral source reduction is inappropriate because the municipal defendants failed to submit interrogatories concerning specific items of damages within the verdict, and the jury ultimately awarded economic damages less than the full amount being claimed without specifying the source of the reduction. The plaintiff further argues that by operation of the general verdict rule, the award is not susceptible to being reduced.
General Statutes § 52-225a provides: " (a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury . . . and wherein liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compensate the claimant, the court shall reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-572h, by an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (b) of this section less the total of amounts determined to have been paid, contributed or forfeited under subsection (c) of this section . . . (c) The court shall receive evidence from the claimant and any other appropriate person concerning any amount which has been paid, contributed or forfeited, as of the date the court enters judgment, by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received as a result of such injury or death."
General Statutes § 52-572h(a)(1) defines economic damages as " compensation determined by the trier of fact for pecuniary losses including, but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care and loss of earnings or earning capacity excluding any noneconomic damages . . ."
" Succinctly put, § 52-225a provides that the trial court shall reduce an award for economic damages by an amount equal to the total amount of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, less any premium paid by or on behalf of the claimant to secure the benefit of such collateral source payments. Section 52-225a is silent, however, on the issue of whether economic damages awarded by the trier of fact shall be reduced by the amount of any collateral source benefits received by a plaintiff, or whether those damages shall be reduced only by the specific collateral source benefits received for items of damages that actually were included in the fact finder's award." (Emphasis omitted.) Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 345, 838 A.2d 170 (2004). " [Section] 52-225a, when viewed in the context of the purposes of tort reform, must be construed to allow only payments specifically corresponding with items of damages included in the jury's verdict to be deducted as collateral sources from the economic damages award." Id., 348.
" [T]he defendant, as the party seeking to reduce the amount of economic damages awarded by the fact finder, bears the burden of proving that the verdict includes items of damages for which the plaintiff has received a collateral source benefit. Specifically, the defendant who is seeking a collateral source reduction must, at the conclusion of the evidence, submit interrogatories to the jury concerning the specific items of damages included within the verdict." Jones v. Kramer, supra, 267 Conn. 349-50. " Once the defendant, through those interrogatories, proves that the verdict includes items of damages for which the plaintiff has received a collateral source benefit, in order to get the full offset pursuant to § 52-225a(c), the plaintiff has the obligation to itemize the insurance premiums to demonstrate the correlation between the medical costs awarded and the years in which the premiums were paid. In other words, after the defendant establishes that the items of damages corresponding with the desired collateral source reduction actually were included in the award, the plaintiff, in order to get the full offset, must establish that the premiums paid to secure the right to any collateral source benefit received were for the years in which the jury awarded items of damages." Pikulski v. Waterbury Hospital Health Center, 269 Conn. 1, 9, 848 A.2d 373 (2004).
The municipal defendants did not submit interrogatories to the jury concerning the specific items of damages included within the verdict. There are limited circumstances by which a collateral source reduction may be achieved despite a defendant's failure to submit interrogatories to prove the specific items of damages included in the verdict. For instance, in Saraceno v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-01-0811755-S (November 24, 2004, Beach, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 325, 326), the trial court permitted a collateral source reduction despite the absence of jury interrogatories because the jury awarded the exact amount the plaintiff claimed in medical bills. The court stated that no interrogatories were needed where a jury's figure of economic damages specifically include[d] all of the bills included in the plaintiff's summary of medical bills and nothing in addition. Given the exact nature of the numbers, any other interpretation, though perhaps theoretically possible, would be simply bizarre." In Furlong v. Merriman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-04-4000416-S, (May 4, 2006, Shapiro, J.), the jury awarded exactly the amount the plaintiffs claimed in medical expenses and lost wages, so despite the failure to submit jury interrogatories, the trial court permitted a collateral source reduction to the verdict. " Here, in the narrow circumstances of this case, it is clear what the jury awarded concerning the plaintiff's claimed medical expenses. These circumstances contrast to those in Jones and Pikulski, where the courts were presented with 'ambiguous' verdicts which created mathematical problems." Id.; see also Perillo v. Jacobs, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-6000215-S (April 20, 2009, Cronan, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 764, 773) (court complied with Jones where jury's award of economic damages could be " readily interpreted, element by element, without any room for confusion" and where defendant had met burden " proving that the verdict included the items of damages for which the plaintiff received a collateral source benefit").
For the most part, however, " [t]he rendering of a general verdict coupled with the absence of interrogatories, [makes] it impossible for the trial court . . . to determine what factors the jury considered in making its award . . . We cannot speculate as to how the jury reached its figure . . . Although [most of the] evidence remained uncontroverted the jury [was] not obliged to accept it. On the other hand, [the jury was] at liberty to accept what part of [the evidence it] chose and factor [that evidence] into [its] total calculations." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrows v. J.C. Penney Co., 58 Conn.App. 225, 229-30, 753 A.2d 404, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 925, 761 A.2d 751 (2000).
In the instant matter, as in Jones and Pikulski, the court is presented with a verdict does not include specific items of damages, which, in turn, creates mathematical problems. The plaintiff, in the special damages list, claimed medical damages of $36, 278 and lost wages of $17, 795.60, for a total of $54, 073.60 in economic damages. The jury awarded a reduced total of $47, 897.48 in economic damages. The jury verdict did not identify which special damages sum was reduced or by how much, or whether the reductions were intended to reflect medical benefits or lost wages.
Without interrogatories or a verdict that clearly corresponds to the special damages claimed by the plaintiff, the court is presented with an ambiguous verdict. Ambiguity in a verdict cannot be resolved by mere inference. See Guay v. Darden, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-03-0824755-S (September 7, 2004, Shapiro, J.) (without interrogatories identifying how jury reached its award, court declined to inter that, " in making its $10, 703.00 past economic damages award, (1) [the jury] awarded the plaintiff the full amount of the claimed medical expenses, rounded down by the absent 26 cents; and (2) that it awarded $5, 000.00 for lost wages"). Therefore, the defendants failed to meet the burden of proving that the verdict includes items of damages for which the plaintiff has received a collateral source benefit. The verdict shall not be reduced by the amount of claimed medical expenses.
The municipal defendants additionally seek to reduce the verdict by $5, 785.66, which reflects lost wages paid by the plaintiff's employer, the city of New Haven, during the period of time that the plaintiff was caused to miss work by the accident. The sums received as part of an employee wage plan are not to be deducted from a damages award merely because a defendant is also the plaintiff's employer. Hassett v. New Haven, 49 Conn.Supp. 7, 14, 858 A.2d 922, aff'd, 91 Conn.App. 245, 880 A.2d 975 (2004) (" It is also a fair result, for the sums that [the plaintiff] received from his wage continuation plan were the fruits of his own labor, namely the devotion of many years of his life to employment which provided him with just this protection for a 'rainy day.' The legislature was entitled to decide, as it has so decided, that sums of this description are not to be deducted from damage awards as 'collateral sources'"). The municipal defendants have failed to identify any wages received by the plaintiff that he was not already entitled to in the form of earned leave time. These wages are not subject to a collateral source reduction. Therefore, the verdict shall not be reduced to reflect lost wages.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the municipal defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and order judgment notwithstanding the verdict (#147) is denied.
Likewise, the municipal defendants' motion for a collateral source reduction to reflect medical benefits and lost wages (#146) is denied.