Opinion
Cause No. NA01-0003-C-B/S
March 21, 2002
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Introduction.
This is a retaliatory discharge and breach of contract case. Richard Mullins worked for Lobdell Emery, Inc. for seven years. He sustained an injury on the job, sought and received Workers Compensation for more than a year, and was declared to have a 10-12% permanent partial impairment of the whole person. Four days after receiving a lump-sum payment in final settlement of his Workers Compensation claim, his employer terminated his employment, saying that he could not perform the job he had been performing before his injury and that it had no permanent position which he could assume.
Mr. Mullins brought suit alleging that he was fired in retaliation for having filed a Workers Compensation claim and that, in firing him, Lobdell Emery breached the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the UAW.
The case is before us on defendant's motion for summary judgment as to both claims. For the reasons that follow, we GRANT defendant's motion.
II. Statement of Facts
Beginning in 1992, Mr. Mullins worked for Lobdell Emery as a production employee operating a press which stamped auto parts. He was a member of the International Union of Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"), which was signatory to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the company. Pl. Facts ¶¶ 1-3; Def. Facts ¶¶ 2-6.
On May 4, 1998. Mr. Mullins injured his back while at work. Shortly thereafter his physician, George Estill, asked that he be assigned to "light duty." On May 4, 1998, Mr. Mullins began receiving Workers Compensation payments. In June 1998, Dr. Estill ordered "no work" at all. Pl. Facts ¶¶ 4-6; Def. Facts ¶¶ 9-11; Def. Ex. 3. From June 1998 to August 1999, Mr. Mullins was unable to work. During that period, he saw various doctors and, after each visit, submitted restrictions on any return to work. In August 1999, one of his providers, Dr. Guarnascheli, determinated that Mr. Mullins had attained maximum improvement and assigned him a permanent partial impairment ("PPI") rating of 10%-12%. Pl. Facts ¶ 9; Def. Facts ¶¶ 12, 17, 20.
In September 1999, Mr. Mullins settled the remainder of his Workers Compensation Claim for $8,500 and received the final lump-sum payment on November 15, 1999. By November 15, Mr. Mullins had not been released by any physician to return to work. On November 15, Mr. Mullins' employment was terminated. The reason he was given was that he had not been released to work his former job and that there was no job available that was consistent with his permanent job restrictions. Pl. Facts ¶¶ 10, 11; Def. Facts ¶¶ 23, 24, 26, 27.
III. Discussion. A. The Standard on Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998).
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests on the moving party to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the opposing party to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the party opposing the motion does not present evidence that would permit the finder of fact to find in his favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against him. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 290. Therefore, in considering the present motion, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Mullins. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1997). If genuine doubts remain, and a reasonable fact-finder could find for Mr. Mullins, then summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that the plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
Our Local Rule 56.1 establishes a regime that implements summary judgment. Among its requirements is that the plaintiff specifically rebut the defendant's statement of facts by contesting the statement and pointing to evidence in the record to support its challenge. Plaintiff has not done that here, although he has offered factual averments of his own. Accordingly, we accept as true the statements of both parties that are uncontested and all of defendant's statements that are uncontroverted and supported by admissible evidence.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Before we proceed to the merits, we take note of an issue that neither party has addressed: whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, and if so, how. Even absent an objection by a party, we are "obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), quoted in Tylka v. Gerber Productions Company, 211 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2000).
At the risk of stirring waters that are now merely muddy, we begin with a few points of certainty. Mr. Mullins has alleged two causes of action. First, he alleges that he was discharged in retaliation for having filed a Workers Compensation claim. Second, he alleges that in discharging him Lobdell Emery breached a contract. As filed, both of these claims arise under Indiana common law and not federal law. Nor has the plaintiff alleged facts in support of diversity jurisdiction. It follows that, on the face of the complaint, there does not appear to be federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Mullins states that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Lobdell Emery is an "employer" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b). But that provision defines "employer" for purposes of Title VII, which protects employees from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, color, and religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Those factors have no apparent relationship to Workers Compensation claims. Title VII contains an anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), but it prohibits retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by Title VII, which protects employees on the basis of the five enumerated criteria, but not for filing Workers Compensation claims.
Next, Mr. Mullins tells us that he filed an EEOC charge and received a Right to Sue Notice; he alleges that either or both are attached to his complaint. But they weren't attached and they don't appear in any of the materials submitted by either party. Accordingly, we cannot discern whether he may have filed a charge alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., which bears some underlying connection to Workers Compensation and might have given rise to federal question jurisdiction. Mr. Mullins mentions the ADA in his complaint, where he states that his employment was terminated because his employer was "unable to offer [him] a job assignment that would accommodate his permanent impairment rating within A.D.A. requirements." But the mere mention of a federal statute as the standard against which an employer took some action is not enough to invoke federal jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, the employer has helped not at all. Lobdell Emery shows by its answers to the pertinent complaint allegations that the allegations of jurisdiction are deficient, but it does nothing to clarify the picture. It simply denies that there is federal question jurisdiction, although it claims that there is diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This is incorrect also, since the complaint makes insufficient allegations of diverse citizenship and no allegations that at least $75,000 is in controversy. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 977-978 (7th Cir. 1999), the litigants should flag deficiencies in jurisdictional pleadings so that they may be corrected. Instead, the parties here "ignored the jurisdictional problems rather than helping to avoid or cure them."
We do, however, have jurisdiction. The complaint alleges that Lobdell Emery breached not merely "a contract," but, specifically, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Lobdell Emery and the UAW; indeed, it alleges that the employer breached a particular provision of the CBA: Article III, § 20. Amended Complaint, ¶ 12. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempts state law breach of contract actions which allege that an employer breached the CBA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994); In re. Bentz Metal Products, Inc., 253 F.3d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 2001). Since the complaint here expressly alleges breach of the CBA, we have federal question jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. See, Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 1995). Additionally, we may (and do) exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Mullins' "Frampton" action for retaliatory discharge. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
C. Plaintiff's LMRA Claim.
Mr. Mullins alleges that Lobdell Emery breached the collective bargaining agreement by firing him. His complaint alleges that:
Article III, section 20 of the Agreement between Defendant and Local 2289 of which Mullins is a member provides that "[a]ny employee who has been incapacitated at his regular work by injury or compensable disease while employed by the Company will be assigned to a job that is operating in the plant which he can do, without regard to any seniority provisions of this Agreement, except that such employee may not displace an employee with longer seniority.
We have determined that section 301 of the LMRA preempts this breach of contract action. Preemption of a contract action occurs when a federal court must interpret the CBA in order to resolve the dispute. Bentz Metal Products, 253 F.3d at 286; Rice, 65 F.3d at 643; Harrison v. Superior Carpet Installers, 2002 WL 243657 (S.D.Ind., 2002), *3. Here, the cause of action does not merely "arise" from the CBA, nor "implicate" the CBA; it is expressly that the employer violated a specific provision of the CBA. We cannot imagine a resolution of Mr. Mullins's claim without discussing a variety of issues — the definitions of "incapacity," "regular work," and "compensable disease" among others — that require an interpretation of the CBA.
Mr. Mullins argues that his contract claim should not be preempted because his union did not represent his interests adequately. Instead of exonerating him from the effects of preemption, however, this allegation heightens his burden. Leaving aside the fact that an action involving the union will almost inevitably require exhaustion of administrative remedies, in order to make such a claim requires allegations of what is generally referred to as a "hybrid 301" action: that the union breached its duty of fair representation and the employer breached the CBA. That, too, is an exclusively federal cause of action. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967); Mechmet v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 825 F.2d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987).
One implication of LMRA preemption is that the LMRA supplies the statute of limitations as well as the substantive law. The statute of limitations for breach of the CBA (as well as for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation) is six months. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Chapple v. National Starch Chem. Co. Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1999). The six-month limitations period began, at the latest, on November 19, 1999 when Mr. Mullins was terminated. To meet the six-month statute of limitations, Mr. Mullins had to file his complaint on or before May 19, 2000. He did not file it until January 10, 2001. Accordingly, his LMRA action is time barred.
D. Plaintiff's Retaliatory Discharge Claim
Mr. Mullins's common law retaliatory discharge action is commonly called a "Frampton" claim. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). In the case from which the action derives its name, the Indiana Supreme Court held that an employer may not discharge an employee in retaliation for filing a Workers Compensation claim. See Markley Enterprises, Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). The parties agree that Mr. Mullins bears the burden of showing that there is a causal connection between his filing the Workers Compensation claim and being discharged. Meanwhile, the employer must have some "independent lawful reason" to justify the discharge. Watkins v. Sommer Metalcraft Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (S.D.Ind. 1994); Dale v. J.G. Bowers, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999).
A Frampton action is subject to a two year statute of limitations. Ahnert v. Delco Electronics Corp., 982 F. Supp. 1320, 1327-1328 (S.D.Ind. 1997).
Like the proof scheme in other retaliation cases, the prima facie case for a Frampton claim consists of three elements. Mr. Mullins easily shows the first two: he filed a Workers Compensation Claim and he was terminated. The third element is that there is a causal connection between filing the claim and being fired. This case (like most unsuccessful retaliation cases) founders on the shoals of causation. Mr. Mullins has presented legally insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference that Lobdell Emery fired him because he filed the Workers Compensation claim. In other words, his evidence is insufficient for a jury to conclude that there is any causal connection between his having filed the claim and being terminated.
Mr. Mullins asks us to infer the requisite causation from the close proximity in time between receiving his Workers Compensation payment and his discharge. He tells us that he was fired on November 19, 1999, a mere four days after receiving his lump-sum payment in settlement of his Workers Compensation claim. It is true that evidence of a "telling temporal sequence" or a short time interval between taking protected action and being fired may be enough to raise an inference of retaliation. Horwitz v. Board of Educ. of Avoca School Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 612-613 (7th Cir. 2001); Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). But focusing on the four day interval here is misleading because it ignores the fact that the payment was merely the final payment and that Mr. Mullins had been receiving Workers Compensation payments for more than a year: from May 4, 1998 to August, 1999. The potentially strong inference of causation from four-days proximity is greatly attenuated over thirteen months.
Next Mr. Mullins argues that he had filed other Workers Compensation Claims and that Lobdell Emery handles hundreds of such claims. We fail to see how these facts support a claim of retaliatory discharge. The fact that the employer did not fire Mr. Mullins for having filed previous claims would seem to be counter-productive to his case. Additionally, since Mr. Mullins presents no comparative evidence — evidence of similarly-situated employees who filed claims and suffered a similar fate, or similarly-situated employees who did not file claims and were not fired — tends to support the more reasonable inference that Lobdell Emery views Workers Compensation claims as a cost of doing business and not as an occasion for termination.
In sum, Mr. Mullins has presented legally insufficient evidence to raise an inference of any causal connection between his filing for Workers Compensation and his having been fired.
Even if Mr. Mullins's evidence were sufficient to raise a prima facie inference of retaliation, he offers no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Lobdell Emery's explanation of why it terminated him was pretextual. In other words, even given an initial inference of causation, Mr. Mullins must still show that the employer's explanation for taking the adverse employment action was pretextual so that a jury could reasonably infer a causal connection between the employee's engaging in protected conduct and the adverse action. Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1999). Lobdell Emery says that it terminated Mr. Mullins because he had not, by November 15, 1999, been cleared to return to work at his old position and that it had no permanent bargaining unit work for him that was consistent with his permanent restrictions.
Mr. Mullins seeks to defeat that explanation by arguing that the company had temporary light duty work that he could perform and that the company had insufficient evidence that his restrictions were permanent. The first argument does not, as the law requires, address the company's proffered explanation. Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo School Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, (7th Cir. 1998); Helland v. South Bend Community School Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1092, 117 S.Ct. 769, 136 L.Ed.2d 715 (1997). The second argument (even if true) would shift the burden of persuasion to Lobdell Emery to prove the opposite of a fact — that Mr. Mullins's restrictions were not permanent — that Mr. Mullins must show in order to prevail.
Lobdell Emery could reasonably conclude that Mr. Mullins's restrictions were permanent because he received a Permanent Partial Impairment rating.
In sum, there is no evidentiary basis from which a jury could reasonably infer that Lobdell emery fired Mr. Mullins because Mr. Mullins filed for or received Workers Compensation benefits.
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons addressed, we find that Mr. Mullins's breach of contract action is preempted by the LMRA and barred by the six-month statute of limitations, and that he has presented legally insufficient evidence to support his Frampton claim. Accordingly, we GRANT defendant's motion for summary judgment as to both claims.