Opinion
2011-11-17
In the Matter of Jorge A. SANCHEZ, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF PAROLE, Respondent.
Jorge A. Sanchez, Otisville, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), for respondent.
Jorge A. Sanchez, Otisville, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), for respondent.
Before: MERCURE, J.P., ROSE, LAHTINEN, STEIN and McCARTHY, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered March 3, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.
In 2008, petitioner was convicted of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree as well as driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 2 to 6 years in prison. In January 2010, he made his initial appearance before the Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. At the conclusion of the hearing, his request was denied and he was ordered held an additional 24 months. Petitioner took an administrative appeal and, when it was not decided within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Following service of respondent's answer, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.
Initially, it is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law § 259–i ( see Matter of Dalton v. Evans, 84 A.D.3d 1664, 1664, 923 N.Y.S.2d 917 [2011]; Matter of Smith v. New York State Div. of Parole, 81 A.D.3d 1026, 1026, 916 N.Y.S.2d 285 [2011] ). Upon reviewing the record, we find no merit to petitioner's claim that the Board failed to consider the proper statutory factors. In addition to the serious nature of petitioner's crimes, the Board also took into account the fact that these were his only criminal convictions, he had no prison disciplinary infractions, completed a number of programs and received a certificate of earned eligibility, and his postrelease plans included deportation to Mexico, his country of origin ( see Matter of Cruz v. New York State Div. of Parole, 39 A.D.3d 1060, 1062, 833 N.Y.S.2d 311 [2007] ). The Board was not required to accord equal weight to each of the statutory factors in making its decision ( see Matter of Blasich v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 48 A.D.3d 1029, 1029–1030, 852 N.Y.S.2d 469 [2008]; Matter of Mojica v. Travis, 34 A.D.3d 1155, 1156, 824 N.Y.S.2d 497 [2006] ). Moreover, we find no error in the Board's reference to petitioner's status as an illegal alien as he admitted that he gained entry to the United States from Mexico illegally. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the Board did not indicate that he had a prior criminal conviction as a result. We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be unavailing. In sum, the Board's decision does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” ( Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] ), and we find no reason to disturb it.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.