Opinion
Civil Action 1:23-CV-00135-GNS-HBB
07-18-2024
NONA S.[1] PLAINTIFF v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY[2] DEFENDANT
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION
H. Brent Brennenstuhl, United States Magistrate Judge
I. BACKGROUND
Before the Court is the Complaint (DN 1) of Nona S. (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the Plaintiff and Defendant have filed briefs (DN 12, 14). Plaintiff has also filed a reply brief (DN 15). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court AFFIRM the final decision of the Commissioner, and that judgment be GRANTED for the Commissioner.
Pursuant to General Order No. 2023-02 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), this matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to review the Fact and Law Summaries and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations. By Order entered December 14, 2023 (DN 8), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 4, 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (Tr. 17, 165-67, 168-69). Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on March 1, 2017, as a result of bipolar disorder, depression, and attention deficit disorder (“ADD”) (Tr. 17, 59, 64, 187). The application was denied initially on November 18, 2021, and upon reconsideration on January 28, 2022 (Tr. 17, 58, 69). On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing (Tr. 17, 96, 97-98).
The ALJ indicates that the Title II application was filed on January 12, 2021 (Tr. 17). The Lead Protective Filing Worksheet indicates the application was filed on July 4, 2021 (Tr. 165-67). The undersigned has used that date.
On September 8, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey L. Eastham (“ALJ”) conducted a telephone hearing due to the extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic (Tr. 17, 34). Plaintiff participated and her counsel, Carrie Link, participated (Id.). Renee Giedl, an impartial vocational expert, testified during the hearing (Id.).
The ALJ indicates that attorney Debra Broz represented Plaintiff during the telephone hearing (Tr. 17). The transcript indicates that Carrie Link, an associate with Debra Broz, represented Plaintiff during the telephone hearing (Tr. 32, 34). Therefore, the undersigned has indicated Ms. Link participated in the telephonic hearing.
In a decision dated September 21, 2022, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on June 30, 2021 (Tr. 19). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's adult disability claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 19-27). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2017, the alleged onset date (Tr. 19). At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, ADD, and migraines (Id.). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has the following non-severe impairments: gastroesophageal reflux disorder (GERD), hypertension, carpal tunnel syndrome, and fibromyalgia (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr. 20).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) with the following exceptions: she can frequently reach, handle, finger and feel bilaterally; she should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she should avoid frequent concentrated exposure to extreme cold and vibrations; she should never work at unprotected heights, never work with dangerous machinery, and never operate a motorized vehicle as a work requirement; her work environment should not be louder than a moderate noise level; she should not engage in fast-paced production rate work such as the rate associated with hourly quotas or conveyor belt paced work; she can perform simple, goal-oriented tasks with simple instructions; these tasks shall be more individualized rather than requiring collaborative or teamwork effort; she can have work related contact occasionally with supervisors, coworkers and the public; and she can tolerate occasional changes to the workplace setting that are gradually introduced (Tr. 22). Additionally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work (Tr. 25).
The ALJ proceeded to the fifth step where he considered Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and past work experience, as well as testimony from the vocational expert (Tr. 25-26). The ALJ found that through the date last insured Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in significant number of jobs in the national economy (Id.). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a “disability,” as defined in the Social Security Act, from March 1, 2017, the alleged onset date, through June 30, 2021, the date last insured (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 162-64). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-3).
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.” Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court “may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility.” Cohen v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-3). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of the Commissioner's decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the ALJ's decision and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695-96.
B. The Commissioner's Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Title II Disability Insurance Benefits). The term “disability” is defined as an:
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See “Evaluation of disability in general,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
2) Does the claimant have a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the duration requirement and significantly limits his or her ability to do basic work activities?
3) Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within Appendix 1?
4) Does the claimant have the RFC to return to his or her past relevant work?
5) Does the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience allow him or her to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy?20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim at the fifth step.
C. Challenge to RFC
1. Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff takes exception with Finding No. 5 because she believes that it is not supported by substantial evidence as there is no medical opinion evidence in the record to support the ALJ's complex RFC findings (DN 12 PageID # 537, 545-50) (citing Deskin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 605 F.Supp.2d 908, 911-12 (N.D. Ohio 2008)). Relatedly, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by relying solely on his own lay interpretation of raw medical data in making his RFC findings (Id.).
Defendant responds that the Court should decline to apply the non-binding Deskin rule- on which Plaintiff relies-because it conflicts with the regulations and Sixth Circuit case law that indicate that the ALJ, not a physician, is responsible for determining Plaintiff's RFC (DN 14 PageID # 555, 563-70). Alternatively, if the Court applies the Deskin rule, Defendant asserts that the medical evidence showed relatively little impairment such that the ALJ could render commonsense findings about Plaintiff's RFC without medical opinion evidence (Id. at PageID # 570-76). Defendant contends the ALJ evaluated all the evidence in the record-which includes the objective medical evidence, hearing testimony, and function reports-and properly concluded that despite Plaintiff's impairments, she was able to do a reduced range of medium work (Id.).
Citing Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 Fed.Appx. 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the ALJ is free to reject medical opinions and make own RFC findings because the Commissioner has a statutory responsibility to determine whether a claimant is disabled); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-0636, 2024 WL 22081, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2024) (declining to apply Deskin)); Kizys v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:10-CV-25, 2011 WL 5024866, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2011) (explaining that Deskin was intended to be a “narrow” decision, rather than one that established a “bright line test”)).
In her reply, Plaintiff acknowledges that the rule in Deskin was later clarified by its author in Kizys v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:10-CV-25, 2011 WL 5024866, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2011) (DN 15 PageID # 578-85). Specifically, Kizys held an ALJ should obtain additional medical opinions when: (1) there is no medical source opinion in evidence; or (2) the only opinion in evidence is an “outdated” opinion from a non-examining source and that source is considered “outdated” when the unreviewed medical evidence is a “critical body of objective evidence” (Id.) (citing Kizys, 2011 WL 5024866, at *2). Plaintiff acknowledges that Kizys also indicates that the ALJ need not obtain another medical opinion when the medical evidence shows relatively little physical impairment and that the ALJ can render a commonsense judgment about functional capacity (Id.). Plaintiff points out that here the ALJ acted outside of his discretion in making the RFC findings because it was based on the raw evidence produced at the hearing level-after the state agency medical consultants rendered their opinions-that documented objective clinical signs and findings establishing the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, ADD, and migraines (Id.).
2. Applicable Law
The RFC determination is the Administrative Law Judge's ultimate determination of what a claimant can still do despite his or her physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 404.1546(c). Administrative Law Judges make this finding based on a consideration of medical source statements, prior administrative medical findings, and all other evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c). Thus, in making the RFC determination Administrative Law Judges must necessarily evaluate the persuasiveness of the medical source statements and prior administrative medical findings in the record as well as assess the claimant's subjective allegations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 404.1529(a).
The new regulations for evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings are applicable to Plaintiff's case because she filed her application after March 27, 2017 (Tr. 17, 165-69). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The new regulations explicitly indicate “[w]e will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),” in the record, even if it comes from a treating medical source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, Administrative Law Judges will now evaluate the “persuasiveness” of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings by utilizing the five factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of the regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) and (b). The five factors are supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). Of these five factors, the two most important are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) and (b)(2). Further, the regulation requires Administrative Law Judges to explain how they considered the supportability and consistency factors in determining the persuasiveness of the medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Notably, under the regulations Administrative Law Judges “may, but are not required to, explain how” they considered the three other factors in determining the persuasiveness of the medical source's opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
At the initial and reconsideration levels State agency medical and psychological consultants review the evidence in the case record and make “administrative medical findings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(a)(1). Administrative law judges “must consider” the administrative medical findings of non-examining state agency medical or psychological consultants according to the new regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1).
The language quoted above indicates that the new regulation has done away with the controlling weight rule in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
In assessing the relationship with the client, consideration should be given to the following: length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment relationship, extent of the treatment relationship, and examining relationship. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)(i)-(v).
3. Discussion
The medical evidence of record is set forth in six exhibits (Tr. 255-75, 276-331, 332-51, 352-63, 364-509, 510-12). Exhibits 1F, 3F, and 4F are treatment records dated April 25, 2017 through October 5, 2021, received from Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Dr. Louis Mudd, (Tr. Tr. 255-75, 332-51, 352-63). Exhibit 2F is a combination of physical and psychological treatment records, dated September 8, 2016 to December 22, 2018, received from the Medical Center at Bowling Green (Tr. 276-31). Exhibit 5F is medical records from the Logan Family Practice that address the treatment Plaintiff received from June 14, 2016 through April 9, 2021, for a broad range of ailments which included sinus infections, an earache, a stomach bug, pneumonia, fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, joint swelling, low back pain, anxiety, and depression (Tr. 365-509). Exhibit 6F is a single page handwritten treatment note prepared by the treating psychiatrist Dr. Mudd on August 23, 2022 (Tr. 512).
The records are a September 8, 2016, MRI of Plaintiff's spine indicating mild multilevel degenerative disc disease with resulting mild central canal stenosis at ¶ 5-6 and C6-7 (Tr. 283); records dated October 10-14, 2016, concerning Plaintiff's admission to the adult psychiatric unit due to depression and suicidal thoughts (Tr. 285-311); and records dated December 16-21, 2018, regarding Plaintiff's admission for treatment of an upper GI bleed (Tr. 312-31).
At the initial level, the non-examining state agency psychological consultant, Clarissa Roan-Belle, Ph.D., reviewed Exhibits 1F-4F (Tr. 60-61). She opined that Plaintiff had medically determinable mental impairments (Id.). However, Dr. Roan-Belle found that the evidence of record was insufficient: to assess the degree of limitation in each of the four broad areas of mental function known as the paragraph “B” criteria; and to establish the presence of the paragraph “C” criteria (Id.). Dr. Roan-Belle then provided the following additional explanation:
Claimant noted workability adversely impacted by mental conditions. Claimant can maintain personal care needs with prompting and encouragement. Claimant can complete simple household chores/duties with reminders encouragement, claimant rarely [leaves] home, can drive, can shop, has difficulties managing finances, noted decreased engagement in social in leisurely activities. Deficits reported in the areas of memory, concentration, understanding, interacting with others. Third-party also noted claimant's mental functioning significant barrier to maintaining employment. Claimant reported completing two years of college and no special education services received. MER [“medical evidence of record”] indicate [sic] claimant has a history of bipolar disorder, ADHD, and depression. Claimant has receive [sic] treatment via psychotropic indication. Limited recent MER prior to DLI [“date last insured”] and currently insufficient evidence in file to assess claimant.(Tr. 61). Dr. Roan-Belle rendered her administrative medical findings on November 18, 2021 (Id.). Regarding Plaintiff's physical impairments, a non-examining state agency medical consultant did not review the record at the initial level and express administrative medical findings concerning Plaintiff's physical RFC (Tr. 59-62).
At the reconsideration level, the non-examining state agency psychological consultant, Tonya Gonzalez, Psy.D., reviewed Exhibits 1F-4F (Tr. 65-66). She affirmed the initial assessment by Dr. Roan-Belle (Id.). Dr. Gonzalez rendered her administrative medical findings on January 28, 2022 (Tr. 66). Regarding Plaintiff's physical impairments, a non-examining state agency medical consultant did not review the record at the reconsideration level and express administrative medical findings concerning Plaintiff's physical RFC (Tr. 64-68).
At step three, the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff met or medically equaled the criteria of listings 1.15 (disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of the nerve root), 12.04 (depression, bipolar and related disorders), and 12.05 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders) (Tr. 20-21). In the context of addressing the severity of Plaintiff's physical impairment, the ALJ found that the medical evidence of record did not document the necessary findings to meet all four components of listing 1.15 (Tr. 20). Regarding the mental impairments, the ALJ assessed the degree of limitation in each of the four areas of mental function known as the paragraph “B” criteria (Id.). The ALJ relied on treatment records from Exhibits 1F, 3F, 4F, and 5F to find that Plaintiff did not satisfy the paragraph B criteria because she had a “moderate” limitation in the four areas of mental functioning (Tr. 21). The ALJ also found that the evidence failed to establish the presence of the paragraph “C” criteria (Id.). In making these findings, the ALJ did not rely on the prior administrative medical findings of Drs. Roan-Belle and Gonzalez as they did not assign specific mental limitations due to insufficient evidence (Tr. 25).
The four areas of mental functioning in the paragraph “B” criteria are: “1. Understand, remember, or apply information (paragraph B1)”; “2. Interact with others (paragraph B2)”; “3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (paragraph B3)”; and “4. Adapt or manage oneself (paragraph B4)”. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00E1-4. These four areas of mental functioning are evaluated on the following five-point rating scale:
a. No limitation (or none). You are able to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.
b. Mild limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is slightly limited.
c. Moderate limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is fair.
d. Marked limitation. Your functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.
e. Extreme limitation. You are not able to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00F2a-e. To satisfy the paragraph “B” criteria for Listings 12.04 and 12.06 a claimant's mental disorder must result in extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, paragraph B areas of mental functioning. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00F2, Listing 12.04 Depressive, bipolar and related disorders, and Listing 12.06 Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders.
At step four, the ALJ made his physical and mental RFC findings (Tr. 22). In the discussion that follows, the ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff's testimony concerning her mental and physical impairments (Tr. 22-23). The ALJ set forth an accurate recitation and analysis of the medical evidence in Exhibits 1F through 5F (Tr. 23-25). The ALJ also explained in detail why Plaintiff's statements-concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her physical and mental symptoms-were not consistent with the medical evidence (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ provided the following explanations concerning the limitations imposed by Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments:
The ALJ did not discuss Exhibit 6F (Tr. 23-25). Perhaps the ALJ declined to consider Exhibit 6F because Plaintiff provided it the day before the scheduled telephone hearing (Tr. 511). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.935(a) (must submit written evidence no later than 5 business days before the hearing). Regardless, the ALJ's failure to consider Exhibit 6F would be harmless error because it addresses Plaintiff's psychological condition more than a year after her date last insured (Tr. 512).
The undersigned has accounted for her degenerative disc disease by limiting her to medium level work with limited climbing, limited exposure to extreme cold and vibrations and limited handling, fingering and feeling when in combination with her non-severe carpal tunnel syndrome. The undersigned does not finds [sic] additional limitations warranted, as the complaints of pain has been infrequent, treatment conservative and limited and imaging and exam findings limited (Exhibits 1F, 2F and 5F). ...
[As for her migraine headaches,] [t]he undersigned does not find additional limitations warranted. The claimant's treatment for these headaches has been conservative, there is no imaging findings and her treatment has been more limited since 2018 of record (Exhibits 1F, 3F and 5F). It is not clear if she currently takes medications for the headaches but it does appear that medication has helped in the past by her own report (Exhibit 5F). ...
In terms of the claimant's mental impairments, the undersigned has limited the claimant to no fast-paced production rate type work,
simple tasks with simple instructions and limited social interaction with only occasionally changes in the workplace setting. The claimant was hospitalized consistent with her hearing testimony in 2016, outside of the relevant period due to suicidal ideation and depression (Exhibit 2F). There has not been evidence of suicidal ideation during the relevant period. ...
The undersigned does not find additional limitations warranted. The claimant's mental health treatment has been conservative during the relevant period (Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, 4F and 5F). It appears her mental health has improved with medication and in the most recent relevant records it was described as stable (Exhibits 1F, 4F and 5F). The claimant testified that she has continued to have some issues with anxiety but her depression has improved. The undersigned has accounted for what mental health symptoms she continues to experience with the assigned limitations. Her concentration has improved with medication and she testified that she spends most of her time with various family members (Exhibit 4F).(Id.).
As mentioned above, Drs. Roan-Belle and Gonzalez reviewed Exhibits 1F, 2F, 3F, and 4F but did not assign specific mental limitations due to insufficient evidence. Exhibit 2F also included an MRI from 2016 that showed mild multi-level degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine (Tr. 283). Apparently, this MRI was not considered sufficient to warrant review by a non-examining state agency medical consultant at the initial or reconsideration level.
As is common in these cases, the administration received additional evidence after the state agency psychological consultants reviewed the record and rendered their opinions. See Kelly v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 314 Fed.Appx. 827, 831 (6th Cir. 2009). Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel submitted medical records from the Logan Family Practice that addressed the treatment Plaintiff received-from June 14, 2016 through April 9, 2021-for a broad range of ailments which included sinus infections, an earache, a stomach bug, pneumonia, fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, joint swelling, low back pain, anxiety, and depression (Tr. 365-509). The treating source at the Logan Family Practice did not express-in the treatment notes or a separate report- any opinions concerning short- or long-term mental or physical limitations imposed by Plaintiff's impairments (Id.). Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's conclusion that the medical evidence in the record showed relatively little physical and mental impairment (Tr. 23-25). The ALJ did not inappropriately play doctor but instead weighed the evidence-including Plaintiff's subjective statements-and gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt by deciding to impose slightly greater physical and mental limitations than what the treatment records alone would have warranted. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the subsequently received evidence fatally undermines the accuracy of the ALJ's RFC findings. Moreover, the ALJ's imposition of these greater limitations ultimately benefited Plaintiff and cannot constitute error.
Plaintiff's reliance on Deskin and Kizys for relief is misplaced because both cases recognize that an Administrative Law Judge retains discretion to impose work-related limitations without a medical opinion where the medical evidence shows relatively little impairment, and the Administrative Law Judge can make a commonsense determination about the claimant's RFC. See Kizys, 2011 WL 5024866, at *2 (citing Deskin, 605 F.Supp.2d at 912). As explained above, the evidence of record showed relatively little physical and mental impairment and the ALJ made a commonsense judgment about Plaintiff's RFC. In sum, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on her claim.
D. Conclusion
As the undersigned noted previously, “[a]s long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision, we must defer to it, even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion . . .” Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Regardless of how the undersigned may view the evidence, it is not this Court's place to re-try or re-evaluate the findings of the ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Rather, the undersigned is only to find if substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision and if the ALJ followed the applicable law. Id. After reviewing the record, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and correctly followed the applicable law. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief with regard to her challenge.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence and comport with applicable law. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court AFFIRM the final decision of the Commissioner, and judgment be GRANTED for the Commissioner.
V. NOTICE
Therefore, under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge files these findings and recommendations with the Court and a copy shall forthwith be electronically transmitted or mailed to all parties. Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such findings and recommendations as provided by the Court. If a party has objections, such objections must be timely filed, or further appeal is waived. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).