Opinion
24A-MI-2026
01-31-2025
In Re the Name Change of Shawntrell Norington, v. Indiana Department of Correction, Appellee-Intervenor Shawntrell Norington, Appellant-Petitioner
APPELLANT PRO SE Shawntrell Norrington Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Carlisle, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General David A. Arthur Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 53C04-2308-MI-001806 The Honorable Catherine B. Stafford, Judge
APPELLANT PRO SE Shawntrell Norrington Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Carlisle, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General David A. Arthur Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Shawntrell Norington, an incarcerated person at the Miami Correctional Facility in Miami County, Indiana, filed a petition seeking to change his name and gender marker in Monroe County, which the trial court granted. After receiving notice of the order changing Norington's name and gender marker, the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") intervened and requested the trial court's order be set aside. The trial court then vacated its order and dismissed Norington's petition nunc pro tunc. Norington now appeals, raising several issues for our review that we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Norington's petition.
Throughout this Decision, we use Norington's legal name instead of the name he was requesting. Additionally, we are using the pronouns that match his identified sex in the criminal causes for which he is an inmate. See footnote 3.
[¶2] Because Norington's noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46 substantially impedes our review of this claim, we hold that he has waived appellate review of his claim and therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] After the trial court granted Norington's unverified request to prohibit public access of the petition for name change, on August 24, 2023, Norington confidentially filed a petition requesting (1) his name be changed from "Shawntrell Marcel Norington" to "Lakesha Lasure Norington" and (2) the gender marker on his birth certificate be changed from male to female. Even though Norington was incarcerated in the DOC, the trial court granted Norington's petition.
Norington does not include a copy of the petition in the Appendix. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). We have taken judicial notice of the petition pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27.
In 2004, Norington was sentenced to 60 years of incarceration for robbery, burglary, and voluntary manslaughter. Norington v. State, 873 N.E.2d 205, No. 49A04-0702-CR-112 (Ind.Ct.App. Sept. 10, 2007) (mem.); Norington v. State, 102 N.E.3d 352, No. 49A05-1707-PC-1966, slip op. at ¶ 2 (Ind.Ct.App. May 22, 2018) (mem.).
[¶4] Once the DOC received a copy of the order from Norington, the DOC filed a motion to intervene in the case and to set aside that order. The DOC asserted in relevant part that pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-28-2-1.5(b)(1), Norington could not "lawfully petition the Court for a change of name" because he was an incarcerated individual. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 20. The trial court granted the DOC leave to intervene, and after briefing and a hearing, the trial court vacated its prior order granting Norington's petition for a name and gender marker change, and it dismissed Norington's petition nunc pro tunc. This appeal ensued.
"A person may not petition for a change of name under this chapter if the person . . . is confined to a department of correction facility." Ind. Code § 34-28-2-1.5(b)(1).
Discussion and Decision
Norington Has Waived His Appeal by Failing to Significantly Comply with Appellate Rule 46
[¶5] Norington contends the trial court erred by dismissing his petition for a name and gender marker change. However, we cannot address this claim due to Norington's significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is "sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised," we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).
Norington's choice to proceed pro se does not loosen the requirements of the Indiana Appellate Rules. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (citing In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)) ("A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.").
[¶6] The purpose of our appellate rules-especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs-"is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case." Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021)). For instance, a party's arguments must be supported by cogent reasoning. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). "We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, 'nor will we address arguments' that are 'too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.'" Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).
[¶7] In the Argument section of his brief, Norington provides statements of law followed by conclusory statements, but he does not provide any analysis or explanation of how the law he cites applies to the facts of this case. That is, Norington fails to provide reasoning-let alone cogent reasoning-in support of his arguments. For instance, Norington contends the trial court's dismissal order "is in conflict with the United State Supreme Court holding of/within Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (June 26th, 2023)," Appellant's Br. at 10, and proceeds to briefly explain and quote that decision; however, without any analysis, Norington then claims the trial court's dismissal order
denied and is denying Appellant-Petitioner her inalienable right to liberty, the Pursuit of Happiness, Freedom, self-autonomy, Freedom of thought, Freedom of expression in her lifes' [sic] spatial and more transcendent dimensions.
As a result, the trial court[']s July 16th, 2024 dated order infringing upon, and denying Appellant her inalienable right to liberty, the Pursuit of Happiness, Freedom, self-autonomy, Freedom of thought, Freedom of expression must be vacated.Id. at 11.
[¶8] We also observe that several of Norington's arguments relate to topics and issues not addressed by the trial court's dismissal order. For example, Norington contends the trial court's order conflicts with the statutes and rules governing declaratory judgments; Norington's petition for a name and gender marker change was not a complaint seeking declaratory judgment, and the trial court denied Norington's petition because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
[¶9] Because Norington's noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46, especially Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), substantially impedes our review of his claims, he has waived appellate review thereof. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[¶10] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.