Opinion
2015-09-17
In the Matter of Lynard K. NEAL, Appellant, v. Tina M. STANFORD, as Chair of the Board of Parole, Respondent.
Lynard K. Neal, Sonyea, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frederick A. Brodie of counsel), for respondent.
Lynard K. Neal, Sonyea, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frederick A. Brodie of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY, EGAN JR. and LYNCH, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.), entered November 24, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying his request for parole release.
In 2012, petitioner was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 2 to 6 years in prison. In November 2013, he made his initial appearance before the Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. The Board denied his request and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal and, when it was not decided within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.
We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i ( see Matter of Delrosario v. Evans, 121 A.D.3d 1152, 1152–1153, 993 N.Y.S.2d 591 [2014]; Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 1215, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 [2014] ). Contrary to petitioner's claim, the record here discloses that the Board took into account the relevant statutory factors, including not only the crime of conviction, but also petitioner's criminal history, prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plans, as well as the sentencing minutes and the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument ( see Matter of Diaz v. New York State Dept. of Corrections & Community Supervision, 127 A.D.3d 1493, 1494, 7 N.Y.S.3d 690 [2015]; Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 [2014] ). The Board further considered petitioner's certificate of earned eligibility and receipt of merit time ( see Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 [2012]; Matter of Wright v. Alexander, 71 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 896 N.Y.S.2d 507 [2010] ). Notably, it was not incumbent upon the Board to give each statutory factor equal weight in making its decision ( see Matter of Lackwood v. New York State Div. of Parole, 127 A.D.3d 1495, 1495, 8 N.Y.S.3d 461 [2015]; Matter of Sanchez v. Division of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1305, 1306, 933 N.Y.S.2d 139 [2011] ). Accordingly, inasmuch as the Board's decision does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality borderingon impropriety’ ” ( Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] ), we decline to disturb it.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.