Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC322116. Joanne B. O’Donnell, Judge.
Law Offices of Jacob N. Segura and Jacob N. Segura for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Barak Isaacs and Barak Isaacs for Defendants and Respondents.
DOI TODD, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Kenneth Joel Niems appeals from a judgment entered against him following a bench trial on his action brought against defendants and respondents Kevin and Sydney Niems. After appellant executed a quitclaim deed in favor of his son, Kevin, he brought an action seeking cancellation of the deed and/or quiet title on the grounds of undue influence and fraud. In a detailed statement of decision, the trial court ruled that the evidence did not support appellant’s claims. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by disregarding testimony from his psychiatrist and by applying Evidence Code section 662, the latter of which he claims had the effect of improperly shifting the burden of proof and imposing on him the obligation to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence.
We affirm. The trial court had discretion to reject the testimony of appellant’s psychiatrist and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Moreover, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that no presumption of undue influence arose and that appellant failed to overcome the presumption that Kevin, as the holder of legal title, was the beneficial owner of the transferred property.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Parties and the Property.
Appellant purchased the property located at 1663 South Spaulding Avenue in Los Angeles (the property) approximately 25 to 30 years ago, after his son Kevin was born. The property consists of a corner lot with two houses. One house served as appellant’s primary residence while he raised Kevin and the other was rented out. At age 19, Kevin first moved away from the property; he later relocated to the San Diego area and married Sydney Niems.
For clarity and convenience, we refer to several parties by first name only.
In 1996, Matthew Dawe, M.D., diagnosed appellant as being bipolar. The symptoms of bipolar disorder include an episode of mania characterized by an elevated mood, high energy, racing thoughts, decreased sleep and impulsive behavior, followed by a depression that may result in a sense of emptiness, poor concentration, a feeling of helplessness and difficulty making decisions. According to appellant, his condition causes him to have severe mood swings and affects his ability to concentrate; stressful situations exacerbate the condition. As of December 2001, Dr. Dawe was seeing appellant only once or twice per year, and had prescribed several antipsychotic medications to treat appellant. Appellant is on total disability as result of his bipolar condition.
In 2001, appellant resided at the property with his girlfriend Holly Levinson. Kevin and Holly did not get along; according to appellant each thought the other wanted the property.
Appellant’s Arrest and Plea.
Shortly prior to appellant’s arrest, his relationship with Holly was “crazy-making” and he discovered she was seeing someone else. He planned on asking her to move out, and asked Kevin to assist him financially while he stayed somewhere else to give her time to leave. Kevin had “always been there” for appellant financially and, since moving away from the property, had periodically given appellant money when asked.
In December 2001, appellant was arrested on charges of domestic violence against Holly, who claimed appellant tried to run her over with a car. During appellant’s approximate six days of incarceration, he was unable to take the medications prescribed to alleviate the symptoms of his bipolar condition. Dr. Dawe opined that these circumstances could have provoked either depression or mania in appellant.
Appellant was released to Kevin’s custody and went to live with Sydney and him in Escondido; appellant had agreed that Holly could remain at the property for some period of time. On January 25, 2002, Kevin and Sydney drove appellant back to Los Angeles for a court hearing. Appellant’s attorney negotiated a plea bargain, which he reluctantly accepted due to pressure from his attorney and Kevin.
Appellant’s Transfer of the Property.
Sometime after his arrest, appellant asked Kevin if he would take the property, stating that he could not afford the mortgage payments and that he feared his ownership could negatively affect his disability payments. At first Kevin declined, but he later agreed so that appellant would have a place to live. He also confirmed with his accountant that appellant’s ownership could potentially affect his disability payments. According to appellant, Kevin asked him to transfer the property so Holly would not have any claim to it.
The day of appellant’s plea, January 25, 2002, appellant executed a quitclaim deed to the property in favor of Kevin. According to appellant, he and Kevin understood that the arrangement was in name only and that appellant could get the property back whenever he wanted, so long as he reimbursed Kevin for any expenses he incurred in connection with the property. Kevin denied the existence of such an arrangement. In his criminal trial, appellant testified that he transferred the property to Kevin because he could not afford the mortgage payments.
At the time of the transfer, appellant had encumbered the property with three different loans—the first for about $80,000 or $90,000, the second for $48,000 which he used to prevent a foreclosure and the last one for $20,000. Before the transfer, Kevin made a payment on the first loan in response to a delinquency notice. Appellant was also behind in his utility bills. The property was in poor condition and, according to appellant, was “[j]ust like any other unit that would have five pages of code violations.”
Events Following the Property Transfer.
After residing in Escondido for approximately six weeks at a hotel near Kevin, appellant returned to the property to reside. At this point, Kevin was paying the mortgage on the property. Kevin also paid off the third loan against the property after receiving a notice that the lienholder intended to foreclose. In March 2002, Kevin entered into a new lease with the existing tenant on the property and raised her rent. When she later moved out in early 2003, Kevin reimbursed her security deposit.
Also in March 2002, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of his motion, he submitted a declaration averring that his plea was “based upon extreme duress, misunderstanding, and inadequate representation.” He declared that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and was unable to think clearly due to traumatic conditions, which included his being beat up by two deputies while in custody, feeling pressure from his son and attorney to plead guilty and feeling “unfocused and unable to think cognitively” from taking several medications. The court granted his motion. In June 2002, a jury acquitted appellant following a trial on the charges.
On April 19, 2002, appellant signed a notarized declaration affirming that he executed the quitclaim deed; the declaration provided in part “[t]hat said deed is valid and in full force and effect and that I claim no ownership interest in the property described therein” and “[t]hat I hereby acknowledge, confirm, and ratify the above described deed.” According to appellant, he did not mean what he said in the declaration and signed it only because Kevin said he needed it to refinance the property.
In April 2002, Kevin refinanced the property to lower his payments and recoup some of the money he had spent paying off other loans against the property. He refinanced a second time to obtain a lower interest rate. After the transfer, in addition to paying the mortgage, Kevin insured the property, paid all property taxes and paid some utility bills. At some point in late 2002, Kevin approached a co-worker about purchasing the property, but the two could not work out a deal given that one of Kevin’s conditions was that appellant remain on the property rent-free.
During the next two years, appellant continued to reside at the property while Kevin made significant efforts to retain contractors to fix up the property. Appellant, however, repeatedly tried to stop Kevin from making any repairs. By August 2004, appellant’s and Kevin’s relationship had deteriorated and Kevin’s attorney sent appellant a letter offering to sell the property back to him for $250,000. Thereafter, Kevin obtained an exemption from the City of Los Angeles so that certain repairs would not have to be done. In response to the exemption, appellant complained to the city about the property’s condition; Kevin made certain requested repairs and caused the city to reinstate the exemption.
Pleadings.
In September 2004, appellant filed suit against Kevin and Sydney, alleging causes of action for cancellation of deed/quiet title, fraud, unjust enrichment and declaratory relief. He alleged that his signature on the deed transferring the property to Kevin was obtained “directly as the result of the fraudulent statements made by Defendant to Plaintiff, and as the result of the undue influence exerted by Defendant over Plaintiff in light of Plaintiff’s fragile medical condition.” In July 2005, appellant filed a first amended complaint alleging the same causes of action but correcting the alleged date of the transfer and adding a verification. Kevin and Sydney answered, denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses.
In August 2005, the trial court denied Kevin and Sydney’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether title to the property was acquired by fraud.
Trial and Statement of Decision.
A four-day bench trial commenced on October 21, 2005. On January 30, 2006, the trial court issued a minute order granting judgment in favor of Kevin and Sydney, ruling that the weight of the evidence failed to support appellant’s claims. Thereafter, in March 2006, the trial court filed a statement of decision detailing the bases of its ruling.
With respect to the first cause of action seeking cancellation of the deed/quiet title on the ground of undue influence, the trial court determined that the evidence did not support the application of a presumption of undue influence because: “(1) the evidence that [appellant] was ‘of weak mind’ at the time of the January 25, 2002 transfer of the property was not convincing, consisting only of Plaintiff’s self-serving testimony, which the Court finds not to be credible, (2) the evidence that [Kevin] pressured [appellant] to sign the quitclaim deed was also unconvincing, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Kevin] exercised control over [appellant] or that [appellant] was in a condition of dependency on [Kevin].” According to the trial court, the evidence established that “[appellant] transferred the property to [Kevin] because he [(appellant)] could no longer afford the payment on his multiple mortgages. In consideration of the transfer, [Kevin] agreed to and did take over the payments on the mortgages as well as the obligation to repair the property.” The trial court noted that Kevin also paid the third mortgage holder $40,000 after receiving a notice of default. The trial court added that even if a presumption of undue influence had arisen, it was rebutted by evidence showing that the transfer was voluntary.
On the basis of its evidentiary findings, the trial court applied the presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 that the “owner of legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title” and found that the presumption was not overcome by clear and convincing evidence. It further noted that even if clear and convincing evidence were not required, the result would be the same.
As to the second cause of action for fraud, the trial court found that the weight of the evidence supported Kevin’s claims that “(1) [Appellant] asked [Kevin] to take the property and assume responsibility for [appellant’s] multiple mortgages because [appellant’s] financial difficulties made it impossible for him to meet his financial obligations and that (2) there was no misrepresentation or agreement that [Kevin] would return the property.” The trial court based its conclusions on “all of the evidence,” including, but not limited to the following: Appellant’s trial testimony “was marked by inconsistency and a willingness to change his story whenever the need arose”; appellant’s evidence supporting his claim he was of weak mind was not credible; appellant voluntarily testified during his criminal trial that he transferred the property to Kevin because he “‘couldn’t afford the payments’”; appellant signed a notarized declaration reaffirming the transfer shortly after he wrote a note to his psychiatrist explaining that he was of a “‘clear mind’”; and Kevin’s behavior after the transfer was inconsistent with appellant’s claim that the transfer was only temporary.
For the reasons indicated in connection with appellant’s first and second causes of action, the trial court likewise found that the evidence did not support appellant’s third and fourth causes of action for unjust enrichment and declaratory relief.
On March 22, 2006, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Kevin and Sydney. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the judgment on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding Dr. Dawe’s testimony concerning appellant’s bipolar disorder and that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s presuming the transfer was valid. We find no merit to either challenge.
I. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Considering Dr. Dawe’s Testimony.
The statement of decision does not mention Dr. Dawe’s testimony. Appellant contends that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court unlawfully disregarded uncontroverted expert testimony that appellant’s bipolar disorder impairs his decisionmaking and erroneously concluded that the weight of the evidence did not support appellant’s contention that he was of “weak mind” at the time of the transfer.
In Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621 (Howard), the appellate court rejected the identical argument. There, after the jury entered a defense verdict in an action seeking damages for personal injuries arising from exposure to asbestos, the plaintiffs challenged the judgment on the ground that the jury should have accepted uncontroverted expert medical testimony diagnosing asbestos-related diseases. The plaintiffs argued “that, as a matter [of] law, ‘[i]t is only when there is a conflict between expert testimony and the facts of the case, that the jury may determine the relative weight of the evidence. But when the expert testimony is uncontroverted, and no conflict exists, as here, the “uncontroverted testimony upon matters of expert knowledge is conclusive.”’” (Id. at p. 632, italics omitted.)
The Howard court responded to this argument: “Appellants have seriously misstated the law. A careful examination of the cases they cite reveals that the stated principle—uncontroverted expert opinion testimony may be ‘conclusive’ on the jury—is actually the ‘single exception’ to the general rule that ‘expert testimony, like any other, may be rejected by the trier of fact, so long as the rejection is not arbitrary.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[a]s a general rule, “[p]rovided the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even though the witness is uncontradicted. [Citations.]” [Citation.] This rule is applied equally to expert witnesses.’ [Citation.]” (Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 632; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 368; Conservatorship of McKeown (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 502, 509; Ortzman v. Van Der Waal (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 167, 171.)
Like the plaintiffs in Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 621, appellant relies only on professional negligence cases, which stand for “the exceptional principle requiring a fact finder to accept uncontradicted expert testimony as conclusive . . . where the standard of care must be established by expert testimony. In such instances, ‘the plaintiff must prove by members of the defendant’s profession the standard of care or skill ordinarily used in the practice of that profession at a particular place’ [citation]; only then may this ‘standard of care, when testified to by experts who are uncontradicted, . . . be conclusively shown by such testimony.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632, fn. omitted.) Indeed, the Howard court expressly distinguished the principle case on which appellant relies, Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore (1997) 67 Cal.App.3d 278, 313, on the ground that the controverted issue there involved the standard of care, thereby requiring application of the exception to the general rule that the trier of fact has discretion to reject an expert witness’s testimony. (Howard, supra, at p. 632.)
Applying the general rule, we must determine only whether the trial court’s implicit rejection of Dr. Dawe’s testimony was a proper exercise of discretion. (Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 632; see also Goehring v. Chapman University, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [the trier of fact may reject any witness’s uncontradicted testimony, so long as the rejection is not arbitrary]; South Bay Irr. Dist. v. California-American Water Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 944, 965 [the trier of fact is the sole arbiter of the weight and interpretation of the evidence, and “is not required to accept the opinion testimony of any witness”].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding Dr. Dawe’s testimony. Either considering Dr. Dawe’s statements in isolation or when balanced against the weight of the evidence demonstrating that appellant was fully aware of his actions in transferring the property, Dr. Dawe’s testimony added nothing to appellant’s claims. Although Dr. Dawe submitted a declaration in connection with appellant’s plea withdrawal in which he stated that appellant’s decisionmaking capabilities at the time of his plea could have been affected by his bipolar disorder and lack of medications, he could not render the same opinion with regard to appellant’s state of mind at the time of the property transfer. On cross-examination, when asked if appellant knew what he was doing on the day he transferred the property, Dr. Dawe responded: “I don’t have specific enough information to comment on whether he understood what he was doing.” Responding to the same question at his deposition, Dr. Dawe went further, stating: “My sense is he understood what he was doing, yes.”
Moreover, the trial court was entitled to give greater weight to other evidence that contradicted any assertion by Dr. Dawe that appellant’s bipolar disorder impaired his decisionmaking abilities at the time of the transfer. (E.g., Mills v. Kopf (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 780, 784–785 [trial court entitled to reject psychiatrist’s testimony that the plaintiff was incompetent to transact business affairs given conflicting, nonexpert evidence that demonstrated her competency]; Ortzman v. Van Der Waal, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at pp. 170–171 [trier of fact entitled to reject expert medical testimony regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries given conflicting evidence including the plaintiff’s medical history, her own statements and the lapse of time between the accident and manifestation of her injuries].) Here, ample evidence established that appellant was fully cognizant of his actions and that his bipolar disorder had no effect on his transfer of the property. This evidence included the over one month lapse of time between any lack of medication and the property transfer; appellant’s reaffirmation of the voluntariness of transaction in a signed and notarized declaration he executed three months after the transfer; appellant’s testimony at his criminal trial that he transferred the property to Kevin because appellant could not afford the payments; and Kevin’s testimony regarding his conversations with appellant leading up to the transfer.
In view of Dr. Dawe’s own equivocal statements and other evidence showing that appellant’s actions were not affected by his bipolar disorder, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in disregarding Dr. Dawe’s testimony.
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Application of the Presumption Afforded by Evidence Code Section 662.
Evidence Code section 662 provides: “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” The trial court applied this presumption and found that evidence suggesting appellant transferred the property as a result of Kevin’s undue influence failed to rebut it. Appellant contends that, instead, the trial court should have applied a presumption of undue influence given appellant’s and Kevin’s father-son relationship. According to appellant, the effect of the trial court’s error was to impose an improper evidentiary burden on appellant—requiring him to bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
The standard of review is twofold. We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) Thus, we independently review the trial court’s determination to apply Evidence Code section 662. But we review for substantial evidence the trial court’s evidentiary findings in support of its determination that no presumption of undue influence arose or overcame the presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662. As explained in Estate of Gelonese (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 854, 863: “The question whether the evidence adduced by a party who has the burden of proof carries the required weight is for the trier of fact and not the court of review. [Citations.] ‘On appeal the question is governed by the substantial evidence rule like any other issue of fact.’ [Citations.]” (See also In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 496 [“it is axiomatic that the issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption [arising from the form of title] is a question of fact for the trial court whose determination will not be overturned on appeal if supported by sufficient evidence”].)
Initially, we conclude that the trial court properly applied Evidence Code section 662. There was no dispute that Kevin held title to the property as the result of a quitclaim deed executed by appellant. “It is well recognized that a quitclaim deed is a distinct form of conveyance and operates like any other deed inasmuch as it passes whatever title or interest the grantor has in the property. [Citations.] It is equally settled that the form of the instrument creates a presumption that the title to the property is held as shown in the instrument. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Broderick, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 496.) Because Kevin held legal title to the property, the presumption codified by Evidence Code section 662 applied. (See Murray v. Murray (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1067 [“Evidence Code section 662 has application, by its express terms, when there is no dispute as to where legal title resides but there is [a] question as to where all or part of the beneficial title should rest”].)
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether a presumption of undue influence arising from appellant’s and Kevin’s relationship should have overcome the presumption of ownership set forth in Evidence Code section 662. (See, e.g., Rieger v. Rich (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 651, 665 [in a transaction between persons standing in a confidential relationship, “‘the law will presume that he who held the influence over the other exercised it unduly to his own advantage’”].) In Toney v. Nolder (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 791 (Toney), the appellate court rejected the identical argument. There, the defendant held legal title to a condominium which had been purchased while she was involved in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff, who asserted the parties had an oral agreement to hold the property jointly. The trial court ruled that because the parties were in a confidential relationship, the plaintiff had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to prove his interest in the property. (Id. at p. 794.) The appellate court reversed, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument “that there is a common law exception to the clear and convincing evidence rule where a confidential relationship is shown to exist between the parties at the time of the execution of the deed.” (Ibid.) Rather, after analyzing the case law predating the enactment of Evidence Code section 662, the court held: “We conclude, therefore, that at common law neither the so-called majority American view nor the so-called minority American view recognized a ‘confidential relationship’ exception to the rule that an oral trust in derogation of title may be shown only by clear and convincing evidence. A fortiori there is no such exception under the unambiguous language of Evidence Code section 662 that the ‘presumption [of title] may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.’” (Toney, supra, at p. 796; accord, Tannehill v. Finch (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 224, 228 [where the plaintiff sought to establish a contractual agreement which, if proven, would rebut the presumption that the legal title holder was also the beneficial title holder, the plaintiff was required to establish her claim by clear and convincing evidence].)
Accordingly, the trial court properly applied Evidence Code section 662 notwithstanding the relationship between appellant and Kevin. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the holding in In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 is inapplicable here. There, the court concluded that application of Evidence Code section 662 is improper when it conflicts with the presumption of undue influence that emanates from Family Code section 721, subdivision (b), which addresses transactions between spouses. The court was careful to limit its holding only to spouses, noting: “The issue is how property should be divided between spouses upon dissolution. This case does not involve third parties nor does it place at risk the rights of a creditor.” (In re Marriage of Haines, supra, at pp. 294–295.) Moreover, the court premised its holding on public policy grounds specific to marriage, explaining that “[a]ny other result would abrogate the protections afforded to married persons and denigrate the public policy of the state that seeks to promote and protect the vital institution of marriage.” (Id. at p. 302.) Given these considerations, we find no basis to extend the holding in In re Marriage of Haines to other types of confidential relationships.
Contrary to the presumption of undue influence in transactions between spouses, “‘a deed of conveyance from a parent to a child is not presumed to be invalid. Indeed, without further facts, just the contrary is true, and such a deed is presumed to be valid. [Citation.]’” (Beckmann v. Beckmann (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 717, 721.)
Our inquiry therefore turns to the question of whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the evidence of undue influence was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Kevin was the legal and beneficial owner of the property. (See In re Marriage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342, 354 [the question of whether undue influence was exerted is one of fact reviewed for substantial evidence].) “On review for substantial evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference. [Citation.] We accept all evidence favorable to the prevailing party as true and discard contrary evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) Moreover, “[w]hether the test at the trial court is preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence, a substantial evidence standard of review applies on appeal” and we apply the usual rules of conflicting evidence. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581, fn. 5.)
As set forth in Civil Code section 1575, undue influence may be established in three ways: “Undue influence consists: [¶] 1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him; [¶] 2. In taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind; or, [¶] 3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another’s necessities or distress.” The trial court concluded that whether it applied a clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence standard, a presumption of undue influence did not arise. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion.
First, though appellant and Kevin as father and son had a confidential relationship, the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Kevin did not intend to obtain unfair advantage over appellant as a result of the transfer. (See O’Neill v. Dennis (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 210, 212 [presumption of undue influence arises “[w]hen a grantee in a deed occupies a relation of trust and confidence toward the grantor . . . and is active in the preparation of the deed and stands to profit unduly by the transaction”].) Rather, the evidence showed that after the transfer appellant lived on the property rent-free while Kevin assumed the mortgage payments, paid off other loans against the property, paid for utilities and property taxes and tried to make repairs to the property.
Second, the trial court concluded that Kevin did not take advantage of appellant’s “weakness of mind,” finding evidence of such weakness not credible. This type of undue influence typically arises in cases involving the elderly, sick or senile, where the evidence establishes a “total weakness of mind” or “subnormal capacities” that allows for “a lessened capacity . . . to make a free contract.” (Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 131–132; accord, Buchmayer v. Buchmayer (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 462, 471.) Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s bipolar disorder did not cause appellant to be of such “weak mind” that it affected his ability to make a reasoned decision to transfer the property to Kevin. Evidence including Kevin’s testimony that appellant asked him to take the property, Dr. Dawe’s concession that appellant “understood what he was doing” at the time of the transfer and appellant’s reaffirmation of the voluntariness of and reason for the transfer showed that Kevin did not take advantage of any weakness of mind on the part of appellant.
Finally, under the third and more general form of undue influence, a dominant party exerts excessive pressure over a servient party, resulting in the apparent will of the servient party being in fact the will of the dominant one. (Robison v. City of Manteca (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 452, 457.) Circumstances establishing this sort of “overpersuasion” include a discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time; consummation of the transaction in an unusual place; an insistent demand that the business be finished at once; an extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay; the use of multiple persuaders by the dominant side against a single servient party; the absence of third party advisors to the servient party; and statements that there is insufficient time to consult financial advisors or attorneys. (Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at p. 133; see also Robison v. City of Manteca, supra, at pp. 457–458 [simultaneous presence of multiple factors shows undue influence].)
Here, few if any of these factors were present. Though the transfer occurred on the same day as appellant’s plea—which could be considered an unusual time—the evidence showed that was the day the parties were in Los Angeles and thus able to record the deed. Kevin testified that before the day of the transfer, appellant had repeatedly asked him to take the property and explained the reasons for his request; evidence of Kevin’s discussion with his accountant corroborated this sequence of events. Kevin testified that it was appellant’s idea to effect the transfer via a quitclaim deed to avoid escrow. There was no evidence that Kevin rushed the transaction or encouraged appellant to forego outside advice. Finally, appellant’s subsequent declaration and testimony under oath at his criminal trial confirmed that he made the transfer voluntarily for personal financial reasons. In sum, Kevin’s conduct did not demonstrate that he took grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of appellant’s necessities or distress. (See Civ. Code, § 1575, subd. (3).) Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding of no undue influence sufficient to rebut the presumption afforded by Evidence Code section 662.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.