Opinion
No. 19-907-cv
05-05-2020
GERARD NGUEDI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Gerard Nguedi, pro se, Woodbridge, VA. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Michael M. Brennan, Michele Kalstein, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of May, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Gerard Nguedi, pro se, Woodbridge, VA. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Michael M. Brennan, Michele Kalstein, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gregory H. Woods, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Gerard Nguedi, pro se, sued the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the "Fed") for discriminating against him based on his race by terminating him from his job in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), and by subjecting him to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and the NYCHRL. Nguedi was terminated after he brought an illegal weapon - a taser - into the Fed. The district court (Woods, J.) dismissed Nguedi's Title VII hostile work environment claim and all claims based on conduct by persons other than his supervisor. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment on Nguedi's remaining claims: discriminatory termination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, and hostile work environment under the NYCHRL. Nguedi appeals, contending that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Fed. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
"We review [the] district court's grant of summary judgment de novo," Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep't, 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lombard v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2002)), "resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party," id. at 127. "Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment with mere speculation and conclusory assertions. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that a nonmoving party "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation" to survive summary judgment (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Upon review of the record below, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment because there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Fed discriminated against Nguedi in violation of Title VII, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL, or subjected him to a hostile work environment under the NYCHRL. We affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its March 7, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Several points, however, warrant brief discussion.
First, the district court cited nonbinding caselaw for several propositions under the NYCHRL: (1) that "[a] plaintiff may bring claims under the NYCHRL for both discrimination and hostile work environment," Suppl. App'x at 412; (2) that a court considers the totality of the circumstances, and even a single incident may be actionable in the proper context; and (3) that a defendant may come forward with "legitimate, non-discriminatory motives" to defeat a NYCHRL discriminatory termination claim, id. at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We considered all of these propositions in Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America, Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108-12 (2d Cir. 2013). In that case, we reviewed both discriminatory treatment and hostile work environment claims under the NYCHRL, explaining how the changes to the NYCHRL in 2005 required district courts to both analyze such claims separately from federal and state law claims, and to construe its provisions broadly in favor of a plaintiff - i.e., to analyze whether a plaintiff is treated "less well" because of a discriminatory intent. See id. at 110 (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 39 (1st Dep't 2009)). We also opined that the "totality of the circumstances" should be considered in evaluating the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's affirmative defense, and that a single incident could be actionable. Id. at 111 (quoting Hernandez v. Kaisman, 957 N.Y.S.2d 53, 59 (1st Dep't 2012)). Finally, we explained that while it was unclear whether the burden shifting framework that we applied in federal and state discrimination claims had been modified for NYCHRL claims, "[t]he employer [could] present evidence of its legitimate, non-discriminatory motives to show the conduct was not caused by discrimination, but it is entitled to summary judgment on this basis only if the record establishes as a matter of law that 'discrimination play[ed] no role' in its actions." Id. at 110 n.8 (quoting Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 38). More recently, in Ya-Chen Chen v. City University of New York, 805 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2015), we held that, after a plaintiff established a prima facie case under the NYCHRL, the defendant could "offer legitimate reasons for its actions." "If the defendant satisfie[d] that burden, summary judgment [was] appropriate if no reasonable jury could conclude either that the defendant's 'reasons were pretextual' or that the defendant's stated reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least 'in part on discrimination.'" Id. at 76 (quoting Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 35, 41 (1st Dep't 2012)).
Second, Nguedi raises three procedural arguments on appeal. Each claim fails. He first contends that he presented numerous witnesses that the district court ignored. However, Nguedi received notice, pursuant to Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center, 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999), that his claims could be dismissed without a trial if he did not respond to the Fed's summary judgment motion by filing sworn affidavits and/or other documents, such as witness statements, to counter the facts asserted by the Fed. Nguedi never offered any such evidence from his purported witnesses, and his speculation about what those witnesses might have said was insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 428.
Nguedi next maintains that the district court ignored his pro se status and deprived him of a trial. However, the district court explicitly recognized his pro se status and acknowledged its obligation to liberally construe his pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Suppl. App'x at 407 (quoting Corcoran v. N.Y. Power Auth., 202 F.3d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, as noted above, Nguedi's pro se status did not eliminate his obligation to support his claims with some evidence to survive summary judgment. His reliance on "conclusory allegations" and "unsubstantiated speculation" could not suffice. See Fujitsu, 247 F.3d at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nguedi finally asserts that the district court failed to consider "the fact that [the Fed] was caught lying to the court and misrepresenting facts and arguments so many times they had to change lawyers at least 4 times." Nguedi's Br. at 8. Again, Nguedi does not provide any factual support for this bald assertion.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Fed.
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We have considered Nguedi's remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court