Opinion
No. 60968-8-I.
February 2, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-25657-1, Bruce Heller, J., entered November 9, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The trial court granted Hackey Choi and Jane Watkins' (Choi/Watkins) motion to enforce a settlement agreement with their neighbor, Anna Nerbovig. Nerbovig appeals, arguing that she withdrew her settlement offer before Watkins signed the blank line above her name on the signature page. Because RCW 2.44.010(1) authorizes a client's attorney to sign settlement agreements, Watkins' lawyer created an enforceable agreement by signing as "[a]ttorney for Choi/Watkins" before Nerbovig withdrew her offer. We affirm.
FACTS
Nerbovig sued Choi/Watkins, married owners of an adjoining property, after an easement dispute. The parties entered into mediation on October 8, 2007, and left eight hours later with a settlement agreement signed by Choi, the attorney for Choi/Watkins, Nerbovig, and Nerbovig's attorney. Watkins did not attend the mediation and did not sign the signature line above her name on the agreement that day. On October 13, 2007, Nerbovig sent a letter to Choi/Watkins' lawyer informing him that she was withdrawing her offer to settle. Choi/Watkins moved to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court granted their motion to enforce the settlement agreement and awarded them $4,000 in postmediation attorney fees and costs. Nerbovig appeals. Choi/Watkins did not file a respondent's brief.
Watkins later signed the agreement.
DISCUSSION
Nerbovig argues that the settlement agreement is unenforceable because she withdrew her offer before Watkins signed the agreement. Choi/Watkins' position before the trial court was that the settlement agreement became enforceable when their attorney signed it because RCW 2.44.010(1) authorizes a client's attorney to sign settlement agreements. We review the application of law to particular facts de novo.
Tapper v. State Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wn.2d 397, 403, 858 P.2d 494 (1993).
CR 2A and RCW 2.44.010 govern trial court enforcement of settlement agreements. CR 2A "`precludes enforcement of a disputed settlement agreement not made in writing or put on the record.'" While Nerbovig disputes the validity of the agreement, CR 2A does not preclude enforcement here because the disputed settlement agreement was reduced to writing.
In re Patterson, 93 Wn. App. 579, 582-83, 969 P.2d 1106 (1999) ("`[CR 2A] does not affect an agreement made in writing, or put on the record.'") (quoting In re Marriage of Ferree, 71 Wn. App. 35, 39-40, 856 P.2d 706 (1993)). CR 2A provides that
[n]o agreement or consent between parties or attorneys in respect to the proceedings in a cause, the purport of which is disputed, will be regarded by the court unless the same shall have been made and assented to in open court on the record, or entered in the minutes, or unless the evidence thereof shall be in writing and subscribed by the attorneys denying the same.
Contrary to appellant's view of CR 2A, the rule does not bar an attorney from signing a settlement agreement on behalf of a client. Instead, the rule bars enforcement of settlement agreements between lawyers or clients when the agreement's material terms or existence is disputed and the lawyers or clients either did not reduce the agreement into writing or did not put it on the record.
A settlement agreement signed by the parties' attorneys is binding under RCW 2.44.010(1). RCW 2.44.010(1) authorizes an attorney
Morris v. Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865, 868, 850 P.2d 1357, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1020 (1993). Morris used the abuse of discretion standard to uphold the trial court's enforcement of the settlement agreement. Because this case, unlike Morris, involves only the application of law to facts, we review de novo. See Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 99 Wn. App. 692, 696, 994 P.2d 911 (2000) (discussing standard of review for orders enforcing settlement agreements). Although Morris affirmed the trial court's enforcement under a more lenient standard than we use, Morris's holding about the effect of an attorney's signature applies to this case.
[t]o bind his client in any of the proceedings in an action or special proceeding by his agreement duly made, or entered upon the minutes of the court; but the court shall disregard all agreements and stipulations in relation to the conduct of, or any of the proceedings in, an action or special proceeding unless such agreement or stipulation be made in open court, or in presence of the clerk, and entered in the minutes by him, or signed by the party against whom the same is alleged, or his attorney[.]
In Morris v. Maks, the parties' attorneys created a binding settlement agreement by exchanging letters confirming the terms of their parties' agreement when only the parties' attorneys, and not the parties, signed the letters. Here, Watkins' attorney signed the agreement as "[a]ttorney for Choi/Watkins."
Nonetheless, Nerbovig claims that the parties did not reach an agreement because Watkins did not objectively manifest her intent to be bound by signing her name on the blank signature line. Because settlement agreements are contracts, contract law principles apply to determine whether the parties formed an enforceable settlement agreement. Parties form a contract when they objectively manifest their mutual assent. Here, Watkins' lawyer signed the agreement before Nerbovig withdrew her offer, creating a binding agreement between Watkins and Nerbovig. Accordingly, we affirm.
See Stottlemyre v. Reed, 35 Wn. App. 169, 171, 665 P.2d 1383, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1015 (1983).
Keystone Land Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 152 Wn.2d 171, 177, 94 P.3d 945 (2004).